Ronald K. Payne v. United States

309 F.2d 231, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 10, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3985
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 1962
Docket17003_1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 309 F.2d 231 (Ronald K. Payne v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald K. Payne v. United States, 309 F.2d 231, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 10, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3985 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In the first count of a three-count indictment, Ronald K. Payne and two others were charged with robbery. In the second and third counts, he and another were charged with rapes of two victims, one named in each count. Tried separately, Payne was found guilty by the jury and was sentenced to five to fifteen years on count one, ten to thirty years on count two, and five to fifteen years on count three. The first two sentences were consecutive but the third was concurrent with the first two. We refrain from reciting the unusually revolting details. Suffice it to say that the evidence showed Payne himself committed the rape described in count two, and aided and abetted his companion in the accomplishment of the rape described in count three.

Payne contends on appeal that an acquittal on all counts should have been directed on the ground of insanity, that an acquittal on count three should have been directed because of insufficient evidence, and that the court “erred in it’s Instruction and comments to the Jury.”

Conflicting evidence on the insanity issue presented a question for the jury which that body resolved against the appellant. We need not consider his argument as to the insufficiency of the evidence that he aided and abetted in the rape charged in count three, because his sentence therefor was concurrent with those imposed under the first two counts, which are not being disturbed. A familiar and well-established principle makes the count three argument academic.

Appellant’s criticism of the court’s charge and comments to the jury is without substance.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re J. W. Y.
363 A.2d 674 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1976)
Matter of JWY
363 A.2d 674 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
309 F.2d 231, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 10, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-k-payne-v-united-states-cadc-1962.