NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2687-23
RONALD SCHECHTER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SOCIETY HILL EAST CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted September 15, 2025 – Decided October 29, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. SC-001003- 23.
Cutolo Barros, LLC, attorneys for appellant (James F. Vislosky, Jr. and Jennifer M. Kurtz, on the briefs).
Ronald Schechter, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM Defendant Society Hill East Condominium Association, Inc., appeals
from an order of the Special Civil Part, Small Claims Section, entered after a
bench trial, awarding plaintiff Ronald Schechter $1,600 as compensation for
repairs he made to his unit, and $42 in court costs. The judge concluded
plaintiff's damages related to defendant's failure to remediate defects in the
condominium's common elements. Based upon our review of the record and
applicable legal principles, we affirm.
Defendant is a New Jersey non-profit corporation that operates Society
Hill East Condominiums in East Brunswick, a 414-unit complex. Plaintiff, a
retired engineer, and his wife, have owned a unit at Society Hill and resided
there for over forty years. Plaintiff also previously served as a member of the
defendant's board for approximately five-and-a-half years.
As the trial record reveals, over a four-year period, plaintiff experienced
repeated freezing of the toilet water supply line pipe located in a bathroom
adjacent to an exterior wall. Plaintiff stated the pipe continued to freeze during
inclement weather, despite his efforts to warm and insulate the pipe.
Commencing in February 2019, plaintiff submitted multiple, unsuccessful
requests to defendant asking that it investigate and correct the issue related to
the water supply pipe, which he asserted was defendant's responsibility under
A-2687-23 2 the relevant operating documents, because it was caused by a lack of insulation
in the interior wall, a common element. After his initial work request on the
pipe was "closed" without explanation, the supply line pipe froze again the
following winter. Plaintiff insulated it himself, which prevented it from freezing
for the rest of that winter and the next. In January 2022, plaintiff again filed a
work request after temperatures plunged, and the water supply pipe once again
froze.
In August 2022, plaintiff received a response from defendant's director of
operations. In his letter, the director, despite acknowledging defendant "[was]
responsible for the space between the unit's sheetrock and the . . . [exterior]
wall," asserted defendant had "no legal duty to install insulation in that area and
the board decided against voluntarily assum[ing] such a duty." The director also
informed plaintiff the board concluded "this was not a common pipe [and] . . .
only serviced [plaintiff's] unit."
The water supply line pipe again froze in February 2023, and plaintiff
once more contacted defendant to address the issue. A September 2023 letter
informed plaintiff that defendant's lawyer had determined "the cause of
[plaintiff's] line freezing in [his] lower bathroom is isolated to [his] unit only."
Defendant also stated as the pipe "is not considered a common element, . . . it is
A-2687-23 3 [plaintiff's] responsibility to repair." Defendant further explained "[i]f the
[board were] to move forward with [plaintiff's] request . . ., [it] would be setting
a precedent for other homeowners to come forward with the expectations [for]
the same treatment."
Plaintiff continued to ask defendant to investigate and address the issue.
In this regard, he forwarded a "[r]elease of [i]ndemnity" informing defendant he
planned to proceed with repairs on October 16, 2023, that would "consist of the
removal of the interior drywall behind the commode and a section of side wall."
He also explained the "plumbing supply line to the commode [would] be
shortened . . . [and] R[-]15 insulation [would] be installed." Plaintiff further
informed defendant he "retained all rights to recover the cost of the repairs . . .
either through direct payment or through the . . . [c]ourt system." Defendant
never responded, and plaintiff accordingly proceeded with the repairs, which
cost $1,600.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a small claims complaint demanding $2,109.87 in
damages, plus costs, and alleged his claim was based on a "contract" with
defendant. The amount requested represented the costs of the plumber and the
additional expenses plaintiff incurred to insulate the water supply line pipe
himself beginning in the winter of 2020.
A-2687-23 4 Plaintiff specifically alleged he had "been ignored by the [b]oard . . . for
[four] years." Plaintiff then proceeded to give a timeline of his complaints,
beginning with the February 2019 request. As the matter proceeded in small
claims court, defendant opted not to file an answer.
The judge held a one-day bench trial in which plaintiff and Jackie
Thormador, Branch President of Associa Community Management of New
Jersey (Associa) testified. According to Thormador, Associa acts as the
"managing agent" for defendant and is responsible for overseeing the "day -to-
day operations" including repairing common elements.
