In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-24-00050-CR ___________________________
RONNIE JACKSON JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 372nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1646727
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION
After striking a police officer with a stolen vehicle while evading arrest,
Appellant Ronnie Jackson Jr. was convicted of aggravated assault of a public servant
with a deadly weapon. 1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B).
On appeal, Jackson argues in two points that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
(1) that Jackson was driving the vehicle when it struck the officer or (2) that he acted
with the requisite intent or knowledge. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2020, Jackson—by his own admission—stole a black Dodge
Journey from the parking lot of Barrow Land Surveying, where the vehicle’s owner
worked. The theft was caught on surveillance footage.
Two days later, Fort Worth Police Officer Lisa Guerrero observed that same
Dodge Journey driving erratically while heading northbound on Interstate 35 in Fort
Worth. She turned on her overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle did
not stop. Instead, it sped up, touching off a high-speed chase that covered
approximately twenty miles. During the chase, the Dodge Journey continued to
maneuver dangerously, and at one point, it struck a pickup being driven by Jeremy
1 Jackson was charged by indictment with five offenses: (1) attempted capital murder, (2) aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon, (3) aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, (4) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and (5) felony evading arrest. Before trial, the State elected to proceed only on the charge of aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon.
2 Day while attempting to squeeze between Day’s pickup and another vehicle in the
neighboring lane.
Multiple Fort Worth Police Department officers responded to calls to assist in
bringing an end to the chase. Among them were Officers Matthew Casey and
Matthew Brazeal, who headed toward the Camp Bowie exit on Highway 820. While
Officer Casey diverted traffic into the two left lanes of the four-lane highway, Officer
Brazeal attempted to deploy stop sticks in the exit lane—the only lane not blocked by
a police vehicle or slow-moving traffic.
As Officer Brazeal began deploying the stop sticks, the Dodge Journey was
barreling down the highway. As the Dodge Journey approached the Camp Bowie
exit, it swerved onto the shoulder to avoid the standstill. It then continued onto the
median, running directly into Officer Brazeal despite having room to avoid him.
Officer Brazeal was dragged several hundred yards before the Dodge Journey sped off
down the Highway 820 access road.
After seeing Officer Brazeal get hit, Officer Guerrero continued her pursuit of
the vehicle. Eventually she lost sight of it, but she continued to look for it in nearby
neighborhoods.
Multiple squad cars and an Air One helicopter unit assisted in the search.
Officer Jaskie, who was flying the Air One unit, spotted a vehicle matching the Dodge
Journey’s description and made a radio announcement that the suspect that he saw
3 “was a light-skinned black . . . or Hispanic male with blue jean shorts or shorts, short
hair but not shaved and a dark . . . , short-sleeved shirt.”
The Dodge Journey was eventually found in a neighborhood approximately
three miles east of the location where Officer Brazeal had been struck. The vehicle
was initially discovered by Jerry Jefferson, who found it parked under a carport in his
dad’s driveway while stopping off to pick up food for a family celebration. Officers
arrived at the house shortly after Jefferson spotted the vehicle, and one of the officers
walked the property with Jefferson but found no one. About an hour later, Jefferson
noticed someone sitting in the family’s white Thunderbird and immediately notified
Officer Dutch Rovell, who had been stationed behind the Dodge Journey.
Officer Rovell and several other officers surrounded the Thunderbird and
ultimately arrested the suspect—Jackson—without incident. When asked why he was
in the car, Jackson, who was not wearing a shirt or shoes, claimed that he was about
to purchase it. After Jackson was removed from the Thunderbird, the officers found
the keys to the stolen Dodge Journey tucked into a crease in the Thunderbird’s
passenger’s seat. As he was being escorted into jail, Jackson admitted that he had
stolen the Dodge Journey.
About a week after Jackson was arrested, Jefferson found “a lot of odd things”
underneath another family vehicle that had been parked next to the Thunderbird.
These items included two cell phones, a blue pullover shirt, a pair of shoes, and a
baseball cap. Detective Anthony Rimshas testified that the distinctive baseball cap
4 and shoes matched those worn by the man who could be seen stealing the Dodge
Journey on the surveillance footage from Barrow Land Surveying.
Jackson was indicted for five offenses, including aggravated assault of a public
servant with a deadly weapon. Jackson pleaded not guilty and was tried by a jury,
which convicted him of aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon.
After a punishment trial, Jackson was sentenced to life in prison. Jackson filed a
motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P.
21.8(a), (c). This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute
5 our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine
whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative
force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569
S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the
evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at
608.
To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,
622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by
state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which
the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the
indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging
instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
see Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads
6 a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element,
the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually
pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”).
