Rone v. Rone

D.C. Circuit

Rone v. Rone

141 F.2d 23, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3590

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedMarch 6, 1944

DocketNo. 8494

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 141 F.2d 23 (Rone v. Rone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rone v. Rone, 141 F.2d 23, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3590 (D.C. Cir. 1944).

Pincite

Opinion

ARNOLD, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint in which Guy Rone, the former husband of appellant, and Major James R. Lusby, Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia, are named as defendants. The complaint discloses the following facts: Appellant was divorced from Guy Rone by the Corporation Court of Alexandria, Virginia, in 1939. The decree awarded her $30 a month alimony which appellee Rone has not paid. He is entitled to a pension for disability, payable out of the funds of the United States Treasury designated as the “Policeman’s and Fireman’s Relief Association, District of Columbia”. Appellant states that she has no remedy at law to attach or garnishee these funds and, therefore, seeks relief in equity against Major James R. Lusby, Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia, through the appointment of a sequestrator to collect the pension from Major Lusby and pay the proceeds in satisfaction of her alimony claim.

The motion to dismiss was properly granted as to the Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia. In the case of Chewning v. District of Columbia, 1941, 73 App.D.C. 392, 119 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 639, 62 S.Ct. 74, 86 L.Ed. 513, this court held that the District of Columbia, like the United States, is not subject to garnishment. There is no essential difference between attachment and garnishment and the relief sought here, i.e. the appointment of a sequestrator to collect funds from the District and pay them to appellant. Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1893, 1 App.D.C. 351; McGrew v. McGrew, 1930, 59 App.D.C. 230, 38 F. 2d 541.

The facts stated in the complaint would support a cause of action for a money judgment against appellee Rone, but no prayer for such relief was made. Appellee Rone is a non-resident and cannot be served personally. However, he has filed an unqualified motion to dismiss. Whether this would constitute a general appearance under these circumstances we need not decide, because the point was waived by failure to present it either to the trial court or on appeal.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ARNOLD, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint in which Guy Rone, the former husband of appellant, and Major James R. Lusby, Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia, are named as defendants. The complaint discloses the following facts: Appellant was divorced from Guy Rone by the Corporation Court of Alexandria, Virginia, in 1939. The decree awarded her $30 a month alimony which appellee Rone has not paid. He is entitled to a pension for disability, payable out of the funds of the United States Treasury designated as the “Policeman’s and Fireman’s Relief Association, District of Columbia”. Appellant states that she has no remedy at law to attach or garnishee these funds and, therefore, seeks relief in equity against Major James R. Lusby, Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia, through the appointment of a sequestrator to collect the pension from Major Lusby and pay the proceeds in satisfaction of her alimony claim.

The motion to dismiss was properly granted as to the Disbursing Officer of the District of Columbia. In the case of Chewning v. District of Columbia, 1941, 73 App.D.C. 392, 119 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 639, 62 S.Ct. 74, 86 L.Ed. 513, this court held that the District of Columbia, like the United States, is not subject to garnishment. There is no essential difference between attachment and garnishment and the relief sought here, i.e. the appointment of a sequestrator to collect funds from the District and pay them to appellant. Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1893, 1 App.D.C. 351; McGrew v. McGrew, 1930, 59 App.D.C. 230, 38 F. 2d 541.

The facts stated in the complaint would support a cause of action for a money judgment against appellee Rone, but no prayer for such relief was made. Appellee Rone is a non-resident and cannot be served personally. However, he has filed an unqualified motion to dismiss. Whether this would constitute a general appearance under these circumstances we need not decide, because the point was waived by failure to present it either to the trial court or on appeal.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

141 F.2d 23, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3590, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rone-v-rone-cadc-1944.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack