Rosa v. Figueroa Gomez,et al

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: June 9, 1993
• Docket: 92-1715
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1715

                           AGAPITA ROSA VELAZQUEZ, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                           EDNA J. FIGUEROA-GOMEZ, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-2155

                           AGAPITA ROSA VELAZQUEZ, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                              EDNA J. FIGUEROA, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-2223

                           AGAPITA ROSA VELAZQUEZ, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                           EDNA J. FIGUEROA-GOMEZ, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Roberto Schmidt-Monge, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                              _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Breyer, Chief Judge,
                                         ___________

                          Torruella and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
                                             ______________

                                _____________________

               Eliezer  Aldarondo-Ortiz,   with  whom   Miguel  Pag n   and
               ________________________                 _____________
          Aldarondo, L pez Bras, Pag n & Ortiz Ballester, were on brief for
          ______________________________________________
          appellants.
               Zuleika Llovet, with whom Juan B.  Soto-Balbas and Mercado &
               ______________            ____________________     _________
          Soto, were on brief for appellees.
          ____

____________________

                                     June 9, 1993
                                 ____________________

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TORRUELLA,  Circuit Judge.   In this appeal,  we review
                                _____________

          the  district  court's denial  of  a  Motion  to Alter  or  Amend

          Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).  This

          is  a  run  of  the mill  political  discrimination  case brought

          against appellants,  Municipality  of Luquillo,  Puerto Rico  and

          several officials of the Municipality, under 42 U.S.C.   1983 for

          violation of appellees'  First Amendment rights under  the United

          States   Constitution.    The  jury  found  that  the  appellants

          discriminated against appellees, thirty-eight former employees of

          the  Municipality, and awarded  damages in favor  of twenty-seven

          appellees.  Appellants request that we vacate the judgment of the

          district  court entirely because the evidence was insufficient to

          support the  jury's verdict that  appellants terminated appellees

          because   of  their   political   affiliation.     Alternatively,

          appellants pray that we reduce the damage awards because they are

          allegedly  excessive.   Plaintiff-appellees,  in a  cross-appeal,

          request that they be reinstated in their employment.

                                          I
                                          I
                                          _

                    Normally, to challenge the sufficiency of  the evidence

          on appeal, a  party must move for a directed verdict at the close

          of  all the  evidence  and follow  it by  a  motion for  judgment

          notwithstanding the  verdict.  See Fed. R. Civ.  P. 50 (a) & (b);
                                         ___

          Wells Real Estate, Inc. v.  Greater Lowell Board of Realtors, 850
          _______________________     ________________________________

          F.2d  803, 810  (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  488 U.S.  955 (1988).
                                       ____________

          Motions for  directed verdict  and judgment n.o.v.  must be  made

          with sufficient particularity to alert  the trial judge as to why

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the evidence is  insufficient.  The moving party  may appeal only

          from  the grounds  stated in  the  motion.   Id.; Pstragowski  v.
                                                       ___  ___________

          Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1977).  Since
          __________________________

          appellants  failed to move  for a  directed verdict  and judgment

          n.o.v., we may  not consider this ground  of appeal.  Wells  Real
                                                                ___________

          Estate, 850 F.2d at  810; La Forest  v. Autoridad de las  Fuentes
          ______                    _________     _________________________

          Fluviales, 536 F.2d 443, 445 (1st Cir. 1976).  
          _________

                    However,  waiver of  the right  to  request a  judgment

          n.o.v. does not prevent a party from moving for a new trial under

          Fed. R. Civ.  P. 59(a), alleging that the verdict  is against the

          weight of  the evidence.   Wells Real  Estate, 850  F.2d at  810.
                                     __________________

          "[A] motion for  a new trial must  be made in the  first instance

          before the  trial  court, particularly  where the  weight of  the

          evidence is at issue."  Id., 850 F.2d at 811 (citing 6A James WM.
                                  ___

          Moore, Moore's Federal  Practice    59.15[3], at  326-27 (2d  ed.
                 _________________________

          1987)).  Failure to move for a new trial also waives the issue on

          appeal.  Id. 
                   ___

                    In this  case, appellants once again failed  to make an

          appropriate motion  for a  new trial  before the  district court.

