Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-22-00674-CR
Ronald GUILLORY, Jr., Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 687328 Honorable Brenda Chapman, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 26, 2024
AFFIRMED
Ronald Guillory, Jr. appeals his conviction for evading detention. In a single issue, Guillory
asserts he was denied a meaningful right to self-representation when the trial court denied his
request for a continuance prior to voir dire. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2022, San Antonio Police Officer Rafael Medel stopped Guillory for
panhandling. Guillory gave the officer a false name and date of birth. While Officer Medel was
running the information in the police department’s system, Guillory rode away on his bicycle. A 04-22-00674-CR
different officer apprehended Guillory shortly thereafter. Guillory was subsequently charged by
information with evading arrest or detention by a peace officer. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04.
On the morning of trial on September 13, 2022, Guillory expressed his dissatisfaction with
appointed counsel and stated his desire to represent himself. The trial court conducted a Faretta
inquiry to determine whether Guillory was competent to represent himself, understood the nature
of the charged offense and punishment range, and understood the risks and consequences of
waiving his right to counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding a
defendant who chooses to represent himself must be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages). The trial court confirmed Guillory understood his right to remain silent, cross-
examine and call his own witnesses, object to evidence and file motions, and do “anything else
that an attorney would be doing on [Guillory’s] behalf.” Guillory replied “I’ve got this,” stating he
was “familiar . . . on what we will be looking at as far as going into trial” and he was “full[y] aware
of what [he was] giving up.” The trial court also informed Guillory if he proceeded pro se he would
not receive special treatment but would be “charged with the same knowledge of the law and the
rules of evidence and procedure as any attorney who has passed the bar . . . .” Having determined
Guillory’s waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the
trial court ruled he was competent to waive counsel and represent himself. Guillory also signed a
waiver of his right to counsel. Appointed counsel was instructed to remain as standby counsel to
assist Guillory during the trial.
At the end of the Faretta admonishments, Guillory orally moved for a continuance and
requested time to review the discovery materials and prepare a defense. Guillory also stated he
wanted to file some motions and investigate potential witnesses. The trial court indicated its desire
to proceed with jury selection since there was a venire panel waiting. The State stated it planned
-2- 04-22-00674-CR
to call Officer Medel as its sole witness and would offer an approximately five-minute bodycam
video of the detention into evidence.
After determining Guillory had not previously seen the discovery materials, the trial court
asked whether he wanted to view the bodycam video before jury selection began. Guillory twice
responded that he did not want to watch the video, stating, “I know I was in the video so I know
quite clearly . . . where I will be heading [in] this particular case,” and “I can handle that . . . right
when the State decides that they want to play that.” The trial court decided the best course was to
select the jury that day, a Tuesday, and then recess until Thursday morning. The trial court
reasoned this would give Guillory the remainder of the day and a full day Wednesday to review
the State’s evidence and prepare any motions before the State’s case in chief commenced. The
State did not object, and Guillory also agreed.
Later, Guillory changed his mind stating he “had been thinking” and would rather proceed
to trial that same day after jury selection. He explained he was eager to start the trial and get it
resolved, and his review of the discovery packet would not take long. When the trial court asked
whether he still wanted time to prepare and file motions, Guillory replied he did not and preferred
to proceed with trial that day. The prosecutor explained the discovery packet did not contain the
entire State’s file and suggested Guillory should have an opportunity to review the entire case file
before proceeding to trial. Despite Guillory’s statements that he did not need to review the State’s
file before its case in chief commenced, the trial court ultimately agreed with the State and ruled
opening statements would commence on Thursday. The trial court released the venire panel to go
to lunch, allowing Guillory time to prepare for voir dire. When the venire panel returned, Guillory
and the State conducted jury selection, and a jury was impaneled and told to return Thursday
morning. Guillory was allowed to stay in the courtroom for the rest of the afternoon to review the
State’s file.
-3- 04-22-00674-CR
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Officer Medel, and the trial court admitted the
bodycam video into evidence. Guillory testified in his own defense. The jury found Guillory guilty
of evading detention as charged in the information. The trial court sentenced Guillory to 87 days’
confinement in the Bexar County Jail and determined that his credit for time served awaiting trial
satisfied the judgment. Guillory appeals.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, Guillory argues the trial court’s ruling “forcing [him] to conduct voir dire
without a prior opportunity to obtain and review the discovery, conduct a meaningful investigation
into the underlying facts of the case, or to file written pretrial motions . . . deprived [him] of any
meaningful right to self-representation at that phase.” He contends the trial court’s refusal to delay
jury selection amounted to structural error requiring no harm analysis. See Weaver v.
Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (holding violation of defendant’s right to conduct his
own defense is structural error not subject to harm analysis); see also Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d
223, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
A defendant’s right to conduct his own defense “is based on the fundamental legal principle
that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own
liberty.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295. A defendant must be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that his choice is made “with eyes open[,]” but he need not
possess the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose to represent
himself. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A
defendant who chooses to represent himself is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-22-00674-CR
Ronald GUILLORY, Jr., Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 687328 Honorable Brenda Chapman, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 26, 2024
AFFIRMED
Ronald Guillory, Jr. appeals his conviction for evading detention. In a single issue, Guillory
asserts he was denied a meaningful right to self-representation when the trial court denied his
request for a continuance prior to voir dire. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2022, San Antonio Police Officer Rafael Medel stopped Guillory for
panhandling. Guillory gave the officer a false name and date of birth. While Officer Medel was
running the information in the police department’s system, Guillory rode away on his bicycle. A 04-22-00674-CR
different officer apprehended Guillory shortly thereafter. Guillory was subsequently charged by
information with evading arrest or detention by a peace officer. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04.
On the morning of trial on September 13, 2022, Guillory expressed his dissatisfaction with
appointed counsel and stated his desire to represent himself. The trial court conducted a Faretta
inquiry to determine whether Guillory was competent to represent himself, understood the nature
of the charged offense and punishment range, and understood the risks and consequences of
waiving his right to counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding a
defendant who chooses to represent himself must be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages). The trial court confirmed Guillory understood his right to remain silent, cross-
examine and call his own witnesses, object to evidence and file motions, and do “anything else
that an attorney would be doing on [Guillory’s] behalf.” Guillory replied “I’ve got this,” stating he
was “familiar . . . on what we will be looking at as far as going into trial” and he was “full[y] aware
of what [he was] giving up.” The trial court also informed Guillory if he proceeded pro se he would
not receive special treatment but would be “charged with the same knowledge of the law and the
rules of evidence and procedure as any attorney who has passed the bar . . . .” Having determined
Guillory’s waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the
trial court ruled he was competent to waive counsel and represent himself. Guillory also signed a
waiver of his right to counsel. Appointed counsel was instructed to remain as standby counsel to
assist Guillory during the trial.
At the end of the Faretta admonishments, Guillory orally moved for a continuance and
requested time to review the discovery materials and prepare a defense. Guillory also stated he
wanted to file some motions and investigate potential witnesses. The trial court indicated its desire
to proceed with jury selection since there was a venire panel waiting. The State stated it planned
-2- 04-22-00674-CR
to call Officer Medel as its sole witness and would offer an approximately five-minute bodycam
video of the detention into evidence.
After determining Guillory had not previously seen the discovery materials, the trial court
asked whether he wanted to view the bodycam video before jury selection began. Guillory twice
responded that he did not want to watch the video, stating, “I know I was in the video so I know
quite clearly . . . where I will be heading [in] this particular case,” and “I can handle that . . . right
when the State decides that they want to play that.” The trial court decided the best course was to
select the jury that day, a Tuesday, and then recess until Thursday morning. The trial court
reasoned this would give Guillory the remainder of the day and a full day Wednesday to review
the State’s evidence and prepare any motions before the State’s case in chief commenced. The
State did not object, and Guillory also agreed.
Later, Guillory changed his mind stating he “had been thinking” and would rather proceed
to trial that same day after jury selection. He explained he was eager to start the trial and get it
resolved, and his review of the discovery packet would not take long. When the trial court asked
whether he still wanted time to prepare and file motions, Guillory replied he did not and preferred
to proceed with trial that day. The prosecutor explained the discovery packet did not contain the
entire State’s file and suggested Guillory should have an opportunity to review the entire case file
before proceeding to trial. Despite Guillory’s statements that he did not need to review the State’s
file before its case in chief commenced, the trial court ultimately agreed with the State and ruled
opening statements would commence on Thursday. The trial court released the venire panel to go
to lunch, allowing Guillory time to prepare for voir dire. When the venire panel returned, Guillory
and the State conducted jury selection, and a jury was impaneled and told to return Thursday
morning. Guillory was allowed to stay in the courtroom for the rest of the afternoon to review the
State’s file.
