Ronald Van Hook v. Winmill

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 18, 2023
• Docket: 22-36065
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD VAN HOOK, No. 22-36065

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00347-JCC

v. MEMORANDUM* WINMILL, 4th Judicial District Southern Idaho; A.A AND THE CLERK’S OFFICE, and others unknown of the 4th Judicial District of Southern Idaho; STATE OF IDAHO; ROBERT A. BERRY, Idaho Deputy Attorney General; ALL MEMBERS OF THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT; SUSAN WIEBE, Payette County District Court Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 12, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Ronald Van Hook appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187

(9th Cir. 2003). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson

v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Van Hook’s claims against Judge

Winmill and a staff member in the district court clerk’s office on the basis of

judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385,

1388, 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that judicial or quasi-judicial

immunity available to federal officers extends to actions for damages as well as

those for equitable relief, and holding that court clerks have quasi-judicial

immunity for performing, or failing to perform, tasks that are an integral part of the

judicial process).

The district court properly dismissed Van Hook’s claims against state court

Judge Wiebe and all members of the Idaho Supreme Court on the basis of judicial

immunity and as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Cooper v. Ramos,

704 F.3d 772, 777-79 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a “de facto” appeal

of a state court decision and claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court

2 22-36065 decision); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001)

(describing factors relevant to whether an act is judicial in nature and subject to

judicial immunity).

The district court properly dismissed Van Hook’s claims against the State of

Idaho because his claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (explaining that the

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against

an unconsenting state, regardless of the nature of the relief sought).

Dismissal of Van Hook’s claims against defendant Berry was proper

because Van Hook failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Appling v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that

fraud on the court is defined narrowly as “that species of fraud which does or

attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court

so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial

task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Van Hook’s motion

to add state court Magistrate Judge Meienhofer as a defendant, by denying Van

3 22-36065 Hook’s filing seeking to add a claim of treason, or by dismissing without leave to

amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041

(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court

may dismiss without leave where amendment would be futile); see also Cooper,

704 F.3d at 777-79 (discussing application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting in part and denying

in part Van Hook’s motion for judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (providing

that a court may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable

dispute”); United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County,

547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard of review).

We reject as without merit Van Hook’s contention that the district court

erred by denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s postjudgment order

declaring Van Hook a vexatious litigant because Van Hook failed to file an

amended or separate notice of appeal. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585

(9th Cir. 2007) (appellant generally must file a separate notice of appeal or amend

a previously filed notice of appeal to secure review of a postjudgment order). The

appeal of the district court’s vexatious litigant order is pending in appeal No. 23-

35457 and will be addressed in that docket.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

4 22-36065 in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs, set forth in the answering

brief of Judge Wiebe and all members of the Idaho Supreme Court, is denied

without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 38 (requiring a separate motion for fees and

costs); Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir. 2009)

(a request made in an appellate brief does not satisfy Rule 38). All other pending

motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

5 22-36065