Plaintiff acknowledged "[the pipe] under normal circumstances . . .
[would] be [his] responsibility to repair." He testified, based on his experience
on the board for five-and-a-half years, "the [b]oard [would have] gone in and
made repairs to . . . unit[s]" including damaged sheetrock from a faulty common
element like a roof leak. Plaintiff provided exhibits and documentary evidence
including his work orders for maintenance on the frozen water supply line pipe,
his lawyer's demand letter, copies of defendant's response to his demand letter,
photographs of the pipe and his efforts to solve the issue, the invoice reflecting
the plumber's repair, and photographs of online weather trends and his
A-2687-23 5 thermostat showing the frigid weather on the days he recounted the pipe
freezing.
Plaintiff acknowledged the master deed specified "no owner shall make
any structural modifications, or alterations, within a dwelling unit, without any
written consent of [defendant]." Plaintiff stated in repairing the pipe, "the only
. . . change was . . . the insulation was added to any area that had no insulation
prior." He asserted "when [his] contractor pulled the sheetrock down, there was
no additional insulation" in the area of the water supply line pipe.
Plaintiff acknowledged section one of the condominium bylaws requires
"[e]ach member . . . [to] perform properly, and at his own risk, cost and expense,
all maintenance or repair work, with respect to the portion of each unit, owned
by that member, which does not comprise a part of the common elements" and
section nine states, in part, "a member shall not make structural modifications
or alterations, in its unit, or installations, located therein, without the written
consent of [defendant]." Plaintiff also testified the plumber's invoice did not
break down the cost of the repairs.
Thormador explained her understanding of the master deed and bylaws
and stated, based upon her experience, the water supply line pipe "would be
considered as part of the unit, and not a common element." She alleged
A-2687-23 6 defendant attempted to inspect the water supply line before plaintiff went
forward with the repair "to . . . make a determination . . . whether or not a
common element was causing his issue." She also confirmed she had previously
been in plaintiff's unit when plaintiff highlighted the pipe "to show [her] what
the problem was." Finally, Thormador acknowledged that if a roof leak caused
damage to the interior of a unit, defendant would have likely reimbursed the unit
owner for those repairs.
After considering the testimony of the parties and the documentary
evidence, the judge entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,642,
approximately $500 less than his requested damages, and explained its decision
in an oral opinion. The judge rejected defendant's contention that the invoice
was insufficient to prove plaintiff's damages claim because it did not itemize the
different costs associated with the repairs. The judge explained it would not
expect "for a relatively small job, [a] plumber[] . . . [to] not break out time and
materials." The judge found the $1,600 cost was "for a job of this nature . . .
[not] out of the range of things."
As to defendant's responsibility for the repairs, the judge noted both
parties agreed that defendant was only required to repair common elements. The
judge then found "plaintiff, . . . an engineer, testified accurately that the problem
A-2687-23 7 with his pipe[] was . . . caused by . . . the cold. [T]he fact that [plaintiff] was
able to solve the problem by heating up the wall with a hairdryer, . . . indicate [s]
. . . that the problem was that the pipe was frozen."
The judge found defendant breached its duty to provide sufficient
insulation and explained that "if there's a problem with insulation . . . in the . . .
wall, . . . that's a common element, and [defendant] need[ed] to deal with it."
Finally, the judge found plaintiff was required to shorten the water supply line
pipe because it was freezing from cold weather, a fact that did not require expert
testimony as it was "knowable to anybody with a high school knowledge of . . .
physics."
As noted, the judge entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $1,600, plus
$42 in court costs and rejected his request for the additional costs incurred
related to his attempt to insulate the water supply line pipe himself.
Before us, defendant argues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ASSOCIATION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF PLAINTIFF’S SHEETROCK AND WATER PIPE, AS SAME ARE COMPONENTS OF THE UNIT, WHICH PLAINTIFF MUST MAINTAIN AND REPAIR, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSOCIATION IN
A-2687-23 8 MAINTAINING THE COMMON ELEMENT NECESSITATED SUCH REPAIRS.
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND UNDISPUTED AT TRIAL, PLAINTIFF – AND NOT THE ASSOCIATION – IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF THE WATER PIPE AND SHEETROCK, WHICH ARE PART OF THE UNIT, RATHER THAN THE COMMON ELEMENT.
B. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSOCIATION WARRANTING AN AWARD OF DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN HOLDING THE ASSOCIATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COSTS OF COMMON ELEMENT MODIFICATIONS IMPROPERLY MADE BY PLAINTIFF – A DECISION THAT CANNOT STAND AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE ENTIRE AMOUNT SET FORTH IN AN UNITEMIZED INVOICE, WHICH INCLUDED WORK PERFORMED ON COMPONENTS OF THE UNIT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS RESPONSIBLE TO MAINTAIN.
IV. PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY THAT THE ASSOCIATION WOULD HAVE REPAIRED HIS SHEETROCK IF THE MATTER INVOLVED A ROOF LEAK WAS IRRELEVANT, SPECULATIVE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED.
A-2687-23 9 V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY RELYING UPON THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN DETERMINING THE CAUSE OF THE FREEZING PIPES AND THE REMEDIAL MEASURES REQUIRED, ABSENT ANY EXPERT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ITS DECISION.
We disagree with all of defendant's arguments as we are satisfied that the
judgment is based on adequate, substantial, credible evidence in the record. We
provide the following comments to amplify our decision.
Our review of a judge's factual findings following a bench trial is limited
and well established. See Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150,
169 (2011). Our task is not to determine whether an alternative version of the
facts has support in the record, but rather, whether "there is substantial evidence
in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions." Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (citing Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, Inc.,
65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961)). Accordingly, we will "not disturb
the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are
convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the
interests of justice." In re Trust Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex
A-2687-23 10 rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, 65 N.J. at
484).
Further, "'[w]e do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of
witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence.'" Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v.
Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). We defer to the
trial court's "feel of the case" because it has the "opportunity to see and hear the
witnesses." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88
(App. Div. 2006) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998)).
However, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's interpretation of legal
issues. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995).
In addition to the aforementioned standard of review principles, we are
mindful that in matters before the Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part
that "the rules of evidence may be relaxed 'to admit relevant and trustworthy
evidence in the interest of justice' in actions . . . ." Penbara v. Straczynski, 347
N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting N.J.R.E. 101(a)(3)(A)). With that
said, "even considering the character of that forum, we think it plain that critical
A-2687-23 11 facts must be proved and not merely assumed." Triffin v. Quality Urb. Hous.
Partners, 352 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (App. Div. 2002).
The rights and responsibilities of a condominium-unit owner and a
governing association are controlled by the master deed, the bylaws, and the
New Jersey Condominium Act (NJCA), N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to -38. Cape May
Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass'n v. Sbraga, 421 N.J. Super. 56, 70 (App. Div.
2011). The NJCA requires the master deed to include certain provisions,
including "[a] description of the common elements and limited common
elements," and allows the master deed to contain other provisions related to "the
use, occupancy, . . . or other disposition" of units as long as the provisions are
not inconsistent with the NJCA. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-9(f), (m).
Pursuant to the NJCA, a condominium association is responsible for "[t]he
maintenance, repair, replacement, cleaning[,] and sanitation of the common
elements." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(a); see also Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condo.
Ass'n, 452 N.J. Super. 574, 585 (App. Div. 2017); Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n v.
Soc'y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 171 (App. Div. 2002). The NJCA
defines common elements to include "the foundations, structural and bearing
parts, supports, main walls, roofs, basements, halls, corridors, lobbies,
stairways, elevators, entrances, exits and other means of access, excluding any
A-2687-23 12 specifically reserved or limited to a particular unit or group of units," "all
apparatus and installations existing or intended for common use," and "such
other elements and facilities as are designated in the master deed as common
elements." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(d)(ii), (vi), (viii). "The inclusion within common
elements in subparagraph '(ii)' of the 'main walls' and 'roofs' implies that material
further to the interior of a unit would be part of the unit." Soc'y Hill Condo.
Ass'n, 347 N.J. Super. at 170.
"[T]he thrust of this section of the [NJCA] is to define common elements
in general as those elements existing or intended for common use." Ibid. The
NJCA further provides "[n]o unit owner shall contract for or perform any
maintenance, repair, replacement, removal, alteration or modification of the
common elements or any additions thereto, except through the association and
its officers." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-18.
We reject the arguments raised by defendant in Point I, A-B. The primary
issue in this appeal is not the distinction between what property is part of
plaintiff's unit, and what constitutes a common element. On that issue the parties
agree, and the governing documents introduced at trial are consistent with the
NJCA. Instead, the triable issue of fact before the highly experienced Special
Civil Part judge was whether defendant should be held responsible for damages
A-2687-23 13 related to deficiencies in the common elements, and if the trial proofs supported
the judge's liability and damages award.
In Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., our Supreme Court held a unit owner
may sue an association "to safeguard his interests in the unit he owns." 93 N.J.
370, 382 (1983). The court recognized defects in common elements "may also
result in injury to the unit owner and damage[] to his personal property and the
unit." Ibid. In such cases where a unit is damaged, "[t]he unit owner's right to
maintain an action for compensation for that loss against the wrongdoer is not
extinguished or abridged . . . ." Ibid.
Here, plaintiff testified defendant's failure to properly insulate the interior
wall of his bathroom, an undisputed common element, caused all his damages.
The judge relied on plaintiff's testimony, and the associated invoice, and
accordingly awarded plaintiff only the expenses related to the installation of
insulation, necessary removal and replacement of sheetrock to access the
uninsulated portion of the wall, and related costs to repair the repeatedly
freezing pipe. The judgment is also supported by plaintiff's testimony that he
observed the lack of insulation in the wall, the repeated freezing of the interior
pipe, the lack of response by defendant's representatives, and his ability to
resolve the issue by heating the area.
A-2687-23 14 We also reject defendant's contention that the judge "committed legal
error" by concluding defendant "somehow breached a legal duty in the absence
of any expert evidence . . . ." Defendant maintains the court correctly
determined defendant was not negligent and, as such, "there are a multitude of
possibilities for pipes freezing, including but not limited to improper placement
of the pipe, inadequate heating within the unit and defects with the pipe itself."
We disagree.
Generally, "[w]hen the proofs involve a defect in a complex
instrumentality, an expert is frequently required to assist the [factfinder] in
understanding the mechanical intricacies and weighing competing theories of
causation." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mendola, 427 N.J. Super. 226, 236 (App.
Div. 2012) (citations omitted). The common knowledge doctrine, however, is
an exception to this rule. Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 394-
95 (2001). The exception applies only in the rare case where "the carelessness
of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence . . . ."
Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985). In such cases, "[i]t
is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to show what the defendant did and what the
circumstances were." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 407
A-2687-23 15 (2014) (alterations in original) (citing Sanzari v. Rosenfield, 34 N.J. 128, 134
(1961)).
We initially note that the court's judgment was based on a breach of the
governing documents, not negligence. Under the circumstances, and based on
the evidence presented, we are satisfied expert testimony was not required to
establish the need for the plumber's repairs to prevent the pipe from freezing,
because, as the court cogently noted based on the evidence presented, that fact
was "knowable to anybody with a high school knowledge of . . . physics."
Indeed, considering plaintiff's testimony and the documentary evidence an
expert was not required to testify as to the cause of the frozen pipe.
In Point II, defendant raises an argument not raised below. Before us,
defendant notes under the NJCA, "[n]o unit owner shall contract for or perform
any maintenance, repair, replacement, removal, alteration[,] or modification of
the common elements or any additions thereto, except through the association
and its officers." (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:8B-19). It further argues the NJCA does
not contain any exception to this prohibition because "[a]llowing [u]nit [o]wners
to make modifications could result in piecemeal modifications of poor quality"
and "arbitrarily burdening condominium associations with the costs of
unauthorized common element and [u]nit repairs, which are unambiguously a
A-2687-23 16 [u]nit [o]wner responsibility, as the trial court did in this matter, creates a
tremendous risk to the operations and fiscal health of the community."
We typically decline to address "questions or issues not properly
presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is
available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the
trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem.
Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58
N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). As neither exception applies, we could
simply decline to address the issue and dismiss defendant's argument on that
basis alone. For purposes of completeness, we nevertheless consider the
argument on the merits and reject it.
As noted, the NJCA specifically prohibits unit owners from repairing or
altering common elements. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-18. Accordingly, unit owners
"generally lack standing to sue for damages to the common elements." Belmont
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52, 72 (App. Div. 2013); see also
Siller, 93 N.J. at 377, 381-82; Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n, 347 N.J. Super. at 169.
