Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee

29 U.S. 349, 7 L. Ed. 882, 4 Pet. 349, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 482
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 22, 1830
StatusPublished
Cited by107 cases

This text of 29 U.S. 349 (Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee, 29 U.S. 349, 7 L. Ed. 882, 4 Pet. 349, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 482 (1830).

Opinion

Mr Justice M’Lean

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ, of error is prosecuted to reverse.a judgment of the circuit court for the district of Columbia.

The defendant in error brought an action of ejectment in the circuit court, to récover possession of lot No. 4, ip square No. 491, in the city of Washington, half of which had been sold for taxes; and under the special instructions of the court,-recovered á verdict and judgment. Several exceptions were taken to the competency of the evidence admitted on the trial, all of which appear in the bill of exceptions.

The first objection was taken to the competency of the proof of the assessment-of the lot-for taxation: the legality-of the tax is not disputed.

To show the taxes assessed on the lot for the years 1820 and 1821, the defendant below produced in evidence the' official tax books of the corporation, regularly made up by its officers; from which it appeared, that thé plaintiff stood charged for 1820, with thirty-one dollars- eighty-six cents for. the tax on the . half, of lot No. 4, which contained four thousand two hundred and two square feet, valued at one thousand six hundred and eighty dollars. For the year 1821, he stood charged with eight dollars forty cents tax on the same lot. It appeared in proof, that the assessors appointed by the authority of the corporation, make a valuation of *359 .property within the city, about the month of October, annually, and a return of their proceedings; which are laid' before the board of appeal empowered to correct the valuations of the assessors, according to the laws and ordinances of the corporation. The assessment' lists are then returned to the register of the corporation. The register then proceeds to make out the tax books, from the original assessment lists returned by the assessors, and corrected by the board of appeal. But it was contended, that the original lists of the assessors must be. produced, and also proof of their appointment.

The court recognize the correctness of the principle contended for by the counsel for tho.plaintiff in error; that in an ex parte proceeding of this kind, under a special authority, great strictness is required. To divest an individual of his property, against his consent, every substantial requisite of the law must be shown to have been complied with. No presumption can be raised in behalf of a collector who sells real estate for taxes, to cover any radical defect in his proceeding; and ihe proof of regularity in the procedure devolves upon the person who claims under the collector’s sale.

In this case, was it necessary to exhibit proof of the regular appointment, of the assessors ? They acted under the authority of the corporation, and the highest evidence of this fact is the sanction which it has given to their return. This return has been examined and .corrected by the board of appeal, and was then handed over to the register, \yhat better proof can be required of the assessor’s authority to act.

The municipal powers of the corporation are conferred by apublic law, and all courts are bound to notice them. Is it necessary.in any case to go into the proof of the election of the mayor, or any of the other officers of this corporation? This has not been contended; nor can it be necessary to ..prove the appointment of an officer of the corporation, who has. acted under its authority, and whose proceedings, as in the present case, have received its express sanction.

Did the court below err in requiring tho original assessment lists to be produced.

These lists, under the law, were not ’Conclusive on the *360 corporation, or on the person whose property was assessed. They were laid before the court of appeal for their correction and sanction, and they were then passed to the register.

If the»assessment was not conclusive, or indeed binding on either party until.sanctioned by the board of appeal; t ten, without this sanction, the assessment lists could not be received as evidence. These lists being handed over to the register, the law requires him to furnish a tax book to the collector, from the original assessment lists on file in his office, according to a prescribed form. -This was done in the case under consideration ; and is-not this book evidence ?

It was made out and arranged by an officer, in pursuance of a duty expressly enjoined by law. This not only makes the tax book evidence, but the best evidence which can be given of the facts it contains. In this book are stated, the name of the owner of the. property, and his residence,,if known ; the number of the square, the number of the lot, the square feet it contains; the rate of assessment, the valuation, and the amount of the tax. Only a part of these appear Upon the assessment list.

This court think, 'that-the circuit court arred in their instructions to the jury on both of the, points stated. 1. In deciding that the proof was not competent to show the authority of the assessorsand, -2. That the official tax book, certified by the register, did not prove an assessment of the property.

The next point presented by .the bill of exceptions is as to the legality of the notice of sale given by the collector.

■Th'e court instructed fhe jury, that the advertisement was defective in several particulars.

By the tenth section of the apt of congress, which directs-this proceeding ;, the collector is required to give public notice of the time and place, of’sale, by advertising once a week, in.some newspaper printed in the city of Washington", for thr.ee months ; when the property is assessed to a person who .resides within'the United. States, but without the district of Columbia.

Notice of the sale.of the lot in controversy was given by .the collector; first; in a newspaper published the 6th of.De *361 cember 1822, and last, in the same paper of the 10th of March 1823. These periods, embrace the time the advertisement is required to be publishéd: but it is contended, that •the notice was not published once in each week, within the meaning of the act of congress. ■

In examining the dates of the publications, it appears that eleven days at one time transpired between them, and at another time'ten days, at another eight.

These:'omissions, it is contended, are fatal: that the publication being once made, it was essential to the validity of the notice that- it should be published every seventh day thereafter.

The words of the law are, “oncea week.” Does this limit the publication to a particular day of the week1? If the notice be published on Monday, is it fatal to omit the publication until the Tuesday week succeeding ^ The object of the notice is as well answered by such a publication,, as if' it had been made on the following Monday.

A week is. a definite period of time, commencing on Sunday and ending on Saturday. By this construction the no, tice in this case must be held sufficient. It was published, Monday, January the' 6th, and omitted until Saturday, January the 18th, leaving an interval of eleven days; still the . publication on Saturday was within the week succeeding the notice of the sixth.

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Bluebook (online)
29 U.S. 349, 7 L. Ed. 882, 4 Pet. 349, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 482, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronkendorff-v-taylors-lessee-scotus-1830.