Ronald Van Hook v. State of Idaho

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 7, 2024
• Docket: 22-35836
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 7 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD VAN HOOK, No. 22-35836

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00199-BLW

v. MEMORANDUM* STATE OF IDAHO; JOHN MEIENHOFFER; ALPS PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; RYAN O’NEAL, Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation; JUDGES OF THE IDAHO THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COLLECTIVELY; STEVEN FISHER; MARY GRANT; KIMBERLY STRETCH; VIRGINIA BOND; DIANE MINNICH; DAVID W. CANTRILL; AARON HOOPER; GARY DEMEYER, Or Estate of Gary DeMeyer; OFFICERS OF THE COURT IN ADAMS COUNTY, Collectively or Individually; OTHER POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted March 7, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges

Ronald Van Hook appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of his

motion to reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of

discretion,1 and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Van Hook’s motion

to reopen the time to appeal. It applied the correct legal standard,2 and its factual

finding that Van Hook did not show non-receipt of notice of judgment was not

“illogical, implausible, or without support” from the record. See United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Because the district

court’s denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion, we are without

jurisdiction to consider Van Hook’s arguments concerning the merits of the

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, see Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2), and therefore denies Van Hook’s motion for oral argument. We also deny Van Hook’s motion for consolidation. 1 Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 See id. at 796.

2 22-35836 underlying case. Cf. Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.,

476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007).

Judge Winmill was not required to recuse himself from considering Van

Hook’s Rule 4(a)(6) motion. Neither Van Hook’s lawsuit against the judge nor his

unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct are sufficient grounds for recusal. See

United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913, 914 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939–40 (9th Cir. 1986).

We deny Van Hook’s motion for judicial notice and supplementation of the

record. Van Hook has failed to specifically connect his prior proceedings with the

district court’s denial of his motion to reopen the time to appeal,3 and we will not

do so on his behalf.4

Finally, we decline to consider Van Hook’s arguments raised for the first

time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam).

AFFIRMED.

3 See Tiedemann v. von Blanckensee, 72 F.4th 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2023). 4 Cf. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 987 (9th Cir. 2011).

3 22-35836