Rosa Furniture Corp. v. Banco de Ponce

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rosa Furniture Corp. v. Banco de Ponce

54 A.D.2d 647, 387 N.Y.S.2d 634, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14155

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 21, 1976

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 54 A.D.2d 647 (Rosa Furniture Corp. v. Banco de Ponce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rosa Furniture Corp. v. Banco de Ponce, 54 A.D.2d 647, 387 N.Y.S.2d 634, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14155 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on February 4, 1976, denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, and motion granted, with $60 costs and disbursements to appellants. The purportedly libelous statements were contained in an affidavit submitted by the defendant vice-president of defendant, Banco De Ponce, in opposition to a motion made by the corporate plaintiff for summary judgment and in support of Banco’s cross motion for summary judgment in an earlier Civil Court action. While the language so utilized may have been professionally ill advised, it was, in the context used, pertinent and, hence, absolutely privileged. (Seltzer v Fields, 20 AD2d 60, affd 14 NY2d 624.) Concur&emdash;Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Birns, Silverman and Capozzoli, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on February 4, 1976, denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, and motion granted, with $60 costs and disbursements to appellants. The purportedly libelous statements were contained in an affidavit submitted by the defendant vice-president of defendant, Banco De Ponce, in opposition to a motion made by the corporate plaintiff for summary judgment and in support of Banco’s cross motion for summary judgment in an earlier Civil Court action. While the language so utilized may have been professionally ill advised, it was, in the context used, pertinent and, hence, absolutely privileged. (Seltzer v Fields, 20 AD2d 60, affd 14 NY2d 624.) Concur&emdash;Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Birns, Silverman and Capozzoli, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

54 A.D.2d 647, 387 N.Y.S.2d 634, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosa-furniture-corp-v-banco-de-ponce-nyappdiv-1976.

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