Ronald Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: April 4, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0012
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: APRIL 4, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0012-MR

RONALD WILLIAMS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE KENNETH HAROLD GOFF, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00262

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, L. JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Ronald Williams (“Williams”) entered a conditional guilty

plea to several drug-related charges. After a remand by this Court for necessary

findings of facts, Williams again appeals the Grayson Circuit Court’s order

denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant of

his residence. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2021, a search warrant was issued for Williams’s residence,

vehicle, and person. When this search warrant was executed, illegal drugs were

found, which led to the charges against Williams. In January 2022, Williams filed

a pro se motion which stated in full: “[T]he Defendant Ronald Dale Williams Jr.

comes before the Grayson County Court to file a motion for a Franks[1] hearing.

This motion is to be heard on the next available court date.” Williams’s appointed

counsel later explained to the circuit court that the motion was to suppress

evidence because Williams believed the search warrant was insufficient to state

probable cause.

On March 15, 2022, the circuit court held a suppression hearing.

Detective Jesse Townsend (“Detective Townsend”) with the Leitchfield Police

Department assigned to the Greater Hardin County Narcotics Task Force testified

about the affidavit he prepared in applying for a search warrant of Williams’s

residence. Detective Townsend relied on information provided to him separately

by a confidential informant (“CI”), an unnamed woman who previously resided

1 Referencing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court held “where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”

-2- with Williams, and two other identified women who claimed their friend was

missing and was at Williams’s residence.

The CI told Detective Townsend that a drug dealer named “JJ” lived

at Williams’s address. The CI had neither been to Williams’s residence nor

personally bought drugs from him. The CI also reported that a woman had been

traded for drugs to Williams. Another unnamed woman reported that she had lived

with Williams and claimed to have been drugged and raped by Williams. She

stated Williams keeps drugs hidden in his residence, as well as in a “fanny pack”

on his person.

Williams testified during the suppression hearing. He claimed the

woman who alleged he drugged and raped her was an ex-girlfriend who made the

report because he had kicked her out. He also denied that any missing women had

ever been located at his house or that any law enforcement had come to investigate

missing women. Williams did acknowledge that he lived at the address listed on

the search warrant.

Williams argued the affidavit did not contain sufficient information to

establish probable cause. He claims the CI never gave any first-hand information

that Williams was selling drugs. Williams also attacked the credibility of the

unnamed woman in the affidavit, as no sexual assault investigation or charges

came from her allegations. The Commonwealth countered that the affidavit

-3- contained three separate reports of drugs being sold from Williams’s residence.

The circuit court orally ruled that the motion for suppression was denied.

In April 2022, Williams entered his conditional guilty plea. He pled

guilty to amended charges, for a total of ten years to serve at 20% parole eligibility.

He reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue.

Williams appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. He argued

that the circuit court failed to make any findings of fact and conclusions of law,

and that there was a lack of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

This Court vacated and remanded2 to the circuit court to enter a new order

containing findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by CR3 52.01.

The circuit court entered a new order on October 6, 2023, again

denying Williams’s motion to suppress. This order contained findings of facts and

conclusions of law to support the ruling. The circuit court determined that the

unnamed woman who provided the report had personal, detailed knowledge of the

residence, as well as the manner and method of concealment of drugs. The circuit

court believed this report, when combined with the CI’s information provided to

Detective Townsend and the other reports, was enough to establish probable cause.

2 Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0612-MR, 2023 WL 4982099 (Ky. App. Aug. 4, 2023). 3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-4- The circuit court further determined that, even if the search warrant was defective,

the “good faith exception” would apply.

This appeal follows. Williams again challenges the circuit court’s

ruling that there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to issue the

search warrant. We will develop any further relevant factual details in our

following analysis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a

two-prong test. First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly

erroneous standard. Under this standard, the trial court’s findings of fact will be

conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Second, we review de

novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” Rhoton v.

Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 273, 275-76 (Ky. 2020) (footnotes omitted).

ANALYSIS

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Section 10 of Kentucky’s

Constitution is essentially the same. The Kentucky Constitution does not provide

-5- any greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

Hunter v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 298, 305 (Ky. 2019).

“Whether probable cause exists is determined by examining the

totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, the test for probable cause is whether

there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place. Probable cause does not require certainty that a crime has been

committed or that evidence will be present in the place to be searched.” Moore v.

Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Ky. 2005), as modified (Apr. 21, 2005)

(citations omitted). When reviewing a motion to suppress, a court must look at the

“‘totality of the circumstances’ presented within the four corners of the affidavit.”

Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Ky. 2010).

Williams argues the affidavit in this case was a facially deficient “bare

bones” affidavit. “An affidavit that states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions,

without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity,

reliability, and basis of knowledge, is a ‘bare bones’ affidavit.” United States v.

Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir. 1996).

The affidavit here contained information from three separate sources.

The first source was an unnamed woman who claimed to have been drugged and

raped by Williams. She informed law enforcement that Williams uses

approximately two ounces of methamphetamine a week, and that he keeps it and

-6- other drugs in his residence. She claimed he specifically hid drugs inside vents in

the home, particularly bathroom vents. Drugs were later found near such a vent

when the search warrant was issued. She stated Williams has cameras both inside

and outside of the home. This woman also told law enforcement she had been at

Williams’s residence about seven days prior to making her report. She claims she

did not report earlier because she had an outstanding arrest warrant.

Detective Townsend’s second source of information came from a CI,

who told him in mid-June 2021 that a large drug dealer lived on Shrewsbury Road

in Leitchfield. This CI gave Detective Townsend directions to the location, which

was Williams’s address. The CI claimed to know this drug dealer only by the

nickname “JJ.” A few weeks later, this CI told Detective Townsend that a woman

had gone missing and was believed to be at JJ’s residence. The CI stated this

woman had been traded for drugs by another woman (“Nicole”). Detective

Townsend stated he has worked with the CI in the past, and the CI had provided

consistently reliable information.

Around this same time, Detective Townsend was given his third

source of information for the search warrant. He was advised by local law

enforcement that two women had made a report that their friend was missing and

was believed to be at Williams’s residence. Detective Townsend wrote in the

affidavit that the friend was in fact located at Williams’s residence and that the

-7- reporting women themselves appeared to be under the influence of drugs, although

the specific source of this information was not provided to Detective Townsend.

In addition to these reports, Detective Townsend included within his affidavit a

summary of Williams’s criminal history, which included both a drug-related felony

and a sex offense.

Williams first attacks the reliability of the CI Detective Townsend

relied upon. The CI had not been inside Williams’s residence, nor had the CI

purchased drugs from Williams. Since it does not seem as if the CI had personal

knowledge of the information given to Detective Townsend, the CI’s information

must have been learned through other sources. Yet “hearsay information may be

the basis of probable cause to search and there is no need for a specific showing of

a named informant’s reliability.” Beckam v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 547, 549

(Ky. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Had this CI been Detective Townsend’s only source of information in

his affidavit for the search warrant, it might have been inadequate to establish

probable cause. Because it was determined the CI did not have personal

knowledge of the information given to Detective Townsend, more information may

be needed to get past “bare bones” conclusions. It is unknown how the CI knew a

drug dealer was living at the address, how the CI was aware a woman had been

traded for drugs, or when these transactions were occurring. Still, a CI’s past

-8- reliability is a component of the “totality of the circumstances” test. Lovett v.

Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Ky. 2003).

When an officer is providing information for a search warrant about a

CI, it is that officer’s duty to outline his or her basis for the belief that the CI is

reliable, or how the CI has proven to be reliable in the past. “An officer’s

statement that ‘affiants have received reliable information from a credible person

and believe’” are inadequate to show probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). “A mere statement

that an informant is reliable, without more, is insufficient in and of itself to

establish the informant’s credibility for purposes of issuing a search warrant.”

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 199 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Ky. App. 2006). But the CI in

this case was not Detective Townsend’s only source of information.

Detective Townsend also received information from an unnamed but

identifiable woman, who claimed to have been recently inside Williams’s

residence. It is interesting to note that while Detective Townsend never gave the

woman’s name, Williams immediately knew, or claimed to know, who she was.

He identified this woman as an ex-girlfriend, who he claims to have kicked out of

the residence. While it was never conclusively stated if this woman was Detective

Townsend’s source of information, Williams’s own testimony lends credence to

-9- the conclusion that this woman had, in fact, been inside Williams’s residence and

was very familiar with it, including the drug activity going on inside the residence.

“When faced with a motion to suppress, a trial court judge must

‘determine whether under the totality of the circumstances presented within the

four corners of the affidavit, a warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed.’” Minks v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d

802, 809 (Ky. 2014) (citing Pride, supra, at 49). We must determine if the

warrant-issuing judge had probable cause at the time the warrant was signed. See

id. at 810.

The circuit court was unaware of who the unnamed woman was until

the suppression hearing. At the time the warrant was issued, it was believed she

was a rape victim. And while she was not named in the affidavit, she was not an

anonymous tipster or confidential informant. Detective Townsend knew her

identity. She claimed to have been inside Williams’s residence, and she claimed

she had been there approximately seven days prior.

She was able to describe where cameras were located at the residence.

