Ronald Lee Stutes, Et Ux. v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc.

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 8, 2017
• Docket: CA-0017-0053
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 17-53

RONALD LEE STUTES, ET UX.

VERSUS

GREENWOOD MOTOR LINES, INC., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20131119 HONORABLE DAVID MICHAEL SMITH, DISTRICT JUDGE

MARC T. AMY

JUDGE

Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Phyllis M. Keaty, and David E. Chatelain *, Judges.

APPEALS DISMISSED AND REMANDED.

* Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore. Ernest Paul Gieger, Jr. Rachel G. Webre Emily E. Eagan Gieger, Laborde & Laperousse, L.L.C. 701 Poydras Street, #4800 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 561-0400 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Lexington Insurance Co.

James Marshall Montgomery Attorney at Law 802 Johnston St. Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 269-0083 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Ronald Lee Stutes Carroll Lynn Stutes

John Barney Davis, II Baker, Donelson, Bearman, PC 450 Laurel Street, 20th Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70801 (225) 381-7000 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Gerald James Pitre, Jr. R & L Transfer, Inc. R & L Carriers Shared Services, LLC R & L Carriers, Inc. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc.

Laura Lee Putnam Assistant Attorney General 556 Jefferson St., 4th Floor Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 262-1700 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development

Virginia Yoder Dodd Kevin W. Welsh Phelps Dunbar, LLP Post Office Box 4412 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4412 (225) 346-0285 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company

Blake R. David Broussard & David, LLC Post Office Box 3524 Lafayette, LA 70502-3524 (337) 233-2323 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Carroll Lynn Stutes Ronald Lee Stutes AMY, Judge.

This court issued a rule for the Defendants-Appellants, Lexington Insurance

Company and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, to show

cause why their appeals should not be dismissed for having been taken from a

judgment lacking proper decretal language. For the reasons assigned, we dismiss

the appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in

accordance with this court’s ruling.

The instant litigation arises from a vehicular accident. According to the

Plaintiff’s petition, Defendant, Gerald James Pitre, Jr., failed to yield right of way

to the Plaintiff, striking Plaintiff’s vehicle and causing the injuries for which this

suit was filed. During the course of this litigation, the State of Louisiana, through

the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), filed a motion for

summary judgment seeking a judgment dismissing it from this suit. In addition,

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and alternative motion in limine

seeking a judgment that no percentage of fault can be ascribed to the DOTD in this

accident.

Following hearings on these motions, the trial court entered two separate

judgments on two separate days. In the judgment signed on September 27, 2016,

the trial court ruled as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”), is hereby granted summary judgment, and the claims asserted against it in the above captioned matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice at the cost of the parties opposed to the motion. However, in the judgment signed by the trial court on October 11, 2016, the trial

court’s ruling, in pertinent part, reads, “Motion for Summary Judgment on

DOTD liability filed by Plaintiff: Granted.”

The Appellants filed separate motions to appeal the separate judgments. The

appeals from the judgment of September 27, 2016, were lodged in this court under

docket number CA17-52. The appeals from the judgment of October 11, 2016,

bear this court’s docket number CA17-53. Upon the lodging of the record in the

latter appeals, this court issued the rule to show cause which is under consideration

herein.

Both Appellants filed briefs in which they contend that the trial court’s

judgment of October 11, 2016, does have proper decretal language. As an

alternative, the Appellants ask that this court remand the appeals for the trial court

to enter a judgment which does contain proper decretal language.

In addition to the requirements that a judgment be precise, definite, and

certain, “a judgment cannot require reference to extrinsic documents or pleadings

in order to discern the court’s ruling.” Thomas v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Sys., 13-91,

p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/13), 128 So.3d 1055, 1056. See State v. White, 05-718

(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144. We find that reference must be made to

additional documents in order to discern what relief was granted to the Plaintiff in

the judgment of October 11, 2016.

A review of the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment reveals that the

Plaintiff sought a declaration from the trial court that no liability could be ascribed

to the DOTD in the cause of the subject accident. However, the judgment merely

states that the Plaintiff’s motion regarding the liability of the DOTD was being

2 granted with nothing further. We find that this judgment is ambiguous and lacks

proper decretal language.

The Appellants point out, though, that in this case, the trial court also

rendered judgment on September 27, which clearly dismisses the DOTD from the

litigation. Therefore, the Appellants contend that this court should not dismiss the

appeals from the October 11 judgment. We find that the Appellants’ contention on

this point goes beyond the issue presented on this court’s rule to show cause. We

note that the logical interpretation of the Appellants’ argument in this regard would

appear to indicate that the trial court’s October 11 judgment was rendered moot

since the DOTD had already been dismissed from this litigation by the September

27 judgment. However, as stated above, the judgment of October 11 is ambiguous;

therefore, its true meaning cannot be discerned by this court at this time.

Accordingly, this court remands this matter to the trial court for further

proceedings in accordance with this court’s ruling.

APPPEALS DISMISSED AND REMANDED.