Ronald Robker, et al v. Lasko Products, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 Ronald Robker, et al, 6 Case No.: 2:25-cv-00385-GMN-NJK

7 Plaintiffs, Order

8 v.

9 Lasko Products, LLC, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions. Docket No. 32. 13 The Court has considered Defendant’s motion, Plaintiffs’ response, and Defendant’s reply. Docket 14 Nos. 32, 35, 40. 15 Spoliation of evidence is “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure 16 to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” 17 United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002). A party spoliates 18 evidence as a matter of law only if the party destroyed the evidence after having some notice that 19 the evidence was potentially relevant to anticipated litigation. Id. Therefore, a party's duty to 20 preserve evidence begins when the party reasonably should have known that the evidence is 21 relevant to anticipated litigation. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 22 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 23 There are two sources of authority under which the Court can sanction a party for spoliation 24 of evidence - its inherent authority or Rule 37. Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th 25 Cir. 2006). A federal court applies federal law when addressing issues of spoliation of evidence. 26 See Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir.1993) (applying federal law when addressing 27 spoliation in diversity litigation). See also Demena v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., at *1 28 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2012); Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (in 1 federal court, federal law of spoliation applies because “the power to sanction for spoliation derives 2 from the inherent power of the court, not substantive law”). 3 The party requesting spoliation sanctions bears the burden of establishing the elements of 4 a spoliation claim. Asfaw v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2021 WL 2006283, at *1 (D. Nev. May 19, 5 2021) (citing Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 604, 626 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). The 6 threshold inquiry is whether evidence was altered or destroyed. Lemus v. Olaveson, 2015 WL 7 995378, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2015). 8 If a court finds spoliation of physical evidence and, thus, exercises its inherent authority, 9 the court “should choose the least onerous sanction corresponding to the willfulness of the 10 destructive act and the prejudice suffered by the victim.” Martin v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, 11 Inc., 2024 WL 3084737, at *4 (D. Nev. June 20, 2024). The right to impose sanctions for 12 spoliation arises from a court's inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation, but the 13 power is limited to that necessary to redress conduct “which abuses the judicial process.” 14 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). 15 Dismissal is a “harsh sanction,” to be imposed only in particularly egregious situations 16 where “a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of 17 judicial proceedings.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal sanctions 18 should not be imposed unless there is clear and convincing evidence of both bad-faith spoliation 19 and prejudice to the opposing party. Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1472, 1477 (D.C.Cir.1995) 20 (noting that dismissal requires proof by clear and convincing evidence); Gates Rubber Co. v. 21 Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 108 (D.Colo.1996) (requiring clear and convincing 22 evidence because “[t]o do otherwise would be to contravene the strong public policy which favors 23 adjudication of cases on their merits”). 24 The Court has “inherent discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in 25 response to the destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence.” Glover, 6 F.3d at 1329. Such broad 26 power includes permitting an adverse inference from the spoliation of relevant evidence against 27 the spoliating party. Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the adverse inference sanction is 28 based on evidentiary and policy rationales that seek to deter a party who has notice of an item's 1} relevance to litigation from destroying it. See Akiona v. United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite for an adverse inference. See Glover, 6 F.3d at 3] 1329. 4 Here, neither party identifies the basis for Defendant’s sanctions request; instead, both 5] parties rely on state law, rather than federal law, for the initial determination of whether spoliation 6] occurred. Further, neither side clearly identifies what sanctions are available for the Court to issue under which authority or analyzes the applicability of those sanctions. Rather, Defendant solely 8|| argues for case-ending sanctions and mentions an adverse inference but fails to meaningfully 9] develop the adverse inference request with points and authorities.| Courts do not address 10] arguments that are not meaningfully developed. Kor Media Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 11] 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013). 12 Accordingly, the Court DENIES without prejudice Defendant’s spoliation motion. Docket 13], No. 32. Any renewed motion must be filed no later than July 16, 2026, and must fully address the 14] proper spoliation standards, including all possible sanctions, and analyze how they apply to the 15] facts of this case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: July 2, 2026.

20 UNITED‘STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ' Instead, Defendant merely states: “[i]f the Court does not dismiss the case but rather finds that the adverse inferences Lasko proposes are appropriate, those adverse inferences should be considered in connection with Lasko’s summary judgment motion.” Docket No. 32 at 13.