In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-14-00373-CV ____________________
RONALD J. WILLS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 14-03-02659 CV ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ronald J. Wills appeals from the denial of a petition for nondisclosure of his
criminal history record information. We must decide whether, under the version of
section 411.081 in effect before its amendment by the 84th Legislature in 2015 1, a
person is entitled to an order of nondisclosure when that person is convicted during
the community supervision period for an offense that occurred before the
1 All references to section 411.081 of the Texas Government Code in this opinion are to the version of the statute in effect before the enactment of S.B. 1902 in 2015. 1 community supervision period commenced. See Act of June 18, 1993, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 790, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3088 (amended in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013, 2015)(current version at Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.074). We hold that the
statute is unambiguous, and that a person is not entitled to an order of
nondisclosure if that person is convicted of an offense during the period of
community supervision regardless of when that offense was committed.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the trial court’s
order denying the petition for nondisclosure.
We review an issue of statutory construction de novo as a question of law.
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). “Our primary objective is to
determine the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain
meaning of the words chosen.” Id. “Where text is clear, text is determinative of
that intent.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.
2009) (op. on reh’g). “We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing
legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or
is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.” Tex.
Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex.
2010). “We presume the Legislature selected language in a statute with care and
that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind.” Id. “Determining
2 legislative intent requires that we consider the statute as a whole, reading all its
language in context, and not reading individual provisions in isolation.” Ross v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. 2015). We presume that the
Legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
311.021(3) (West 2013). In construing a statute, we may consider: (1) the object
sought to be attained by the statute; (2) the circumstances under which the statute
was enacted; (3) the legislative history; (4) the common law or former statutory
provisions and the laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) the consequences of a
particular construction; (6) the administrative construction of the statute; and (7)
the statute’s title, preamble, and emergency provision. Id. § 311.023. We resort to
rules of construction and extrinsic aids only when the words of the statute are
ambiguous. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 437.
The petition for non-disclosure that Wills filed on March 7, 2014, stated that
he was arrested on April 20, 2002, and alleged that he is entitled to an order of
non-disclosure because five years had passed since the successful discharge of
deferred adjudication community supervision for that offense. Wills indicated that
he had not been convicted or placed on community supervision since his discharge.
The State opposed the petition for nondisclosure and alleged that Wills was
statutorily ineligible for an order of nondisclosure because he was convicted of
3 another offense and placed on community supervision during his period of deferred
adjudication community supervision. In his testimony for the hearing on his
petition for nondisclosure, Wills established that his period of deferred
adjudication community supervision for his first offense began April 24, 2003.
Wills also acknowledged that he was placed on community supervision on June 25,
2003, stemming from a second offense, which resulted in a conviction. Documents
admitted in evidence in the hearing show that the two offenses occurred on the
same date, but the period of deferred adjudication community supervision at issue
here began approximately two months before the county court at law judge signed
the judgment placing Wills on community supervision for the other offense. The
order discharging the community supervision on the misdemeanor offense is not in
the trial record and Wills offered no testimony regarding the disposition of his
community supervision for the misdemeanor offense.
Wills argues the intent of the nondisclosure statute is to reward persons who
successfully complete deferred adjudication community supervision. Because he
was not convicted for an offense committed during the community supervision
period, he argues, the interests of justice support issuing an order of nondisclosure.
In a supplemental brief, Wills argues disallowing an order of nondisclosure
4 deprives him of the benefit of his plea bargain agreement and circumvents the
purpose for deferred adjudication.
In implementing public policy on the nondisclosure of criminal record
information, the Legislature defined the class of persons who were eligible for an
order of nondisclosure:
A person is entitled to petition the court . . . only if during the period of the deferred adjudication community supervision for which the order of nondisclosure is requested . . . the person is not convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication community supervision . . . for any offense other than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine only. 2
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.081(e). The Legislature determined the class of
persons eligible for an order of nondisclosure and we are bound to construe the
statute as it was written. See id., First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 636- 2 As amended and redesignated in 2015 as section 411.074(a) of the Texas Government Code, for offenses committed on or after September 1, 2015:
A person may be granted an order of nondisclosure of criminal history record information under this subchapter and, when applicable, is entitled to petition the court to receive an order under this subchapter only if, during the period after the court pronounced the sentence or placed the person on deferred adjudication community supervision for the offense for which the order of nondisclosure is requested . . . the person is not convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication community supervision . . . for any offense other than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine only.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
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In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-14-00373-CV ____________________
RONALD J. WILLS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 14-03-02659 CV ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ronald J. Wills appeals from the denial of a petition for nondisclosure of his
criminal history record information. We must decide whether, under the version of
section 411.081 in effect before its amendment by the 84th Legislature in 2015 1, a
person is entitled to an order of nondisclosure when that person is convicted during
the community supervision period for an offense that occurred before the
1 All references to section 411.081 of the Texas Government Code in this opinion are to the version of the statute in effect before the enactment of S.B. 1902 in 2015. 1 community supervision period commenced. See Act of June 18, 1993, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 790, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3088 (amended in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013, 2015)(current version at Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.074). We hold that the
statute is unambiguous, and that a person is not entitled to an order of
nondisclosure if that person is convicted of an offense during the period of
community supervision regardless of when that offense was committed.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the trial court’s
order denying the petition for nondisclosure.