Here, to convict Jackson of aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly
weapon, the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Jackson
(2) intentionally or knowingly (3) caused bodily injury (4) to Officer Brazeal, (5) a
public servant, (6) by striking him (7) with a motor vehicle (8) while Officer Brazeal
was lawfully discharging an official duty and (9) that Jackson knew that Officer
Brazeal was a public servant and (10) used or exhibited a deadly weapon (i.e., the
motor vehicle) during the commission of the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B).
Direct evidence of each element is not required, and “[c]ircumstantial evidence
alone is sufficient to establish guilt.” See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). Indeed, “[i]ntent and knowledge . . . are almost always proven
through circumstantial evidence.” Clay v. State, 389 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984)). Likewise, “[i]dentity may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence,
and through inferences.” Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (first citing United States v. Quimby, 636 F.2d 86, 90 (5th
Cir. 1981); then citing Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); then
citing Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 157 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d); then
7 citing Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d);
and then citing Creech v. State, 718 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, no pet.)).
“No formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the
accused.” Garcia v. State, No. 13-22-00001-CR, 2022 WL 3257538, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
B. Sufficient Evidence Shows That Jackson Was the Driver
In his first point, Jackson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
the jury’s finding that he was driving the Dodge Journey when it hit Officer Brazeal.
We disagree.
The following evidence supports the jury’s determination that Jackson was the
driver:
• The Dodge Journey was stolen on June 11, 2020—two days before Officer Brazeal was struck by it. Video surveillance showed that the person who stole the vehicle was wearing a bright blue-green hat and distinctive shoes. When he was arrested, Jackson asked if he could “get the rest of [his] clothes.” Later, a hat and shoes matching those seen on the surveillance footage were found under a vehicle near where Jackson was arrested.
• Jackson admitted that he had stolen the Dodge Journey.
• Jackson was found hiding in a Thunderbird parked at the same house where the Dodge Journey had been discovered shortly after it struck Officer Brazeal.
• The keys to the Dodge Journey were found tucked into a crease in the passenger’s seat of the Thunderbird in which Jackson had been hiding.
8 • Both Officer Jaskie, the pilot of the Air One unit, and Jeremy Day, whose vehicle was struck by the Dodge Journey shortly before Officer Brazeal was injured, described the driver of the Dodge Journey as a dark-complected— either black or Hispanic—male. Jackson is a black male.
• Day testified that he saw only one person—the driver—in the Dodge Journey; he did not see any passengers.
• Jackson’s DNA was found on the Dodge Journey’s gearshift and on items discovered in the vehicle.
• After examining the entire Dodge Journey for fingerprints, the police found Jackson’s fingerprints exclusively in the “driver[-]side area.” While none of these individual pieces of evidence, when considered in isolation, is
sufficient to prove that Jackson was the driver, their combined and cumulative force
when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction provides a rational basis for
the jury’s verdict. See Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(instructing that in a legal-sufficiency review, an appellate court should “consider the
combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most favorable to
the conviction to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232 (admonishing that
courts “must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy” when conducting a legal-
sufficiency review “but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence”);
cf. Stroud v. State, No. 09-14-00439-CR, 2016 WL 3136148, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont June 1, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding
that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that appellant was the person who
9 had driven a vehicle found in the mud where appellant (1) had been by himself when
he knocked on a door to seek assistance removing his vehicle from the mud and when
police arrived to investigate who had been driving, (2) had been at another residence
several miles from where the car was found earlier in the evening, and (3) had the key
to the vehicle in his pocket); Hernandez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 78, 80 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove
appellant had been driving vehicle when he was the only person walking near wrecked
vehicle despite his assertion to investigating officers that he was not the driver and
that the driver had run away); Folk v. State, 797 S.W.2d 141, 142–44 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (noting that evidence that the appellant was
found alone at the side of the road near a burning vehicle that was registered to his
roommate was consistent with the conclusion that the appellant had driven the
vehicle).
To support his contention that the State presented insufficient evidence to
identify him as the driver of the Dodge Journey, Jackson emphasizes that he does not
perfectly fit the descriptions provided by Day and Officer Jaskie—the only two
witnesses who observed the driver while he was operating the vehicle or getting in
and out of it. For example, Day described the driver as a dark-complected, non-
Caucasian man who was between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five, but Jackson was
thirty-eight years old at the time of the offense. Further, when Officer Jaskie spotted
a vehicle matching the Dodge Journey’s description from the Air One helicopter, he
10 described the person he saw exiting and then reentering the vehicle as a “light-skinned
black . . . or Hispanic male with blue jean shorts . . . , short hair but not shaved and a
dark . . . , short-sleeved shirt.” However, when Jackson was arrested, he was wearing
full-length blue jeans—not shorts—and while his hair was short on the sides and
back, the top of his head was bald.
