Ronald L. Seay v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 25, 2026·No. 1:24-cv-01324·Unknown

Opinion

RONALD L. SEAY, Case No. 1:24-cv-01324-HBK (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF DISMISS CASE1 CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE Defendant. Pending before the court is Plaintiff Ronald Seay’s Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss the Second Amended Complaint because it fails to state a cognizable federal claim. The undersigned further finds any further amendments would be futile and recommends the case be dismissed without further leave to amend. A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2025). dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). The court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v. Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). The Federal rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010). A. Plaintiff’s Operative Complaint (Doc. 15) Plaintiff proceeds on his Second Amended Complaint filed on January 26, 2026. (Doc. 15, “SAC”). The SAC names “CDCR” in the caption and states in its entirety: “I do not know any other way to describe and document how my rights as a prisoner has been violated as was already communicated in the original complaint.” (Id. at 3). Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, any amended complaint must include all the claims a plaintiff wishes to present and all defendants a plaintiff wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Local Rule 220 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Here, as pled, the SAC is facially deficient. It contains no defendants, other than CDCR in the caption, is completely devoid of facts, and requests no relief. Despite the court’s instruction for a second time2 that an amended complaint must be free-standing and may not incorporate previous pleadings by reference, the SAC contains no claims but only a reference to Plaintiff’s initial complaint. (See id.). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must at a minimum state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly and give defendant fair notice so they may respond. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Because the SAC is essentially a blank pleading, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s it fails to state a cognizable legal claim. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 2 As discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint and first amended complaint were also screened. The Court advised Plaintiff in both screening orders that in filing an amended complaint it must be free-standing. Despite the court repeatedly warning Plaintiff that an amended pleading must be free- standing, due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, in an abundance of caution, the court will consider Plaintiff’s incorporated original complaint. B. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (Doc. 1) Plaintiff’s original complaint filed October 29, 2024,3 alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple defendants at different institutions. (See generally, Doc. 1). Specifically, t

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Ronald L. Seay v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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