Ronald Legardy v. I. Ceballos

Ninth Circuit

Ronald Legardy v. I. Ceballos

528 F. App'x 712

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 14, 2013

Docket12-15893

StatusUnpublished

This text of 528 F. App'x 712 (Ronald Legardy v. I. Ceballos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ronald Legardy v. I. Ceballos, 528 F. App'x 712 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Ronald Earl Legardy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of the disclosure of information in his confidential legal materials. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s rulings regarding both an evidentiary hearing, Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir.2006), and default judgment, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.1986). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion for an evidentiary hearing because Legardy had an opportunity to submit written evidence and there were no factual issues warranting a hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) (court “may” conduct hearings to establish the truth of any allegation by evidence before entering default judgment); Kashin, 457 F.3d at 1043 (“While the district court has the discretion to hold an eviden-tiary hearing, it ‘should not do so if the certification, the pleadings, the affidavits, and any supporting documentary evidence do not reveal an issue of material fact.’ ” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion for default judgment because Legardy failed to establish the merits of his § 1983 claim. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (setting forth factors for entry of default judgment and noting the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th Cir.1980) (affirming denial of default judgment based on “the lack of merit in” plaintiffs § 1983 claims).

*713 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion to alter or amend judgment because Legardy failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Ronald Earl Legardy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of the disclosure of information in his confidential legal materials. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s rulings regarding both an evidentiary hearing, Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir.2006), and default judgment, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.1986). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion for an evidentiary hearing because Legardy had an opportunity to submit written evidence and there were no factual issues warranting a hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) (court “may” conduct hearings to establish the truth of any allegation by evidence before entering default judgment); Kashin, 457 F.3d at 1043 (“While the district court has the discretion to hold an eviden-tiary hearing, it ‘should not do so if the certification, the pleadings, the affidavits, and any supporting documentary evidence do not reveal an issue of material fact.’ ” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion for default judgment because Legardy failed to establish the merits of his § 1983 claim. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (setting forth factors for entry of default judgment and noting the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th Cir.1980) (affirming denial of default judgment based on “the lack of merit in” plaintiffs § 1983 claims).

*713 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion to alter or amend judgment because Legardy failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Kashin v. Kent

457 F.3d 1033 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)

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528 F. App'x 712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-legardy-v-i-ceballos-ca9-2013.

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