Ronald Lunsford, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 14, 2019
• Docket: 18A-PC-2168
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 14 2019, 9:36 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Ronald Lunsford Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Tyler G. Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ronald Lunsford, Jr., February 14, 2019 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-2168 v. Appeal from the Sullivan Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, Appellee-Respondent Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77D01-1607-PC-472

Baker, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2168 | February 14, 2019 Page 1 of 5 [1] Ronald Lunsford appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for

post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to move to dismiss the criminal charges when there was an

alleged double jeopardy violation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts [2] On June 30, 1995, a Wabash Valley Correctional Institution officer heard

noises coming from a nearby prisoner’s cell. He approached the cell and found

Lunsford and fellow inmate Robert Smith repeatedly stabbing another inmate,

Michael Wedmore, to death. On July 11, 1995, the State charged Lunsford with

one count of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder.

[3] In September 1995, the Department of Correction (DOC) instituted a separate

administrative disciplinary proceeding against Lunsford for the murder of

Wedmore. On September 20, 1995, the DOC found that Lunsford had

committed murder and sanctioned him with disciplinary segregation for three

years, a demotion in credit-time class, and a loss in good-time credits.

[4] On August 23, 1996, the State filed an additional voluntary manslaughter

charge against Lunsford. On September 9, 1996, Lunsford pleaded guilty to the

voluntary manslaughter charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other

charges. Both Lunsford and his attorney signed the written agreement. The trial

court imposed a forty-year sentence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2168 | February 14, 2019 Page 2 of 5 [5] On July 26, 2016, Lunsford filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming

that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to

dismiss the criminal charges. Lunsford argued that since he had already been

disciplined in the DOC’s administrative proceeding, it was inappropriate for his

trial counsel to recommend that he plead guilty in the supplemental criminal

prosecution because it would constitute a double jeopardy violation.

[6] The post-conviction court denied Lunsford’s petition, saying that “[p]etitioner’s

argument is wholly without merit as it is well settled law in this state that

administrative punishment by prison officials does not prohibit a subsequent

prosecution arising out of the same act.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 52.

Lunsford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [7] Lunsford appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing

that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to

dismiss his criminal charges.1 2

1 Additionally, Lunsford argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to subpoena his trial counsel and the corrections superintendent. We find this argument unavailing. The post-conviction court held that Lunsford’s petition outright was without merit as a matter of law. Therefore, testimony from Lunsford’s trial counsel and the corrections superintendent was unnecessary, and the post-conviction court did not err in denying the motion to subpoena. 2 Lunsford also claims that because his trial counsel “misadvised” him to plead guilty, his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Once again, this argument is unavailing. Lunsford has proffered no evidence showing that his guilty plea was not knowing,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2168 | February 14, 2019 Page 3 of 5 [8] In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing

grounds for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Helton v.

State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). A petitioner must show that the

evidence unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that

reached by the trial court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993).

Furthermore, we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences

supporting the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id.

[9] For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we use a two-pronged test. To

satisfy the first prong, the defendant must show deficient performance:

representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the “counsel”

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682

(Ind. 2017); see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To

satisfy the second prong, the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable

probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682.

[10] Lunsford argues that his trial counsel should have moved to dismiss the

criminal charges because he had already been subject to disciplinary action for

the murder by the DOC in a separate proceeding. Consequently, he maintains

voluntary, and intelligent. The fact that Lunsford and his trial counsel both signed the agreement after due consideration further undermines this argument.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2168 | February 14, 2019 Page 4 of 5 that the trial court violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because he

was being criminally punished twice for the same action. Mehidal v. State, 623

N.E.2d 428, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (reiterating the principle of double

jeopardy wherein the State may not punish a criminal defendant twice for the

same offense).

[11] However, there is a clear difference between criminal punishment and

administrative sanctions:

[T]his constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy applies only to criminal prosecutions. An administrative punishment by prison officials does not preclude a subsequent prosecution arising out of the same act. The Department of Correction is authorized to administratively punish actions done within the prison walls by imposing disciplinary sanctions.

State v. Mullins, 647 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations

omitted). With this standard in mind, we find Lunsford’s argument unavailing.

The DOC sanctions imposed against Lunsford constituted an administrative

punishment that, when paired with a subsequent prosecution, does not create a

double jeopardy violation. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for declining

to file a motion to dismiss on this basis, and the post-conviction court did not

err by denying Lunsford’s petition.

[12] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

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