Ronald Tolliver v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 22, 2017
Docket63A05-1610-CR-2321
StatusPublished

This text of Ronald Tolliver v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ronald Tolliver v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald Tolliver v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 22 2017, 10:05 am

this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals and Tax Court court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Steven E. Ripstra Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana Jasper, Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ronald L. Tolliver, March 22, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 63A05-1610-CR-2321 v. Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court The Honorable Jeffrey L. State of Indiana, Biesterveld, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 63C01-1604-F5-250

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Ronald L. Tolliver (“Tolliver”) pleaded guilty in Pike Circuit Court to Level 5

felony child solicitation and was sentenced to the advisory term of three years

of incarceration. Tolliver appeals and presents two issues for our review, which

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1610-CR-2321 | March 22, 2017 Page 1 of 9 we restate as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to

consider certain circumstances as mitigating, and (2) whether Tolliver’s three-

year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the

character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In late March 2016, Tolliver, who was then sixty-eight years old, participated in

an internet chatroom for teenagers. In this chatroom, he started a chat

conversation with “Maddie,” who identified herself as a thirteen-year-old girl.

Maddie was actually a screen name used by Petersburg Police Department

Sergeant Chad McClellan (“Officer McClellan”). Tolliver soon began to chat

with Maddie about sexual topics. He asked Maddie if she masturbated and

encouraged her to do so because it felt good. He also informed Maddie that he

masturbated daily and had masturbated since he was eleven years old. Tolliver

was concerned that Maddie’s mother might see their conversations and made

sure that Maddie would not tell her mother about Tolliver’s chat. Tolliver

eventually admitted to Maddie that he was sixty-eight years old and told

Maddie that she could view him as a grandfather.

[4] Nevertheless, Tolliver’s interest in Maddie was not paternal. He told her how to

masturbate, crudely telling her where to find her clitoris. He also asked if she

had small breasts and told her that he liked small breasts. Tolliver told Maddie

that he loved her and that she was beautiful. Tolliver asked Maddie not to put

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1610-CR-2321 | March 22, 2017 Page 2 of 9 on any underwear after showering and again encouraged her to masturbate.

Tolliver also tried to get Maddie to videochat with him, but she told him that

she did not have a camera on her phone. He then told her that he liked to be

watched while masturbating and that she did not need a camera to watch him.

He then sent her video of him masturbating.

[5] On April 4, 2016, the State charge Tolliver with Level 5 felony child

solicitation. On August 15, 2016, Tolliver pleaded guilty as charged. A

sentencing hearing was held on September 6, 2016. At this hearing, Tolliver

presented evidence that he was had been honorably discharged from the Army

and had been fully employed. He had no criminal history and had health

problems that resulted in the amputation of the lower portion of his right leg.

He also had a bypass to save his right leg and a triple coronary bypass. Tolliver

testified that his sister and forty-one-year-old son had recently died.

[6] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court pronounced sentence

as follows:

The Court having considered the Pre[-]Sentence Investigation [report], having considered arguments of counsel and the evidence presented at this hearing. By way of aggravating factors, the Court finds that the IRAS assessment lists the defendant as a high risk to reoffend. IRAS, while everything else appears to be low, has a characterization concerning the nature and the circumstances of the particular offense. And that’s the reason for the high risk to reoffend here. The Court by mitigating circumstances, finds that the defendant has plead guilty, saved the Court’s time and resources. That he has no prior criminal history and has led a law-abiding life. So the Court considers

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1610-CR-2321 | March 22, 2017 Page 3 of 9 then the circumstances of this particular case and the Court considers the Pre[-]Sentence [report] and all the factors listed, considered the character of the defendant, considered the defendant’s statement, in particularly, that while he accepted responsibility and plead guilty, he continues to blame the officer for what happened here. At the same time he knew that what he did was wrong and he’s an adult and he’s responsible for his actions. The Court tries to determine the appropriate sentence in the cause and finds that probation and community corrections in this case are not viable alternatives. And therefore the Court sentences the defendant as follows: to an advisory sentence of three (3) years in the Indiana Department of Corrections. The defendant will receive credit for a hundred fifty-three (153) actual days, from April 7, 2016 through September 6, 2016, for a total of a hundred fifty-three (153) days. And on a three (3) for one (1) good time, that’s fifty-one (51) good time credit days. The defendant is to register as a sex offender.

Tr. pp. 91-92. Tolliver now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Tolliver first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

consider certain mitigating factors. We review a sentence that is within the

statutory range only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d

482, 490 (Ind. 2007). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is

“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn

therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion by: (1) failing to enter a

sentencing statement, (2) finding aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported

by the record, (3) omitting mitigating factors clearly supported by the record

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1610-CR-2321 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 9 and advanced for consideration, or (4) giving reasons that are improper as a

matter of law. Id. at 490-91. When considering aggravating and mitigating

factors, the relative weight given to a factor is not available for appellate review.

Id. at 493-94.

[8] Tolliver claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider certain mitigating

factors that he claims were clearly supported by the record, such as his health

problems, military service, and lack of a criminal history. He also claims that

the trial court abused its discretion by considering his IRAS score as an

aggravator. However, even if we assume arguendo that Tolliver is correct and

that the trial court did abuse its discretion in sentencing Tolliver, this would not

require us to remand for resentencing.

[9] Even if we conclude that a trial court has abused its discretion in sentencing, we

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Related

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895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Windhorst v. State
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Anglemyer v. State
868 N.E.2d 482 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Childress v. State
848 N.E.2d 1073 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2006)
Golden v. State
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869 N.E.2d 546 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)
Fonner v. State
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Chappell v. State
966 N.E.2d 124 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2012)
Trainor v. State
950 N.E.2d 352 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2011)
Fernbach v. State
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David Williams v. State of Indiana
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Ryan Shelby v. State of Indiana
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