Ronald F. v. Lawrence G.

181 Misc. 2d 760, 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 359
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedAugust 11, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 181 Misc. 2d 760 (Ronald F. v. Lawrence G.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 181 Misc. 2d 760, 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 359 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Jeffrey S. Sunshine, J.

Petitioner, Ronald F., a convicted felon who is unrelated to the two subject children, has filed for guardianship of these children who presently reside with him and his wife. The respondent, Lawrence G., the maternal uncle and adopted brother of the children, has cross-petitioned for guardianship of the two subject children and opposed the petition of petitioner F.

Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence introduced at the hearing, the court enters the following findings of fact and conclusion of law.

The children, Tsahai G., born September 5, 1985, and Shawana G., born January 6, 1987, have resided with the petitioner whom they refer to as “Daddy Ronald” since March of 1998.

The children’s mother was a persistent drug abuser and both children were removed from her care, at very young ages. The petitioner believed he was the putative father of Shawana but was not considered a resource for the children. The petitioner was incarcerated when the children were removed from their mother’s cáre. The petitioner has a long criminal history. However, during the times when he was not in prison between 1988 and 1997, the petitioner had regular contact with Shawana. Both children were raised by their maternal grandmother and in 1996, both children were legally adopted by her. On the day the petitioner was released from prison in 1997, he went to the maternal grandmother’s home to visit both children. Throughout the remainder of 1997 and beginning in 1998, the petitioner regularly visited with both children on the weekdays and sometimes on the weekends. It appears that although the children were legally adopted by the maternal grandmother, their biological mother was known to them.

In the fall of 1997, the petitioner was told by the maternal grandmother that she was ill. In early 1998, the respondent uncle (who is also the cross petitioner) visited the petitioner at his place of employment and asked him to take care of the two subject children because the maternal grandmother was dying. In March 1998, both children came to live with the petitioner. In April 1998, the maternal grandmother/adopted mother died. On May 21, 1998, the petitioner filed for guardianship of both [762]*762children. The petitioner believed he was the biological father of Shawana since her birth. It was later determined, during the course of these,, proceedings, that the petitioner is not the biological father of Shawana. However, a temporary order of guardianship was granted to the petitioner on July 7, 1998 and the children have resided with him since that time. It was not until July 15, 1998 that the respondent uncle filed cross petitions for guardianship of both children, his maternal nieces who are by operation of law his adopted sisters.

In a guardianship/custody dispute between two parents, the court is bound to make its determination based solely upon what is in the best interests of the children. The Court of Appeals firmly established a “totality of the circumstances” approach to all custody determinations, indicating that no one factor should be determinative in deciding what is in the best interests of the child. (See, Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 [1982]; Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89 [1982].)

Even though this case does not involve two parents, the totality of the circumstances analysis is appropriate herein.

Under the totality of the circumstances rule no one factor is determinative in making an award of custody. Determining what is in the child’s best interest requires that consideration be given to many factors such as: the relative stability of the respective parents, the wishes of a child, the effect of separation of siblings, the length of time the present custody arrangement has continued, the care and affection shown to the child by the parents, the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, the atmosphere in the homes, the morality of the parents, the financial standing of the parents, the refusal of a parent to permit visitation and/or the willingness of a parent to encourage visitation, and the over-all relative fitness of the parties. The existence or absence of any one factor cannot be determinative since the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. In the end, any determination of child custody must be based upon what is in the best interest of the child and what will best promote his or her welfare and happiness. (See, Young v Young, 212 AD2d 114 [2d Dept 1995]; Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 [1982], supra; Nehra v Uhlar, 43 NY2d 242 [1977].)

Even in a guardianship proceeding, the same best interest test must apply for the benefit and welfare of these children. Neither party is a parent. Although the respondent is a blood relative, there is no prima facie preference for a blood relative [763]*763over a person who is not related to the child. (Matter of Jennifer A., 225 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 91 NY2d 809 [1998]; Matter of Peter L., 59 NY2d 513 [1983].)

Since neither party is a parent, the court need not apply the two-prong test enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys (40 NY2d 543 [1976]), and there is no need for an exceptional circumstances analysis prior to reaching the question of what is in the children’s best interests.

Both parties, the petitioner’s (F.) wife, and the respondent’s (G.) wife testified. The court found the respondent to lack credibility. The respondent’s demeanor was dishonest, circumspect, self-serving and at times arrogant. The court credits the testimony of the petitioner and petitioner’s wife. The evidence has demonstrated the excellent job of parenting the petitioner and his wife have done since the subject children have been in his care since March of 1998. The petitioner has provided a loving, stable environment for both children. The petitioner and his wife have brought stability to the lives of these children in a time of bereavement and emotional turmoil.

On December 3, 1998 blood tests revealed that the petitioner was not the biological father of Shawana even though the petitioner and the child truly believed he was her father. The court directed that neither party was permitted to inform Shawana of the results of the blood tests pending trial. Although the petitioner learned he was not the father of Shawana, he did not consider withdrawing his petition because he loves both children and wants them to live with him regardless of the lack of a blood relationship. The children refer to the petitioner as their father (“Daddy Ronald”) and to the petitioner’s wife as their stepmother.

The evidence shows petitioner has been involved with the respondent’s family for 25 years because he had a periodic relationship with the mother of the children, Camilla G., for 25 years. The G. family assumed that the petitioner was Shawana’s father. Although the natural mother’s rights to these children were terminated years before, she still was involved in their lives. The natural mother, along with others, aided in the care of the subject children when the maternal grandmother/ adopted mother became ill, in October 1997.

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Bluebook (online)
181 Misc. 2d 760, 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 359, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-f-v-lawrence-g-nycfamct-1999.