-3- 04-22-00674-CR
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Officer Medel, and the trial court admitted the
bodycam video into evidence. Guillory testified in his own defense. The jury found Guillory guilty
of evading detention as charged in the information. The trial court sentenced Guillory to 87 days’
confinement in the Bexar County Jail and determined that his credit for time served awaiting trial
satisfied the judgment. Guillory appeals.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, Guillory argues the trial court’s ruling “forcing [him] to conduct voir dire
without a prior opportunity to obtain and review the discovery, conduct a meaningful investigation
into the underlying facts of the case, or to file written pretrial motions . . . deprived [him] of any
meaningful right to self-representation at that phase.” He contends the trial court’s refusal to delay
jury selection amounted to structural error requiring no harm analysis. See Weaver v.
Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (holding violation of defendant’s right to conduct his
own defense is structural error not subject to harm analysis); see also Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d
223, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
A defendant’s right to conduct his own defense “is based on the fundamental legal principle
that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own
liberty.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295. A defendant must be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that his choice is made “with eyes open[,]” but he need not
possess the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose to represent
himself. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A
defendant who chooses to represent himself is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney
and is subject to the same technical rules of evidence and procedure; he does not receive any
special consideration solely because he asserted his pro se rights. Osorio-Lopez v. State, 663
S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Guillory was so admonished.
-4- 04-22-00674-CR
Guillory contends the trial court’s denial of his request to delay jury selection was contrary
to the Faretta admonishment that he would be treated like a lawyer. Specifically, he argues his
request for a continuance was the “precise kind[] of reasonable request[] any diligent attorney
would be expected to make . . . .” Guillory asserts that because he received “disparate
treatment . . . compared with any similarly situated attorney,” the Faretta admonishment he
received was undermined and thus not properly administered. See Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d
353, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding failure to properly administer Faretta warnings is
structural error). We disagree Guillory received disparate treatment compared to a similarly
situated attorney. The record shows the trial court was amenable to Guillory’s requests to review
evidence and prepare his defense.
Guillory initially requested a continuance before voir dire began. The basis for his
continuance was the need for additional time to prepare his defense—including review of the
State’s evidence, investigating a potential witness, and filing motions. The trial court informed
Guillory that “[t]he sole purpose of voir dire is to question the panel with regard to whether or not
they can be fair jurors in this case, but we are not going into the evidence during voir dire.”
Nevertheless, Guillory twice declined the trial court’s offer of an opportunity to review the
State’s bodycam video before jury selection began. After some discussion, the trial court denied
Guillory’s motion in part by declining to delay jury selection because a venire panel was already
waiting. The trial court however granted the continuance in part by postponing opening statements
by a full day for the express purpose of giving Guillory time to review the State’s evidence and
file motions. Guillory lodged no objection but instead agreed to the revised schedule. The trial
court then dismissed the jury early for lunch so that Guillory would have time to prepare questions
for voir dire.
-5- 04-22-00674-CR
After the trial court ruled, Guillory changed his mind and withdrew his request for a
continuance. Guillory explained that, after thinking about it, his review of the State’s evidence
would not take long, and he did not want to file any motions, but rather preferred to proceed with
the trial that day. Considering Guillory withdrew his motion for continuance and expressed his
desire to proceed with trial, we cannot say the trial court treated Guillory any differently than it
would have treated an attorney under the same circumstances. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State,
No. AP-75,706, 2010 WL 359020, at *4–5 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2010) (not designated for
publication) (stating trial court properly proceeded to trial when defense counsel withdrew motion
to continue). Further, Guillory’s withdrawal of his motion to continue waived review of any
potential error. See id.; Lujan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 854, 862 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, pet.
ref’d) (holding defense counsel’s announcement of ready after filing motion for continuance
waived any claim of error).
In addition, a motion for continuance, whether filed by an attorney or pro se defendant,
must be written and sworn to preserve error on appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 29.03,
29.08; Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), declined to follow on
other grounds, Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Thus, if a party
makes an unsworn oral motion for continuance and the trial judge denies it, the party forfeits the
right to complain about the judge’s ruling on appeal.” Anderson, 301 S.W.3d at 279; see also Cruz
v. State, 565 S.W.3d 379, 381–82 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.). Here, Guillory’s
motion for continuance was oral and unsworn, and thus, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate
review.
We conclude Guillory was not deprived of a meaningful right to self-representation by the
trial court’s refusal to postpone jury selection, especially after he withdrew his oral motion for
continuance. Guillory was properly held to the same standards as an attorney per the Faretta
-6- 04-22-00674-CR
admonishment and waived appellate review of any potential error when he made only an oral,
unsworn motion for continuance and then withdrew his motion altogether prior to voir dire.
Accordingly, Guillory’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Irene Rios, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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