She told Detective Townsend what type of drugs would be found in the home and

where Williams typically hid them. “[W]hile a court may question an informant’s

motives, an explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a

statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles [the informant’s] tip to

-10- greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Lovett, supra, at 78 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Williams points out that there is no evidence of an investigation or

charges brought due to the allegations of Williams’s drugging and raping the

unnamed woman as further evidence of her lacking in credibility. But “when a

search warrant has been obtained, there is no reason for an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether the facts alleged in the affidavit are actually true.” Minks,

supra, at 809. The question is not whether the rape allegations turned out to be

true or not, the question is whether the information provided by Detective

Townsend to the circuit court provided probable cause. Detective Townsend, as a

detective assigned to a drug task force, testified that he had no part in any

investigation into the alleged sexual assault. But he did note in his affidavit that

the Grayson County Sheriff’s Department was investigating the reported sexual

crime.

This leads us to Detective Townsend’s third source of information.

Around the same time as the CI’s report, Detective Townsend was contacted by

local law enforcement to advise that two women reported a friend missing and

believed to be at Williams’s address. Because Detective Townsend was not

involved in that investigation, the details are unclear. Yet a woman was located at

-11- Williams’s residence when the search warrant was executed, and she may have

been under the influence of drugs.

Like the information obtained from the CI, this information from the

two additional witnesses by itself might not be adequate to support probable cause.

But this became the third report in a relatively short time frame in which

Williams’s address was brought to the attention of Detective Townsend regarding

drug-related activity. As far as can be determined from the record, these three

reports were all made independently of one another. Taken together, this

information was enough to show “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of

a crime will be found” at Williams’s residence. Moore, supra, at 329. In totality,

the information was sufficient to support the circuit court’s determination that

probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. While the affidavit was not a

perfect one, that is not required.

Additionally, we agree with the circuit court and the Commonwealth

that even if probable cause was not established to support the issuance of the

search warrant, the good faith exception applies, rendering the seized evidence

admissible.

The “good faith exception” was outlined by the United States

Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468, U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.

2d 677 (1984). The Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment

-12- exclusionary rule should not automatically be applied to bar the prosecution’s

evidence obtained by law enforcement officers who acted in reasonable reliance on

a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but was ultimately

ruled invalid. Id. The Supreme Court of Kentucky applied this exception in

Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992), determining the good

faith exception did not violate Section 10 of Kentucky’s Constitution. Crayton

stated:

There is a popular but erroneous belief that the Leon Court eviscerated the exclusionary rule when the evidence is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. In fact, the Court held that the officer must have an objectively reasonable belief in the sufficiency of the warrant and the probable cause determination. If the affidavit contains false or misleading information, the officer’s reliance cannot be reasonable. Likewise, the Court retained the exclusionary rule and applied no presumption of validity in cases of abandonment by the judge of a detached and neutral role, and in cases where the officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause is entirely unreasonable. Finally, suppression was retained as a remedy where the warrant is facially deficient by failing to describe the place to be searched or the thing to be seized. In sum, the court imposed a standard of objective reasonableness on police activity and retained the suppression remedy when police conduct falls below that standard.

Id. at 687-88.

Said otherwise, a technically defective search warrant obtained in good faith after proper application to a judicial officer is preferable to an unsupervised and potentially fraudulent warrantless search. We therefore

-13- hold that application of a good faith exception to the warrant requirement, as articulated in United States v. Leon, supra, does not violate Section 10 of the Constitution of Kentucky.

Id. at 688-89.

Williams argues the good faith exception should not apply here. His

argument reiterates his claim that the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause

that it was unreasonable to rely upon it. Despite his initial motion being for a

Franks hearing, the only information in the affidavit Williams claims is “false or

misleading” is the motive behind the unnamed woman’s report to Detective

Townsend. He makes no allegations that Detective Townsend knew or had reason

to know any of the information in his affidavit was false. There has been no

suggestion that the issuing judge in this instance abandoned his “detached and

neutral” judicial role. The warrant adequately described the “place to be searched

and the thing to be seized.”

As we’ve discussed in detail, Detective Townsend relied on

information provided to him by three separate sources that illegal drug activity was

occurring at Williams’s residence. Even if the probable cause had been just on the

dividing line for enough evidence to sustain a warrant, we do not believe the

officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause in this case was entirely

unreasonable. “[W]here evidence is sufficient to create disagreement among

thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause, it cannot be

-14- said that police officers who provide a truthful affidavit to a neutral magistrate who

then issues a warrant are not objectively reasonable in believing that they have

probable cause.” Beckam, supra, at 551 (citing 29 AM.JUR.2D Evidence § 616

(2008)).

CONCLUSION

The search warrant was properly supported by probable cause. We

further determine that, even if the warrant was deficient, Detective Townsend

reasonably relied on the issuance of the warrant, and therefore the good faith

exception would apply. The Grayson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Erin Hoffman Yang Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-15-