Roost v. Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. (In Re Williams)

234 B.R. 801, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 693, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 600, 1999 WL 388210
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 4, 1999
Docket18-34533
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 234 B.R. 801 (Roost v. Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. (In Re Williams)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roost v. Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. (In Re Williams), 234 B.R. 801, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 693, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 600, 1999 WL 388210 (Or. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBERT E. RADCLIFFE, Bankruptcy Judge.

BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the court upon the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff (the trustee) brought this adversary proceeding to avoid, as a preferential transfer, the security interest of the defendant in the debt- or’s interest in a mobile home. The trustee’s case is based upon the fact that the perfection of the defendant’s security interest in the mobile home occurred more than 90 days, but within one year from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing by the debtor, herein. The trustee contends that the transfer was for the benefit of the debtor’s wife, an insider, therefore, the trustee may avoid the perfection of the security interest under the Deprizio rationale.

The defendant contends that the 1994 Amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) deprive the trustee of any recovery, hence, this adversary proceeding may be disposed of upon the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Defendant’s motion is based on FRCP 12(c) made applicable by FRBP 7012(b). Under FRCP 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted when no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Yanez v. U.S., 63 F.3d 870 (9th Cir.1995). For purposes of the motion, all of the well pled factual allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true and all of the contravening factual allegations are deemed to be false. In Re Reynolds, 189 B.R. 199 (Bankr.D.Or.1995) (internal citations omitted). In considering the motion, the trial court is required to view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, the court is not required to accept, as true, conclusions of law couched as factual allegations. Naehu v. Provest, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 97-6211, 1997 WL 1037947 (D.Hawai’i 1997); Jackson v. East Bay Hospital, 980 F.Supp. 1341 (N.D.Cal.1997).

Here, there does not appear to be any dispute as to the material facts. On June 7, 1996 the debtor and Tonja Williams, the debtor’s wife, incurred a debt to the defendant in the amount of $59,671 for the purchase of a 1994 Liberty Manufactured Home and real property located at 675 Fourth Street, Riddle, Oregon. 1 On the same date, the debtor and Tonja Williams entered into a security agreement, pledging both the real property and the mobile home as security for the payment of the debt. The security interest in the mobile home was not perfected until July 29,1996. The debtor filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, herein, on December 12, 1996. Thus, the perfection of the defendant’s security interest in the mobile home occurred more than 90 days, but less than one year prior to the bankruptcy filing.

ISSUE

The sole issue raised by defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is *803 whether or not the trustee’s claim is barred by the 1994 Amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 550.

DISCUSSION

This court had originally concluded that the perfection of defendant’s security interest was not for the benefit of Tonja Williams in a letter opinion entered, herein, on February 17, 1999. Since the entry of the letter opinion, however, the parties have agreed that the perfection of defendant’s security interest was at least of some potential benefit to Tonja Williams, the insider, hence, the issue described above requires a resolution. This appears to be a matter of first impression in this District.

The trustee relies upon Deprizio and the line of cases decided thereunder in order to prevail. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re Deprizio Construction Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.1989). Indeed, Deprizio has been followed by the Ninth Circuit, See In re Sufolla, Inc., 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir.1993).

In the Deprizio case, Deprizio Construction Company made payments to its lenders on debts that had been guaranteed by Richard Deprizio and his brothers, controlling shareholders. After the corporation filed bankruptcy, the trustee sued the lenders to recover the payments as preferences pursuant to §§ 547 and 550. 2 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the trustee, reasoning that even though the payments were not made to the insiders, they were for the benefit of insider creditors, by reducing their liability to the lenders upon their guarantees.

In response to concerns raised by the lending community, Congress, in 1994, amended § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to its amendment, § 550 provided in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section ... 547 ... of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from—
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.

The 1994 Amendment added subsection (c) which provides:

If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition—
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of such transfer was an insider;
the trustee may not recover under subsection (a) from a transferee that is not an insider.

Since the defendant is a non-insider creditor, defendant maintains that the 1994 Amendment to § 550 bars any recovery by the trustee, hence, this adversary proceeding must fail.

The trustee concedes that the amendment to § 550 bars any “recovery” by the trustee. He maintains, however, that no “recovery” is necessary in this case. Rather, the security interest of the defendant is avoided pursuant to § 547(b), 3 after *804

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234 B.R. 801, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 693, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 600, 1999 WL 388210, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roost-v-associates-home-equity-services-inc-in-re-williams-orb-1999.