Ronald Poulson v. Bank of America National Assoc

Ninth Circuit

Ronald Poulson v. Bank of America National Assoc

675 F. App'x 650

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 30, 2017

Docket15-55389

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 675 F. App'x 650 (Ronald Poulson v. Bank of America National Assoc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ronald Poulson v. Bank of America National Assoc, 675 F. App'x 650 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Poulson and Dulcísima Sinubad Poulson appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging claims arising from the foreclosure of their home. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Manufactured Home Cmties. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Poulsons’ action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because their claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior state court action which resulted in a final judgment. See MHC Financing Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law); Manufactured Home Cmties. Inc., 420 F.3d at 1031-32 (discussing the primary rights theory of res judicata under California law); see also Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defen *651 dant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte setting aside the Clerk’s entry of default. See O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth standard of review and noting “[t]he court’s discretion is especially broad where ... it is entry of default that is being set aside, rather than a default judgment”).

We reject as unsupported by the record the Poulsons’ contentions that the district court judge violated the Judicial Code of Ethics and the Poulsons’ right to due process.

The Poulsons’ pending requests are denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Poulson and Dulcísima Sinubad Poulson appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging claims arising from the foreclosure of their home. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Manufactured Home Cmties. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Poulsons’ action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because their claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior state court action which resulted in a final judgment. See MHC Financing Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law); Manufactured Home Cmties. Inc., 420 F.3d at 1031-32 (discussing the primary rights theory of res judicata under California law); see also Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defen *651 dant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte setting aside the Clerk’s entry of default. See O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth standard of review and noting “[t]he court’s discretion is especially broad where ... it is entry of default that is being set aside, rather than a default judgment”).

We reject as unsupported by the record the Poulsons’ contentions that the district court judge violated the Judicial Code of Ethics and the Poulsons’ right to due process.

The Poulsons’ pending requests are denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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