Rondell Davis v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 0441242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Fulton, Causey and Lorish

RONDELL DAVIS MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0441-24-2 PER CURIAM JUNE 3, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Jacqueline S. McClenney, Judge

(Michael B. Gunlicks; Gunlicks Law, L.C., on brief), for appellant.

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; C. David Sands, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Rondell Davis appeals his convictions, following guilty pleas, for second-degree murder,

use of a firearm in commission of a felony, and robbery using a firearm, in violation of Code

§§ 18.2-32, -53.1, and -58. On appeal, Davis argues that the trial court erred when it denied his

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. For the following reasons, we disagree, and affirm the

convictions.1

BACKGROUND

We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing

party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

On December 8, 2021, Davis was charged with first-degree murder of A.W., robbery,

two counts of use of a firearm in commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a

violent felon on November 30, 2021.2 Davis was also charged with an unrelated robbery of S.D.

and use of a firearm in commission of a robbery on November 25, 2021. Three attorneys were

appointed to represent Davis in his cases: Public Defenders Annalisa Feinman and Tracy Paner

were appointed to represent Davis on the charges stemming from the November 30, 2021

incident, and Pratt Cook was retained to represent Davis on the charges from the November 25,

2021 event.

On October 19, 2022, Davis signed a plea agreement to resolve all seven of his pending

charges. Davis agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder of A.W., use of a firearm in

commission of a felony, and robbery with a firearm on November 30, 2021. In exchange for

Davis’s guilty pleas, the Commonwealth amended the first-degree murder charge to

second-degree murder and nolle prossed the remaining matters. After conducting a plea

colloquy, the trial court found that Davis entered his guilty pleas freely, voluntarily, and

intelligently.

Davis stipulated that the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial would establish that on

November 30, 2021, Davis and three co-conspirators planned to rob A.W. The group lured A.W.

to an apartment complex, ambushed A.W., brandished firearms, and demanded A.W.’s property.

A.W. reached for his firearm and, in response, Davis shot A.W. twice in the back. Davis took

2 The record below primarily refers to the victim by his initials instead of his full name. We will continue this practice when referencing Davis’s victims. -2- A.W.’s backpack and fled with his co-defendants to a nearby apartment; A.W. died at the scene.

Shortly after the shooting, a patrol officer responding to the report of gunshots found A.W. A

subsequent autopsy determined that A.W. died from two gunshot wounds to the back.

When Davis and his co-defendants were arrested, officers recovered the clothing Davis

and the others had worn at the time of the shooting as well as two firearms involved in the

incident. Officers later searched Davis’s aunt’s home and discovered A.W.’s backpack and the

rifle Davis had used during the robbery. Forensic analysis determined that the bullets recovered

from A.W.’s autopsy exhibited similar general rifling class characteristics as the rifle Davis used.

Additionally, casings recovered at the scene were determined to have been fired from the

recovered rifle.

When Richmond police detectives interviewed Davis and his co-defendants, each

confessed to their involvement in the crimes. Davis specifically admitted that he and his

co-defendants had lured A.W. to the area with the intention of robbing him and that Davis had

shot A.W. twice upon seeing A.W.’s firearm. Davis also admitted that he and his co-defendants

had robbed S.D. in a similar manner on November 25, 2021, and that Davis had taken S.D.’s cell

phone and sneakers. At the time of Davis’s interview, he was wearing S.D.’s distinctive black

and yellow sneakers.

The trial court found Davis guilty of the crimes as stated in the plea agreement and

granted the Commonwealth’s motion to nolle pros the remaining charges. The matter was

continued for sentencing on April 7, 2023.

On April 5, 2023, Davis moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing he entered his pleas

under coercion and undue influence. He maintained his innocence and asserted that he wished to

present evidence “as to an alternate suspect.” On April 11, 2023, attorneys Feinman and Paner

filed a motion to withdraw as Davis’s counsel, which the trial court granted. The trial court

-3- appointed another attorney to represent Davis in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and

continued the matter.

At the September 15, 2023 hearing on Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, Davis

testified that he was pressured to plead guilty.3 Though he did not identify them by name, Davis

claimed that people close to him pressured him to take the plea agreement to cover for someone

else. Additionally, he claimed people close to A.W. threatened to hurt his family if he did not

plead guilty. He asserted that these threats were being sent to his sister via text message. Davis

admitted that he did not report the threats made against him to police or jail personnel.