We have previously held, however, "modifications of common elements
and limited common elements having no substantial impact on the condominium
property as a whole or on the rights and expectations of all other unit owners are
A-2687-23 17 not subject to association prohibition." Billig v. Buckingham Towers Condo.
Ass'n I, Inc., 287 N.J. Super. 551, 563 (App. Div. 1996). There is nothing in the
NJCA or the common law supporting defendant's contention public policy
precludes unit owners in all circumstances from conducting their own repairs of
common elements and subsequently seeking reimbursement from the
association, particularly when, as here, for significant periods, defendant
ignored plaintiff's requests and ultimately refused to remedy the situation.
As the trial record amply supports, plaintiff informed defendant about the
freezing water pipe in his unit and defendant failed to inspect properly to
ascertain whether an issue with a common element was causing the issue. As
the evidence fully supported the conclusion that a lack of insulation caused the
pipe to freeze, we are convinced it would be unreasonable to prohibit a unit
owner from remedying the issue on their own in light of an association's failure
to perform its obligation to repair and maintain common elements. In such a
situation, public policy actually favors permitting a unit owner to seek
reimbursement.
We also reject defendant's argument in Point III in which it contends the
judge erred in awarding plaintiff $1,600 based solely upon the plumber's
invoice. Because defendant is only responsible for repairs to common elements,
A-2687-23 18 it maintains "[w]ithout a detailed invoice or testimony regarding the costs
attributable to owner responsibility versus [a]ssociation responsibility, a proper
determination of damages is not possible."
A party asserting claims has the burden of proof to establish all elements
of its causes of action, including damages. Cumberland Cnty. Improvement
Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 503 (App. Div. 2003).
Though a party may not be tasked with proving its damages with exact precision,
a party remains tasked with proving its damages with, at a minimum, "such
certainty as the nature of the case may permit, laying a foundation which will
enable the trier of the facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate." Lane v. Oil
Delivery, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 413, 420 (App. Div. 1987) (citation omitted).
However, "the 'law abhors damages based on mere speculation.'" Mosley v.
Femina Fashions, Inc., 356 N.J. Super. 118, 128 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting
Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 442 (1994)).
Applying our deferential standard of review and against these legal
principles, we are convinced the judge did not err in awarding plaintiff $1,600
in damages. Contrary to defendant's assertion that without a specific breakdown
of costs the invoice was insufficient to establish his damages, as noted above, it
is well established that a plaintiff need not prove their damages with exact
A-2687-23 19 precision. Rather, a plaintiff can satisfy their burden so long as they prove their
damages with sufficient certainty to permit the factfinder to "make a fair and
reasonable estimate." Lane, 216 N.J. Super. at 420 (citation omitted).
Here, plaintiff provided the judge with an invoice reflecting the total cost
of the repair and provided detailed testimony regarding the cause of the freezing
pipe and the work completed by the plumber. Defendant did not challenge the
veracity of the invoice, nor did it offer any substantive proofs challenging the
reasonableness of the costs or the itemization of the work performed. The judge
clearly credited plaintiff's testimony and was satisfied, based on its experience
and the trial proofs, the costs were all related to remedying the lack of insulation.
The invoice, in combination with plaintiff's testimony, fully supported the
reasonableness of the costs incurred for the plumber's: 1) home visit, 2) removal
and replacement of sheetrock, 3) purchase and installation of insulation, and 4)
addressing issues with the supply line.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments detailed in Points
IV and V and deem them of insufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in
a written opinion and add only the following brief comments. See R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E). While it would have been better practice for the judge not to have
discussed his personal experiences with plumbing repairs, we are satisfied the
A-2687-23 20 judge's isolated comment does not warrant reversal. As noted, there was
sufficient evidence in the record based on plaintiff's testimony and the
documentary evidence to support both defendant's liability and the
reasonableness and causal connection between the repair costs and the lack of
insulation in the interior wall.
Similarly, defendant's challenge to plaintiff's comments regarding his
experience as a board member with respect to a prior claim certainly do not
warrant reversal. The decision to admit or preclude evidence is well within the
judge's discretion. See E&H Steel Corp. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC, 455 N.J. Super.
12, 27 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413
(2016)). How defendant addressed a previous matter concerning unit repairs
occasioned by damage to a common element certainly was relevant, and the
judge's consideration of that brief statement from plaintiff was not an abuse of
his considerable discretion.
Affirmed.
A-2687-23 21