          Instead, they moved under Fed. R.  Civ. P. 59(e) to set aside  or

          amend  the verdict.1   The  purpose of  the motion,  however, was
                              
          ____________________

          1  Courts have interpreted Rule 59(e) to allow a motion to vacate
          a judgment entirely, rather than  just alter it.  See  11 Charles
                                                            ___
          A. Wright  & Arthur R.  Miller, Federal Practice and  Procedure  
                                          _______________________________
          817 at 111  n.31, Supp. at 39 n.31 (1973 &  Supp. 1992) and cases
          cited therein.  These courts, however, considered whether  a Rule
          59(e)  motion  was   functionally  equivalent  to  a   motion  to
          reconsider under Rule 60, pursuant  to which a district court may
          vacate a judgment for certain  specified errors.  See, e.g., A.D.
                                                            ___  ____  ____
          Weiss Lithograph Co. v. Illinois Adhesive Products  Co., 705 F.2d
          ____________________    _______________________________

                                         -4-

indisputably to  challenge the verdict  as against the  weight of

          the evidence.  While we  do not condone lax, self-styled motions,

          or disregard of the Rules, our examination of the character  of a

          motion is functional:  "nomenclature  should not be exalted  over

          substance."  Echevarr a-Gonz lez v. Gonz lez-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24,
                       ___________________    _______________

          26 (1st Cir.  1988) (quoting Lyell Theatre Corp.  v. Loews Corp.,
                                       ___________________     ___________

          682 F.2d 37, 41  (2d Cir. 1982)).   We therefore cannot  conclude

          that appellants  failed to  raise the  issue before  the district

          court.

                    The  district   court  apparently  did  not   pay  much

          attention to  the rule under  which the motion was  filed, or the

          caption  that  titled  appellants' plea.    The  magistrate judge

          addressed   the   sufficiency   argument  directly   and   denied

          appellants'  motion because he believed that "[t]he jury received

          abundant  testimonial and  documentary  evidence  with  which  to

          support  their conclusion  of political  discrimination."   Rosa-
                                                                      _____

          Vel zquez v. Figueroa-G mez,  No. 90-1192, slip op. at  1 (D.P.R.
          _________    ______________

          Apr. 15, 1992).   In  addition, appellees did  not object to  the

          styling of  the motion and  seemed to assume that  sufficiency of

          the  evidence could  be assailed  in a  motion under  Rule 59(e).

          Thus,  while  the district  court  ought  to  have  reformed  the

          challenge  as  one  pursuant  to  Rule  59(a)   earlier  in  this

          proceeding, we will treat the motion as one for a new trial.
                              
          ____________________

          249, 250 (7th Cir. 1983); Huff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675
                                    ____    __________________________
          F.2d  119,  122 (6th  Cir.  1982).   We  have found  no authority
          supporting the proposition that a  motion under Rule 59(e) may be
          used  to reevaluate  the weight  of the  evidence after  a jury's
          verdict.

                                         -5-

The decision  to grant a  new trial is  squarely within

          the trial court's discretion.  Allied Chemical Corp.  v. Daiflon,
                                         _____________________     ________

          Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).   "Only an abuse of discretion will
          ____

          trigger reversal  of a denial of a motion  for new trial."  Wells
                                                                      _____

          Real Estate, 850 F.2d  at 811; see also Conway v.  Electro Switch
          ___________                    ________ ______     ______________

          Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 598 (1st Cir.  1987).  Such deference to the
          _____

          trial court  is particularly  appropriate in cases  in which  the

          jury's  verdict  is  challenged  as against  the  weight  of  the

          evidence because  "a jury's verdict  on the facts should  only be

          overturned in  the most  compelling circumstances."   Wells  Real
                                                                ___________

          Estate, 850 F.2d  at 811; Keeler v.  Hewitt, 697 F.2d 8,  11 (1st
          ______                    ______     ______

          Cir. 1982).

