Roper v. Motors Insurance

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Roper v. Motors Insurance

229 S.E.2d 481, 139 Ga. App. 788, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 9, 1976

Docket52026

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 229 S.E.2d 481 (Roper v. Motors Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Roper v. Motors Insurance, 229 S.E.2d 481, 139 Ga. App. 788, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

Quillian, Judge.

Appeal was taken from an order denying the plaintiffs motion for imposition of attorney fees incurred by the plaintiff in resisting the defendant’s motion for new trial and appeal to this court. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Roper, 136 Ga. App. 224 (221 SE2d 55). This judgment was entered on December 10,1975. At that time this case was pending on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Held:

"Once a final judgment is entered, from which a party files a notice of appeal and pays all costs there is an automatic supersedeas which deprives the trial court of [789]*789jurisdiction to modify or alter the judgment of the case pending on appeal.” Philips &c. Corp. v. Production 70’s, 133 Ga. App. 765, 766 (1) (213 SE2d 35), and cit; Code Ann. § 6-1002 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 22). Here the motion was brought in and under the same case which was on appeal at the time the motion was passed on. The motion prayed for "the entry of an award of additional attorney fees.” Thus, in effect it sought to modify or enlarge the prior award. See Code Ann. § 56-1206 (Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 502; 1962, p. 712), which requires that the amount of reasonable attorney fees be determined by the trial jury and included in any judgment rendered in the action.

Argued April 12, 1976 Decided September 9, 1976 Rehearing denied October 5, 1976 Jones, Wilson & Tomlinson, Robert P. Wilson, for appellant. A. Mims Wilkinson, Jr., for appellee. Carter, Ansley, Smith & McLendon, Melburne D. McLendon, Alston, Miller & Gaines, Ronald L. Reid, Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Edgar A. Neely, Jr., amicus curiae.

The judgment rendered while the cause was pending before the Supreme Court is nugatory. Hence, there is nothing from which the plaintiff may appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Deen, P. J., and Webb, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Quillian, Judge.

Appeal was taken from an order denying the plaintiffs motion for imposition of attorney fees incurred by the plaintiff in resisting the defendant’s motion for new trial and appeal to this court. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Roper, 136 Ga. App. 224 (221 SE2d 55). This judgment was entered on December 10,1975. At that time this case was pending on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Held:

"Once a final judgment is entered, from which a party files a notice of appeal and pays all costs there is an automatic supersedeas which deprives the trial court of [789]*789jurisdiction to modify or alter the judgment of the case pending on appeal.” Philips &c. Corp. v. Production 70’s, 133 Ga. App. 765, 766 (1) (213 SE2d 35), and cit; Code Ann. § 6-1002 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 22). Here the motion was brought in and under the same case which was on appeal at the time the motion was passed on. The motion prayed for "the entry of an award of additional attorney fees.” Thus, in effect it sought to modify or enlarge the prior award. See Code Ann. § 56-1206 (Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 502; 1962, p. 712), which requires that the amount of reasonable attorney fees be determined by the trial jury and included in any judgment rendered in the action.

Argued April 12, 1976 Decided September 9, 1976 Rehearing denied October 5, 1976 Jones, Wilson & Tomlinson, Robert P. Wilson, for appellant. A. Mims Wilkinson, Jr., for appellee. Carter, Ansley, Smith & McLendon, Melburne D. McLendon, Alston, Miller & Gaines, Ronald L. Reid, Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Edgar A. Neely, Jr., amicus curiae.

The judgment rendered while the cause was pending before the Supreme Court is nugatory. Hence, there is nothing from which the plaintiff may appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Deen, P. J., and Webb, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

229 S.E.2d 481, 139 Ga. App. 788, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roper-v-motors-insurance-gactapp-1976.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack