Ronk v. Hudson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHELE RONK, No. 24-145 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-09843-FLA-AS v. MEMORANDUM*

KATHERYN ELIZABETH HUDSON, p/k/a Katy Perry; BRITTANY HAZZARD, p/k/a Starrah; FERRAS ALQAISI; OLIVER GOLDSTEIN, p/k/a Oligee; JOSH ABRAHAM; ROBERT MANDELL, p/k/a G Koop; CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC; UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, N.V.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 12, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, HAMILTON***, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, sitting by designation. Plaintiff Michele Ronk appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims for

copyright infringement against Kathryn Elizabeth Hudson (“Katy Perry”) and the

other named Defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s decision dismissing a complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Terpin v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 118 F.4th

1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2024). In so doing, we accept Ronk’s allegations as true and

construe them in her favor. See id.

1. A plaintiff may prove copyright infringement with circumstantial evidence

of both the defendant’s access to the plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity to

protected features of the plaintiff’s work. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212

F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Skidmore ex rel. Randy

Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). To show

that Defendants had “access” to her work, Ronk had to “show a reasonable

possibility, not merely a bare possibility, that an alleged infringer had the chance to

view the protected work.” Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Ent. Inc, 581 F.3d 1138,

1143 (9th Cir. 2009). Ronk challenges only the district court’s rejection of her

theory that Defendants had “access” to her song Upgraded 2.0 through an alleged

conspiracy between them and Facebook to use artificial intelligence to view material

posted to her private Facebook page. We agree with the district court that Ronk’s

allegations are speculative and conclusory.

2 24-145 As the district court explained, this theory “is speculative, conclusory, and

thus insufficient to plausibly plead access” because Ronk failed “to allege facts

showing each link in the chain of events leading to” Defendants’ alleged access.

And “[a]ccess may not be inferred through mere speculation or conjecture.” Three

Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of her

complaint, Ronk introduces unpleaded facts of advances in artificial intelligence and

data-scraping to support her theory of “access.” But this new theory suffers from

the same defects as her initial one—it is grossly speculative. So Ronk’s allegations,

even with her new facts, fall short of the “access” standard. See Art Attacks, LLC,

581 F.3d at 1143; Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482.

2. Because it is clear that Ronk’s “complaint could not be saved by any

amendment,” the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing her

complaint without leave to amend. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

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