Davis also asserted that his attorneys pressured him to sign the plea agreement. He

claimed that his attorneys refused to show him discovery materials from the Commonwealth

until after he signed the plea agreement. He claimed that when he finally reviewed the discovery

materials, he learned about a Crime Stoppers tip that stated he was not at the crime scene when

the robbery occurred. Davis claimed that he had a witness available to testify that he was not

present for the crime but admitted that he did not tell his previous attorneys about his alibi

witness. Davis also denied telling Detective Sleem that he had shot A.W.; he testified that he

could not remember reviewing surveillance footage of his crimes with the detective, reviewing

discovery with his attorneys, signing the plea agreement, or even engaging in the plea colloquy

with the trial court.

Detective Amira Sleem investigated A.W.’s death. During her testimony at the

September 15 hearing, Detective Sleem outlined her investigative steps and her interactions with

Davis. She testified that her investigation found that A.W. did not have any gang affiliation.

She reviewed surveillance video from the crime scene and observed A.W., carrying a backpack,

3 Davis admitted he was a felon and had been convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. -4- enter a breezeway outside of the camera’s view. Moments later, A.W. and several people

appeared to be running away from the breezeway.

Later when Detective Sleem interviewed Davis, Davis admitted that he and his

co-defendants had planned to lure A.W. to the apartment complex to rob him. When Davis

observed that A.W. was armed, Davis shot A.W. twice in the back before fleeing. Davis asserted

that he had not meant to kill A.W. and simply wished to rob him. Detective Sleem showed

Davis the surveillance video, and Davis identified himself and his co-defendants as they fled.

Davis was carrying A.W.’s backpack away from the scene. Davis also confessed to his

involvement in a robbery of S.D. on November 25, 2021.

When police interviewed Davis’s co-defendants, each of them confessed to their and

Davis’s involvement in the crimes. Detective Sleem noted that Davis’s cousin had told police

officers that he saw Davis put A.W.’s stolen property and a weapon inside Davis’s aunt’s home.

Officers later located A.W.’s backpack and a rifle in Davis’s aunt’s home. Detective Sleem

denied threatening Davis or using force against Davis during her interview with him.

Attorneys Cook, Paner, and Feinman testified that over the course of several months they

received discovery from the Commonwealth. Each time they received new discovery, they

reviewed the material with Davis. Attorney Cook noted that he discussed the Commonwealth’s

evidence with Davis six or seven times before Davis pleaded guilty and that those meetings

ranged from an hour to several hours. Additionally, he reviewed the plea agreement with Davis

several times and how the plea agreement would affect his sentencing guidelines.

Attorneys Paner and Feinman denied withholding any discovery material from Davis

until he signed the plea agreement and asserted that they reviewed the plea agreement with Davis

a dozen times. Each attorney noted that although they highly recommended that Davis take the

plea agreement, it was Davis’s decision whether to plead guilty. Each attorney denied forcing,

-5- threatening, or blackmailing Davis to sign the plea agreement or observing another attorney

coerce Davis to sign the plea agreement.

After arguments from counsel, the trial court took the matter under advisement. In an

order opinion, the trial court found that Davis failed to provide testimony sufficient to support his

claim that he was pressured to plead guilty to the charges. The court found that Davis was

presented with discovery materials from the Commonwealth and with sentencing guidelines on

all his charges before he entered his pleas. Additionally, Davis presented no information about

the timing of the alleged threats from others to accept the plea agreement, nor did he offer

evidence from family members aware of these purported threats. Although there was an

anonymous source that asserted that Davis was being framed for A.W.’s murder, the trial court

noted that the tip was not received until nearly six months after the guilty plea was entered and

two years after Davis had been indicted.

Upon these findings, the trial court denied Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Later, the trial court sentenced Davis to 53 years of incarceration, with 28 years suspended.

Davis appeals.

ANALYSIS

Davis argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

“We review a court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere

under an abuse of discretion standard.” Spencer v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 183, 186 (2017)

(citing Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 777, 785 (2013)). Accordingly, we will only

reverse the circuit court’s ruling upon “clear evidence that [the decision] was not judicially sound.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 477, 488 (1998)).

“Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred” with

-6- regard to a circuit court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Williams v. Commonwealth,

59 Va. App. 238, 246-47 (2011) (quoting Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21 (2006)).

“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only before sentence is imposed or

imposition of a sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice, the court within twenty-one

days after entry of a final order may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant

to withdraw his plea.” Code § 19.2-296. Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by two

standards depending on when the motion is made. “A motion to withdraw a guilty plea made after

sentencing is governed by the ‘manifest injustice’ standard.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 297 Va.

