Ronald Green v. Gene Stubblefield

16 F. App'x 546
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 6, 2001
Docket00-2455
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 16 F. App'x 546 (Ronald Green v. Gene Stubblefield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald Green v. Gene Stubblefield, 16 F. App'x 546 (8th Cir. 2001).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Ronald Green appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court 1 for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and (2) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

We agree with the district court that there is no clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the two venirepersons at issue were pretextual. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (factual determinations made by state court are presumed to be correct, and may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence); Shurn v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir.) (prosecutor’s motive in excluding jurors is question of fact), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1010, 120 S.Ct. 510, 145 L.Ed.2d 395 (1999); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 874-75 (8th Cir.) (if petitioner makes prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes, burden shifts to prosecutor to articulate race-neutral explanations for strikes, which petitioner may show was pretextual), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007, 119 S.Ct. 524, 142 L.Ed.2d 435 (1998).

Aso, Green has failed to show that his appellate counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his appeal would have been different if counsel had challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. See Armstrong v. Gammon, 195 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1092, 120 S.Ct. 1731, 146 L.Ed.2d 651 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Green pos *548 sessed cocaine: a detective testified that he saw Green drop a bag containing cocaine after two police officers had identified themselves to him, and that he also found cocaine on Green’s person during the ensuing patdown search. See State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52(Mo.) (en banc) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence), ce rt. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 551, 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998).

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and deny Green’s motions for judgment on the pleadings.

1

. The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastem District of Missouri.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Young v. Warden
N.D. Indiana, 2021

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 F. App'x 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-green-v-gene-stubblefield-ca8-2001.