We review an issue of statutory construction de novo as a question of law.
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). “Our primary objective is to
determine the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain
meaning of the words chosen.” Id. “Where text is clear, text is determinative of
that intent.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.
2009) (op. on reh’g). “We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing
legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or
is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.” Tex.
Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex.
2010). “We presume the Legislature selected language in a statute with care and
that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind.” Id. “Determining
2 legislative intent requires that we consider the statute as a whole, reading all its
language in context, and not reading individual provisions in isolation.” Ross v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. 2015). We presume that the
Legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
311.021(3) (West 2013). In construing a statute, we may consider: (1) the object
sought to be attained by the statute; (2) the circumstances under which the statute
was enacted; (3) the legislative history; (4) the common law or former statutory
provisions and the laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) the consequences of a
particular construction; (6) the administrative construction of the statute; and (7)
the statute’s title, preamble, and emergency provision. Id. § 311.023. We resort to
rules of construction and extrinsic aids only when the words of the statute are
ambiguous. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 437.
The petition for non-disclosure that Wills filed on March 7, 2014, stated that
he was arrested on April 20, 2002, and alleged that he is entitled to an order of
non-disclosure because five years had passed since the successful discharge of
deferred adjudication community supervision for that offense. Wills indicated that
he had not been convicted or placed on community supervision since his discharge.
The State opposed the petition for nondisclosure and alleged that Wills was
statutorily ineligible for an order of nondisclosure because he was convicted of
3 another offense and placed on community supervision during his period of deferred
adjudication community supervision. In his testimony for the hearing on his
petition for nondisclosure, Wills established that his period of deferred
adjudication community supervision for his first offense began April 24, 2003.
Wills also acknowledged that he was placed on community supervision on June 25,
2003, stemming from a second offense, which resulted in a conviction. Documents
admitted in evidence in the hearing show that the two offenses occurred on the
same date, but the period of deferred adjudication community supervision at issue
here began approximately two months before the county court at law judge signed
the judgment placing Wills on community supervision for the other offense. The
order discharging the community supervision on the misdemeanor offense is not in
the trial record and Wills offered no testimony regarding the disposition of his
community supervision for the misdemeanor offense.
Wills argues the intent of the nondisclosure statute is to reward persons who
successfully complete deferred adjudication community supervision. Because he
was not convicted for an offense committed during the community supervision
period, he argues, the interests of justice support issuing an order of nondisclosure.
In a supplemental brief, Wills argues disallowing an order of nondisclosure
4 deprives him of the benefit of his plea bargain agreement and circumvents the
purpose for deferred adjudication.
In implementing public policy on the nondisclosure of criminal record
information, the Legislature defined the class of persons who were eligible for an
order of nondisclosure:
A person is entitled to petition the court . . . only if during the period of the deferred adjudication community supervision for which the order of nondisclosure is requested . . . the person is not convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication community supervision . . . for any offense other than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine only. 2
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.081(e). The Legislature determined the class of
persons eligible for an order of nondisclosure and we are bound to construe the
statute as it was written. See id., First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 636- 2 As amended and redesignated in 2015 as section 411.074(a) of the Texas Government Code, for offenses committed on or after September 1, 2015:
A person may be granted an order of nondisclosure of criminal history record information under this subchapter and, when applicable, is entitled to petition the court to receive an order under this subchapter only if, during the period after the court pronounced the sentence or placed the person on deferred adjudication community supervision for the offense for which the order of nondisclosure is requested . . . the person is not convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication community supervision . . . for any offense other than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine only.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.074 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S. 84 Leg.).
5 37. We cannot disregard direct and clear statutory language that does not create an
absurdity. See First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 638. Section
411.081(e) of the Texas Government Code is unambiguous. Without regard to the
date of the offense, it provides that a person convicted of an offense during a
period of community supervision is not entitled to an order of nondisclosure upon
successful completion of the term of community supervision. See Tex. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 411.081(e).
Wills argues on appeal that his misdemeanor offense did not result in a
conviction because he successfully completed his probationary term for that
offense. In support of his argument, Wills cites to a case that concerns whether an
offense is available for enhanced punishment on conviction for a subsequent
offense. See Ex parte Murchison, 560 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
Wills’s misdemeanor offense is a final conviction for enhancement purposes
“whether the sentence for the conviction is imposed or probated.” See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 49.09(d) (West Supp. 2014). Furthermore, a person whose conviction
is not final for purposes of enhanced punishment has still been convicted for other
purposes. See Throneberry v. State, 109 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, no pet.). Moreover, Wills did not provide the trial court with evidence that
he successfully completed community supervision and obtained a dismissal of the
6 charging instrument for the misdemeanor offense. See generally Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 20 (West Supp. 2014). Because Wills has not shown that
he is statutorily eligible to file a petition for nondisclosure, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition. We overrule the sole issue
that is raised in the appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying the
petition for nondisclosure.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on September 30, 2015 Opinion Delivered October 29, 2015
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.