Rorick v. Railway Officials' & Employees' Acc. Ass'n

119 F. 63, 55 C.C.A. 369, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4638
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 27, 1902
DocketNo. 818
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 119 F. 63 (Rorick v. Railway Officials' & Employees' Acc. Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rorick v. Railway Officials' & Employees' Acc. Ass'n, 119 F. 63, 55 C.C.A. 369, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4638 (9th Cir. 1902).

Opinions

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff in the court below, is the beneficiary named in an accident policy of insurance issued by the defendant in error upon the life of the husband of the plaintiff in error, David G. Rorick, by occupation a passenger train conductor, insuring him against “physical bodily injury resulting in disability or death, as hereinafter (in the policy) expressed, and which shall be effected while this contract is in force, solely by reason of and through external, violent, and accidental means, within the terms and conditions of this contract, and which shall, independently of all other causes, immediately, wholly, totally, and continuously, from the date of the accident causing the injury, disable the insured, .and prevent him from doing or performing any work, labor, business, or service, or any part thereof, within the conditions of this •contract.” The policy also declares that “no liability by reason of any accident is assumed for more than one of the losses below specified ; and payment for any one of such losses shall immediately terminate this policy and all liability hereunder.” This latter clause is followed by an enumeration of injuries that are covered by the insurance, the first of which is “loss of life occurring within ninety days from the date of the accident causing the bodily injury”; and a subsequent provision declares that, “should death result solely from such physical bodily injury within the conditions of this contract, said association will pay at its home office, as provided herein, the principal sum of five thousand dollars to wife, Issola Rorick, if living, [65]*65otherwise to the legal representatives of the insured.”. This latter clause is the only one contained in the policy giving any right to the plaintiff in error. Among its provisions is one in respect to notice, as follows:

“Notice of the accident causing the disability or death shall be given in writing, addressed to the association, at Indianapolis, Indiana, within fifteen days from the date of the accident causing the disability or death, stating the name, occupation, and address of the insured, with date and full particulars of the accident causing the disability or death, and causes thereof; and failure to give such notice within said time shall render void all claims under this policy.”

It is also declared therein that “all the terms and conditions of this contract are conditions precedent.”

It appears from the second amended complaint of the plaintiff in error, to which a demurrer interposed by the defendant insurance company was sustained by the court below, that between the nth and 14th days of March, 1900, and while the policy was in full force, the insured received bodily injury, to wit, “traumatic injury of the cranium, at the vortex thereof, which, independently of all other causes, produced and caused his death within ninety days thereafter, to wit, on the 26th day of March, 1900, at the county of San Bernardino, state of California; that the said injury was effected solely by reason of and through external, violent, and accidental means within the terms and conditions of said policy.” The plaintiff in her second amended complaint also alleged that the injury to her husband occurred while he was acting as conductor of a passenger train of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company, and was caused by his raising his head and thereby striking a bolt or other iron in a railway car; that the injury was at the time supposed to be trivial, and not such as did or would result in either his disability or death; that there was no visible or outward sign of injury resulting from the accident, and that the deceased, notwithstanding it, continued thereafter for six days to perform his duties as such conductor; that he suffered severe pains in the head, which increased in violence until his death, and that on the 20th day of March, 1900, he did, as a direct and proximate result of his said injury, become insane, which condition continued until his death; that on the 21st day of March, 1900, physicians were called, and found the insured suffering as aforesaid, and pronounced his disease acute neuralgia; that neither the deceased nor the plaintiff in error knew or believed, and had no reason to believe, that his sickness or suffering was caused by the accident, nor did the attending physicians of the deceased attribute the same to the injury so received by him; that the fact that the death of the deceased was caused by the injury mentioned was first discovered by and as the result of an autopsy held by the physicians immediately after the death of the insured; that within four days after said discovery the plaintiff in error notified the defendant insurance company of the injury and consequent death of the insured, as required by the provisions of the policy; and a compliance with all of its other provisions is also alleged.

It will be observed that according to the averments of the complaint, the defendant company was not notified of the accident within 15 days [66]*66from the' time 'the insured is alleged to have struck his head, and it was upon that ground that the court below sustained the demurrer, saying in its opinion:

“The notice agreed upon, it will be observed, is a notice of the accident, and the time allowed for giving it, ‘within fifteen days,’ runs from the date of the accident. These provisions, unlike corresponding provisions of the policies sued on in some of the cases cited by plaintiff, are neither obscure nor ambiguous, but clear and imperative. Nor does the notice belong to that class which courts decline to enforce because of unreasonableness, such as notices of disability or death, where the contingency happens after the limitation has expired. In a case such as those last mentioned it may well be held that notice within the time specified, being impossible, was not contemplated by the parties to the contract The alleged insanity of the insured, whatever might have been its effect as an excuse for his failure to give the prescribed notice, had he survived and himself sued to recover damages resulting from his own disability, is not available in the present action for the purpose indicated, for the reason that the plaintiff herself should have given the notice.”

It must be remembered that it was not every accident that was insured against, but only such as should result in the disability or death of the assured. Until one or the other of those things happened as a result of the striking of the head of the deceased, there was no accident to him within the terms of the policy in suit, and therefore nothing for which the insurer was required to be notified. Within 15 days of the disability of the deceased resulting from the striking of his head, and within 4 days after the autopsy upon his body disclosed the cause of his death, the plaintiff, according to the averments of'the complaint, gave the notice specified in the policy. The accident covered by the policy was not complete until the hurt' resulted in the disability or death of the insured; and, according to the averments of the complaint, both his disability and death occurred less than 15 days prior to the giving of the notice.

We do not understand counsel for the defendant in error to contend that under the policy in suit no liability for the death of the insured arose because the striking of his head against the bolt was not productive of immediate, total, and continuous disability.

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Bluebook (online)
119 F. 63, 55 C.C.A. 369, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4638, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rorick-v-railway-officials-employees-acc-assn-ca9-1902.