                    Moreover, the trial court's discretion is quite limited

          concerning motions  for new trials.  A  trial judge may not upset

          the jury's  verdict merely because  he or she might  have decided

          the case differently.  On the contrary, a trial judge may grant a

          new trial only  if she "believes that the  outcome is against the

          clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will

          result in a miscarriage of justice."  Conway, 825 F.2d at 598-99;
                                                ______

          see  also Coffran v. Hitchcock  Clinic, Inc., 683  F.2d 5, 6 (1st
          _________ _______    _______________________

          Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).   We assume, and we do
                 ____________

          not review  for, sufficiency of  the evidence.  Valm  v. Hercules
                                                          ____     ________

          Fish Products, Inc., 701 F.2d 235 (1st Cir. 1983).
          ___________________

                    We  thus review the  evidence to determine  whether the

          district court abused  its discretion.  The evidence  showed that

          all the plaintiffs  were members of the  Popular Democratic Party

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("PDP"); that all defendants were  members of the New Progressive

          Party  ("NPP");  that  many of  the  plaintiffs  were politically

          active for the PDP during the 1988 campaign which brought the NPP

          to  power;  that  defendants knew  of  the  plaintiffs' political

          affiliation   prior  to   termination;   that  plaintiffs'   work

          responsibilities were altered with the change in  administration;

          and that plaintiffs'  positions in the Municipal  government were

          filled with  members of  the NPP after  termination.   Given this

          evidence, the  district court  did  not abuse  its discretion  in

          finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict and

          denying appellants' motion.

                                          II
                                          II
                                          __

                    Appellants' second argument  fails for similar reasons.

          Appellants urge  that if the  evidence is deemed  sufficient, the

          damage  awards  be  reduced  because  they are  excessive.    The

          standard of review of damage  awards places an enormous burden on

          the party challenging the award.  To begin with, the evidence  is

          viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Betancourt  v. J.C.  Penney Co., 554  F.2d 1206,  1207 (1st
          ____  __________     ________________

          Cir. 1977).   In  addition, it is  exceedingly "difficult  on the

          basis of  an  algid  appellate record  to  quantify  damages  for

          intangible losses."  Ruiz v. Gonz lez-Caraballo, 929  F.2d 31, 34
                               ____    __________________

          (1st Cir.  1991).  Indeed, "[t]ranslating legal damage into money

          damages  -- especially  in cases  which  involve few  significant

          items of  measurable  economic loss  --  is a  matter  peculiarly

          within a jury's ken."  Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st
                                 _________    _____

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Cir.  1987).   Therefore, unless  we can  say  that the  award is

          "'grossly excessive,'  'inordinate,' 'shocking to  the conscience

          of  the court,' or 'so high that it  would be a denial of justice

          to permit  it to stand,'"  Segal v. Gilbert Color  Systems, Inc.,
                                     _____    ____________________________

          746 F.2d  78, 80-81 (1st  Cir. 1984) (quoting Grunenthal  v. Long
                                                        __________     ____

          Island R.R. Co.,  393 U.S. 156,  159 & n.4  (1968)), we will  not
          _______________

          "overrule a trial  judge's considered refusal to tamper  with the

          damages  assessed by  a jury."   Ruiz, 929  F.2d at 34;  see also
                                           ____                    ________

          Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at  215.  We certainly cannot  say that these
          _________

          awards for  political discrimination  in employment  fall outside

          this broad standard for acceptable jury verdicts.2

                                         III
                                         III
                                         ___

                    The  last issue that  we must  confront is  whether the

          district  court   properly   denied   plaintiffs'   request   for

          reinstatement.   This  circuit  has  determined  previously  that

          "[o]ne of  the remedies  available for a  political discharge  in

          violation of First Amendment rights is reappointment."  Santiago-
                                                                  _________

