Ronald Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 20, 2024
DocketAT-315H-18-0244-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ronald Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Ronald Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RONALD C. GRAHAM, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-18-0244-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: March 20, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Frankie Baker , Tampa, Florida, for the appellant.

Barbara Kehoe , Esquire, St. Petersburg, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). Effective July 23, 2017, the agency appointed the appellant to a Nursing Assistant position in the excepted service subject to the completion of a 1 -year probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 6. The record reflects that the appellant had prior service that the agency credited towards completion of his probationary period and that his probationary period was scheduled to end on February 21, 2018. Id. By notice dated January 8, 2018, the agency informed the appellant that he would be terminated from his position based on alleged misconduct effective January 10, 2018. IAF, Tab 1 at 9-11. The appellant appealed and, attached to his appeal, he submitted a Standard Form 50 (SF-50) showing that he resigned from his position effective January 10, 2018. Id. at 8. The administrative judge issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction upon finding that the appellant failed to show that he was an employee with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-4. The appellant petitions for review of the initial decision and the agency responds in opposition to the petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4. The appellant has the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Niemi v. Department of the Interior, 114 M.S.P.R. 143, ¶ 8 (2010). The administrative judge must provide the 3

appellant with explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, because the appellant is a nonpreference eligible in an excepted-service appointment, he must satisfy the definition of “employee” set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C) to have Board appeal rights. McCrary v. Department of the Army, 103 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶ 7 (2006). In her jurisdictional order, the administrative judge provided the appellant with notice of how a competitive service employee could establish the Board’s jurisdiction over his appeal. IAF, Tab 3. She did not provide Burgess notice appropriate to the appellant’s situation. However, the Board has held that the failure to provide an appellant with proper Burgess notice in an acknowledgement order or show cause order can be cured if the initial decision itself puts the appellant on notice of what he must do to establish jurisdiction so as to afford him the opportunity to meet his jurisdictional burden for the first time on review. Caracciolo v. Department of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 11 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Brookins v. Department of the Interior , 2023 MSPB 3. Although the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order did not contain Burgess notice appropriate to this appeal, the initial decision did contain this notice. ID at 2-3. Thus, the appellant received actual notice of how he may establish jurisdiction over his appeal and an opportunity to establish jurisdiction on review. Under the circumstances, the administrative judge’s failure to provide proper Burgess notice below did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). 4

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C), an “employee” is a nonpreference eligible in the excepted service: (i) who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (ii) who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less[.] 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C); McCrary, 103 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶ 7. According to the evidence of record, the appellant resigned 2 prior to completing his probationary period and cannot satisfy section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i). IAF, Tab 1 at 8. According to the service computation date on the SF-50 documenting his resignation, he had less than 2 years of total Federal service at the time of his separation, and therefore, he cannot satisfy section 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). Id. In his petition for review, the appellant again argues that the agency’s reasons for terminating him are false. PFR File, Tab 1. He does not address the issue of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to show that he is an “employee” with appeal rights to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C), and properly dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C.

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Related

Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Karl Brookins v. Department of the Interior
2023 MSPB 3 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Ronald Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-graham-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.