Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedSeptember 7, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00824
StatusUnknown

This text of Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, (D. Colo. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer Civil Action No. 21-cv-00824-PAB ROOFTOP RESTORATION, INC., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff, v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S OF LONDON, ASPEN INSURANCE UK LIMITED, and SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. SECOND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE This matter is before the Court on defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company’s (“Scottsdale”) response, Docket No. 35, to the Court’s order to show cause, Docket No.

32. Scottsdale asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. Docket No. 35 at 6, ¶ 19. Scottsdale removed this case from state court on March 19, 2021. See Docket No. 1. On April 20, 2021, the Court ordered Scottsdale to show cause why the case should not be remanded due to the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Docket No. 32 at 5. Specifically, the Court noted that Scottsdale’s allegations as to defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (the “Syndicate”) and defendant Aspen Insurance UK Limited were insufficient. Id. at 2-4 In Scottsdale’s response to the Court’s first order to show cause, Scottsdale represents that the membership rules for Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) have changed. See Docket No 35 at 5. As a result of those changes, any member of a Lloyd’s syndicate must be a “[United Kingdom] tax resident.” See id.; see also Docket No. 35-3 at 1. Scottsdale asserts that, because “any corporate or individual member subscribing to policies through the Lloyd’s of London marketplace must be a resident of the United

Kingdom after January 1, 2015, and since the operative policy in this case incepted on July 2, 2016, Lloyd’s is a resident of the United Kingdom” and thus is “diverse from [p]laintiff.” Docket No. 35 at 6, ¶ 18. Scottsdale misunderstands what is required for citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. First, the Court explicitly noted in its first order to show cause that Scottsdale may not simply allege that each “name” or member of the Syndicate is not of the same citizenship of plaintiff, but must specifically plead the citizenship of each of the members. See Docket No. 32 at 4 n.3 (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990)). Even if Scottsdale’s analysis of Lloyd’s membership rules is correct, Scottsdale would still be required to identify members of the Syndicate and plead their

citizenship. Scottsdale cannot simply allege that any and all Lloyd’s members are diverse from plaintiff. Rather, “to establish diversity of citizenship as to a Lloyd’s underwriting syndicate, the citizenship of every participating Name must be affirmatively alleged.” See Montgomery v. Markel Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 3d 857, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2017). This is because Lloyd’s is not an insurance company, but a group of underwriters, and it is those underwriters’ citizenships that Scottsdale must demonstrate. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, Scottsdale must identify each member of the Syndicate and allege that member’s citizenship. 2 Second, although each member of Lloyd’s must be a United Kingdom tax resident, an analysis of Lloyd’s rules demonstrates that United Kingdom tax residency does not necessarily equate to citizenship for purposes of an analysis of diversity jurisdiction. A Lloyd’s member may be one of three types of tax resident: “individual, company[,] or SLP/LLP.” See Docket No. 35-4 at 2. The Court addresses each in turn.

An individual may be a UK tax resident if he or she meets one of several UK government tax tests. See Docket No. 35-6 at 3. First, there are “[a]utomatic UK tests,” which automatically qualify an individual as a UK tax resident: (1) an individual will be considered a tax resident if he or she has “been in the UK for 183 or more days”; (2) a person will be considered a UK tax resident if he or she had a home in the UK during the tax year, and had that home for 91 consecutive days, was in the home for at least 30 days, and the person had no overseas home or, if he or she did, spent fewer than 30 days in the overseas home; and (3) a person will be considered a UK tax resident if he or she worked full time in the UK in the last 365 days, more than 75% of those days

were for work over three hours, and at least one of those 365 days overlaps with the current tax year. Id. at 4-5. If a person meets the first step, being in the UK for over 183 days, “[t]here is no need to consider any other tests.” Id. at 3. However, if a person meets one of the other two tests, the automatic overseas tests must be applied. Id. There are three automatic overseas tests: an individual will not be considered a tax resident (1) if he or she was a tax resident in one or more of the three previous years, but spent fewer than 16 days in the UK during the current tax year; (2) if he or

3 she was not a tax resident in the previous three years and spent fewer than 46 days in the UK in the current tax year; and (3) if he or she works full-time outside of the UK, spent fewer than 91 days in the UK, works fewer than 31, 3-hour days in the UK, and has no “significant break” from the work taking place outside of the UK. Id. at 4. If an individual does not meet any of these tests and meets one of the automatic UK tests,

he or she will be considered a UK tax resident. Id. at 3. Conversely, if an individual does not meet one of the UK tests, but does meet the overseas tests, he or she will not be an UK tax resident. Id. In situations where an individual does not meet either of the automatic tests, that person is to apply the “[s]ufficient ties test,” which seeks to determine whether the individual’s “connections to the UK . . . taken together with the number of days . . . spen[t] in the UK, will make you a resident for that particular tax year.” Id. at 5. The determination of UK tax residency should consider several “ties” to the UK, such as family, work, or accommodation. Id. Whether someone has sufficient ties to the UK to be a tax resident will depend on the number of ties that person has,

how long he or she has been in the UK, and whether he or she was a previous UK tax resident. Id. at 5-7. Critically, none of the tests for determining whether an individual is a UK tax resident also determines whether that individual is a citizen of a U.S. state, in this instance, Colorado, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. “For purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, an individual’s state citizenship is equivalent to domicile.” Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). “To establish domicile in a particular state, a person must be physically present in the state and intend to remain there.” Id.

4 at 1260. Additionally, residency is not synonymous with domicile, see Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (“‘Domicile’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘residence,’ and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another.”) (citations omitted)), and only the latter is determinative of a party’s

citizenship. See Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[A]llegations of mere ‘residence’ may not be equated with ‘citizenship’ for the purposes of establishing diversity.”).

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Related

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
490 U.S. 30 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Carden v. Arkoma Associates
494 U.S. 185 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Smith v. Cummings
445 F.3d 1254 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
C. L. Whitelock v. Delbert Leatherman
460 F.2d 507 (Tenth Circuit, 1972)
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn
613 F.3d 1079 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Montgomery v. Markel International Insurance Co.
259 F. Supp. 3d 857 (N.D. Illinois, 2017)

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Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rooftop-restoration-inc-v-certain-underwriters-at-lloyds-of-london-cod-2021.