          Negr n  v. Castro-D vila, 865 F.2d 431, 437  (1st Cir. 1989).  As
          ______     _____________

          reinstatement is an  equitable remedy, we have  stressed that its

          flexible  application  "seems  particularly  desirable  in  cases

          involving  important private rights and public institutions" such

          as those involving political  discrimination.  Rosario-Torres  v.
                                                         ______________

          Hern ndez-Col n, 889 F.2d  314, 320-21 (1st Cir. 1989).   We have
          _______________

          rejected the notion that  finding a violation of  first amendment

          rights leads a fortiori to reinstatement, and recognized that the
                       __________
                              
          ____________________

          2  The jury awarded sums ranging between $14,200 and $33,500.

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application  of the  remedy  lies  within  the  district  court's

          discretion.  Id. at 321-22.  The court must apply that discretion
                       ___

          on a case by case  basis with a keen eye  to the many factors  in

          the balance.

                    The trial court's discretion is not unbounded, however.

          In  fact, we  have cautioned  that  the incidental  burdens on  a

          public  employer accompanying reinstatement -- i.e., "tension (or

          even  hostility) between parties  when forcibly reunited"  -- are

          "usually  insufficient, without more,  to tip the  scales against

          reinstatement  when first  amendment  rights are  at  stake in  a

          section  1983 action."  Id. at  322 (citing Banks v. Burkich, 788
                                  ___                 _____    _______

          F.2d   1161,   1165   (6th  Cir.   1986)).      Thus,  "equitable

          considerations different in  kind or degree from  those regularly

          accompanying reinstatement must be present if reinstatement is to

          be withheld from  the victim  of a  first amendment  infraction."

          Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 323.  
          ______________

                    In  the past,  we have  indicated a  number of  special

          considerations that influence the district court determination in

          specific  cases, including:   (1)  the strength  of the  evidence

          proving the first amendment violation; (2) whether the discharged

          employee has found comparable work; (3) the absence of a property

          right in the position because the employee was hired in violation

          of local law; and (4)  the ineligibility of the employee  for the

          position,  due to  failure  to  meet established  qualifications,

          which would permit  immediate discharge for no reason  or for any

          permissible reason.   See Hiraldo-Cancel v. Aponte,  925 F.2d 10,
                                ___ ______________    ______

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13-14 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.  637 (1991); Rosario-
                             ____________                          ________

          Torres,  889  F.2d   at  322-24.    Although   ineligibility  for
          ______

          appointment "neither suspend[s] their  first amendment rights nor

          undercut[s]  their  entitlement  to  legal relief  under  section

          1983,"  it is  a  factor  weighing  against  reinstatement  if  a

          reappointee would be immediately discharged.  Hiraldo-Cancel, 925
                                                        ______________

          F.2d at 14.  This list does not canvass all the  relevant factors

          but rather  highlights several  that are particularly  important.

          With these principles in mind,  we review the choice of equitable

          remedies for abuse of discretion while recognizing that the trial

          court  views the evidence from a  better vantage point than we do

          on the appellate record.  Id.
                                    ___

                    In  this case the  trial court denied  reinstatement to

          all prevailing  plaintiffs.   The scant  evidence supporting  the

          first amendment claims, the amount  of the damage awards, and the

          fact  that these employees  were hired illegally  in violation of

          Puerto Rico's  personnel laws  provided sufficient  justification

          for  denying  reinstatement.    We  readily  find  no  abuse   of

          discretion.

                                          IV
                                          IV
                                          __

                    In  conclusion, we affirm  the trial court's  denial of
                                       ______

          the Rule 59(e) motion and plaintiffs' request for reinstatement.

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