295, 300 (2019) (emphasis omitted). In contrast, motions made before a defendant is sentenced

should be granted if the plea was entered “by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the

charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official

misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly,

if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury.” Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 786 (quoting

Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325 (1949)).

To satisfy the “more forgiving” pre-sentence standard, Davis had “the burden of establishing

that his motion is made in good faith” and “proffer evidence of a reasonable basis for contesting

guilt.” Spencer, 68 Va. App. at 187. The trial court must also consider whether the Commonwealth

would be prejudiced by granting the motion. Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 787; Hubbard v.

Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 211 n.4 (2012).

“A reasonable defense sufficient to withdraw a guilty plea is ‘one based upon a proposition

of law or one supported by credible testimony, supported by affidavit.’” Ramsey v. Commonwealth,

65 Va. App. 593, 602 (2015) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249). “[T]he reasonable defense

requirement ‘defeats motions to withdraw which would result in an essentially futile trial[.]’”

Hubbard, 60 Va. App. at 208 (quoting Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34 (2008)). The

-7- appellant need not present proof that he would prevail on his asserted defense, but only that

evidence that allows the court “to determine whether [he] has made a prima facie showing of a

reasonable defense.” Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 67, 79 (2016). “To meet the

burden of introducing prima facie evidence of a reasonable defense, [the appellant] is required to

‘proffer[] . . . sufficient facts to support the asserted defense, such that it is reasonable to present it to

the judge or jury trying the case.’” Spencer, 68 Va. App. at 189 (second and third alterations in

original) (quoting Hernandez, 67 Va. App. at 79).

Here, regardless of whether Davis demonstrated that his motion to withdraw was made in

good faith, he did not establish a reasonable defense to the charges. Davis claimed that his peers

pressured him to take the Commonwealth’s plea deal to cover for someone else, that people close to

A.W. threatened him to take the plea agreement, and that his attorneys pressured him to take the

plea agreement. Davis, however, failed to identify any peers who pressured him or the person they

wished to protect from prosecution. Additionally, Davis provided no timeline for the context of the

threats A.W.’s associates allegedly made, provided no specific language used in the threats, offered

no testimony from family members about the threats, or clarified who was threatening him.

Despite Davis’s testimony that his attorneys did not show him discovery material until after

he pleaded guilty to the charges, each of Davis’s previous attorneys testified that they reviewed

discovery material with Davis on numerous occasions and discussed the pros and cons of accepting

the Commonwealth’s plea agreement before Davis ultimately pleaded guilty. Each attorney also

denied pressuring Davis to take the plea agreement or observing another attorney pressure Davis.

Although the attorneys candidly admitted that they recommended Davis take the plea deal, each of

them also made it clear that the choice to accept the deal was Davis’s alone. While Davis points to

an anonymous tip that Crime Stoppers received as evidence in support of his defense, that tip was

-8- received two years after his indictment and six months after his guilty pleas. Moreover, Davis

named no witnesses or proffered what his alibi defense would be.

Finally, Davis contends that he entered the pleas “inadvisedly”; we disagree. Here,

Detective Sleem testified that she viewed surveillance footage that showed A.W. arrive at the crime

scene with a backpack. Moments later, several people fled that scene, including Davis who was

carrying A.W.’s backpack. Based on a tip from Davis’s cousin, officers recovered A.W.’s backpack

and the weapon Davis used during the robbery at Davis’s aunt’s home. Upon being interviewed by

officers, Davis and his co-defendants admitted to their involvement in the robbery of A.W. as well

as the robbery of S.D. days earlier. Davis identified himself in the surveillance footage and

admitted that he shot A.W. twice upon seeing A.W.’s firearm. Forensic analysis confirmed that the

recovered rifle was the likely murder weapon. Nothing in the record suggests that the attorneys’

recommendation to accept the plea deal was coercive. Rather, counsel offered sound advice which

Davis chose to take.

In sum, Davis offered no evidence to support anything other than an insubstantial or

“formal” defense and nothing in the record supports an assertion that the guilty pleas were entered

“inadvisedly.” Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to withdraw his

guilty pleas.4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

4 The Commonwealth argues that Davis’s argument has been waived for his failure to satisfy Rule 5A:20, because the brief does not include “principles of law and authorities” supporting a lack of prejudice to the Commonwealth by the grant of the plea withdrawal. While Davis’s brief asserts that “there would not be true prejudice to the Commonwealth because the other defendants in the offenses had not been tried at the time of the motion [to withdraw the guilty pleas], and that all witnesses and evidence were still available,” we hold that Davis’s brief satisfactorily presents “principles of law and authorities,” albeit rudimentarily. -9-