But these seeming inaccuracies do not render the evidence insufficient to show
that Jackson was driving. While Day testified that he got a good look at the driver, he
only saw him very briefly through tinted windows after the Dodge Journey contacted
his vehicle. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Day would be unable
to perfectly estimate the driver’s age. Further, Detective Rimshas testified that
Jackson fit Officer Jaskie’s description of a light-skinned black male with short hair,
and he explained why Officer Jaskie might have believed that Jackson was wearing
jean shorts. Detective Rimshas pointed out that on the surveillance footage depicting
Jackson stealing the Dodge Journey, he had one of his pant legs pulled up to the knee.
According to Detective Rimshas, if Jackson had been wearing his pants in a similar
fashion when Officer Jaskie spotted him from the air, it would appear that he was
wearing shorts. It was the jury’s role to resolve any discrepancies or inconsistencies in
the evidence. Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet.
ref’d); cf. Dominguez v. State, No. 06-98-00293-CR, 1999 WL 641651, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana Aug. 25, 1999, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding
that “as fact finder, the jury was entitled to conclude that the inconsistencies in the
11 description of [the appellant] on the night of the assault by . . . two witnesses [were]
immaterial”). And given the nature of—and the circumstances surrounding—Day’s
and Officer Jaskie’s descriptions as well as the other strong circumstantial evidence
that Jackson was driving the Dodge Journey when it struck Officer Brazeal, we
conclude that, notwithstanding the descriptions’ inclusion of seemingly inaccurate
details, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson
was the driver. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at
622.
Jackson also makes much of the fact that unknown DNA was found on “nearly
every item” in the Dodge Journey. He asserts that this unknown DNA indicates that
another unknown person had been inside—and in position to drive—the vehicle. But
as the State’s DNA expert explained at trial, it is impossible to tell how—or when—
this unknown DNA was deposited in the vehicle. Thus, the mere presence of
unknown DNA does not, in and of itself, suggest that another person besides Jackson
was in the vehicle at the time that Officer Brazeal was struck—much less preclude a
rational juror from finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was the driver. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.
In sum, viewing the evidence—as we must—in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude that its combined and cumulative force and the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn therefrom allowed the jury to rationally conclude
12 beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was driving the Dodge Journey when it
struck Officer Brazeal. Accordingly, we overrule Jackson’s first point.
C. Sufficient Evidence Shows That Jackson Acted Intentionally or Knowingly
In his second point, Jackson contends that the evidence is insufficient to show
that he intentionally or knowingly struck Officer Brazeal. Again, we disagree.
Aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon is a result-oriented
offense. Johnson v. State, 271 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d);
Hernandez v. State, No. 05-01-00749-CR, 2002 WL 1164059, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 4, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citing Peterson v. State,
836 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d)). Thus, to sustain a
conviction, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that it was
Jackson’s conscious objective or desire to injure Officer Brazeal by striking him with a
vehicle or (2) that he was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause this
result. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b).
As noted, “[i]ntent and knowledge . . . are almost always proven through
circumstantial evidence.” Clay, 389 S.W.3d at 878. Here, the State presented ample
circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Jackson acted intentionally
or knowingly. First, the State presented evidence that the vehicle had been fully
inspected and that no mechanical issues had been found that would have affected
Jackson’s ability to avoid hitting Officer Brazeal. Second, the State presented
testimony from multiple eyewitnesses who stated that Jackson could have avoided
13 colliding with Officer Brazeal but instead deliberately chose to hit him.2 For example,
Officer Casey testified that “[t]here were a lot of different ways [Jackson] could have
gone to avoid hitting” Officer Brazeal. Several customers at a nearby Harley-
Davidson dealership who witnessed the incident agreed. One such witness stated that
Jackson could have stopped but did not, that there were different routes that Jackson
could have taken, and that Officer Brazeal had tried to run out of the way. Another
testified that the Dodge Journey drove “towards” Officer Brazeal and “absolutely”
did not veer off course; “instead of going straight, it[] follow[ed] the path” of Officer
Brazeal as he was running and “start[ed] to turn, to follow him.” A third Harley-
Davidson customer told the jury that Jackson had “every opportunity to avoid hitting
Officer Brazeal. He could have gone right and easily avoided him. There was plenty
of open road. He could have continued down 820. The lanes were pretty much
open. He could have continued straight, but he deliberately turned and hit Officer
Brazeal.”
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
2 Jackson asserts that the jury “had no need of bystanders’ opinions and perceptions” because the offense was captured on Officer Guerrero’s in-car camera and on Officer Casey’s and Officer Brazeal’s body-worn cameras, meaning that the jurors were “able to perceive it for themselves.” But Jackson has not challenged the admissibility of these witnesses’ testimony, and it is part of the record. Thus, it is part of the panoply of evidence that the jury could have considered in assessing whether Jackson acted with the requisite knowledge or intent. See Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted, whether proper or improper.”).
14 Jackson intentionally or knowingly struck Officer Brazeal with the vehicle. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Accordingly, we
overrule Jackson’s second point.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Jackson’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: June 5, 2025