Ronald D. Stafford and Tamela S. Stafford v. James R. Canedy, Vance Brothers, Inc. and Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company;

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: November 12, 2019
• Docket: NO. 2018-CA-00890-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-CA-00890-COA

RONALD D. STAFFORD AND TAMELA S. APPELLANTS STAFFORD

v.

JAMES R. CANEDY, VANCE BROTHERS, INC. APPELLEES AND ATLANTIC SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/31/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: MARYANNA PENTON JAMES COLLIN MALEY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: LAWRENCE ELDER HAHN JAMES D. HOLLAND ROBERT O. ALLEN JAMES HENDERSON HALL JESSICA SUSAN MALONE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/12/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This case concerns a car accident that aggravated injuries Ronald D. Stafford had

suffered in a previous car accident. Stafford filed suit regarding the first accident and, after

the action was removed to a federal district court, was awarded damages. He filed suit

regarding the second accident in circuit court. The defendants argued judicial estoppel

applied to bar Stafford’s recovery in the second suit. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment for the defendants. Finding judicial estoppel does not apply and

summary judgment was erroneously granted, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 2012, Stafford was injured in a car accident. Two years later, he was injured in

another car accident. Stafford was rear-ended in both accidents.

¶3. He filed suit in 2015 against several defendants, seeking damages resulting from the

first accident. The case was removed to federal court. After a jury trial, Stafford was

awarded approximately $1.2 million in economic and noneconomic damages. The

defendants filed posttrial motions arguing that because the jury was aware of the second

accident, it must have compensated Stafford for the injuries he sustained in both accidents.

¶4. The district court denied the defendants’ posttrial motions, finding the jury was

instructed “that it could not award any damages caused by the second accident.” Stafford v.

Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 1:15cv414, 2018 WL 736042, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2018).

The district court also noted that defense counsel reminded the jury during closing arguments

that it was “not to award any damages for whatever happened to [Stafford] in the July 2014

accident.” Id. The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, which affirmed the judgment. Stafford v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 754 Fed. App’x 241 (5th

Cir. 2018).

¶5. Seeking damages from the second accident, Stafford filed suit in 2017 in the Pearl

River County Circuit Court against James R. Canedy, Vance Brothers Inc., and Atlantic

Specialty Insurance Co. (collectively Canedy). The complaint alleged Stafford suffered

2 aggravation of his preexisting injuries as well as new spinal injuries. Stafford’s complaint

also included a loss-of-consortium claim by his wife, Tamela.

¶6. Vance Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Stafford’s claims

were barred by judicial estoppel. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Stafford

now appeals, arguing that judicial estoppel does not apply and that the trial court therefore

erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. Our “analysis requires [us] to use the abuse of discretion standard to review the trial

court’s determination that judicial estoppel is or is not applicable.” Adams v. Graceland

Care Ctr. of Oxford LLC, 208 So. 3d 575, 580 (¶12) (Miss. 2017). After that, we “use the

de novo standard to determine whether summary judgment was or was not appropriate.” Id.

DISCUSSION

¶8. The trial court based its decision to grant summary judgment entirely on the

application of judicial estoppel,1 so we need only address whether judicial estoppel applied.

“Judicial estoppel arises when one party asserts a position contrary to one taken in prior

litigation,” and it “precludes a party from asserting a position, benefitting from that position,

and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating from that position later

in the litigation.” Clark v. Neese, 131 So. 3d 556, 560 (¶15) (Miss. 2013). There are three

elements of judicial estoppel: “A party will be judicially estopped from taking a subsequent

position if (1) the position is inconsistent with one previously taken during litigation, (2) a

1 Although the trial court’s order simply granted the motion for summary judgment, the sole issue at the summary-judgment hearing was whether judicial estoppel applied.

3 court accepted the previous position, and (3) the party did not inadvertently take the

inconsistent positions.” Id. at (¶16). All three elements must be met for judicial estoppel to

apply. Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery P.A., 186 So. 3d 836, 846 (¶25) (Miss.

2016).

¶9. As to the first element, Stafford’s position is not inconsistent because he filed two

separate, unrelated civil claims. This is not the classic red truck/blue truck situation where

a plaintiff declared in one suit that a blue truck caused his injuries and in another suit that a

red truck caused the same injuries. Coral Drilling Inc. v. Bishop, 260 So. 2d 463, 465-66

(Miss. 1972).2 Stafford’s second suit alleged an aggravation of prior injuries plus a loss-of-

consortium claim by his wife. He is not asserting a position in the second suit that is contrary

to the one he took in the first suit. Even though Canedy argues that Stafford is seeking

damages for injuries for which he has already been compensated, the district court ruled

otherwise. Stafford, 2018 WL 736042, at *4. We agree that Stafford’s position in the second

suit is not inconsistent with his position in the first suit, and so the first element for judicial

estoppel to apply cannot be met.

¶10. Canedy’s argument was that Stafford had already been awarded damages from the

first accident for “full economic loss,” so he could not also recover “full economic loss” from

the second accident. Yet there were pleaded damages from the second accident not included

2 In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court barred the second suit based on election of remedies but recognized that judicial estoppel might also bar the second suit. Coral Drilling, 260 So. 2d at 466. The Supreme Court stated that “Courts should on their own initiative preclude a party from repudiating in one suit a sworn statement made in support of former litigation.” Id.

4 in the first suit. The trial court noted that “there were some additional expenditures that

could be allocated in the [second accident],” like ambulance and emergency room bills.

Stafford is entitled to seek to recover for medical and other noneconomic damages associated

with the second accident, as well as his wife’s loss-of-consortium claim. Although he can

seek recovery for those claims, he is necessarily foreclosed from recovering past and future

economic loss.

¶11. Even if Stafford had taken inconsistent positions, which he did not, the district court

did not accept his first position. The district court noted that Jury Instruction 14 “made it

clear that Stafford carried the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his

damages were caused by the . . . [first] accident.” Id. Although the jury heard testimony

about the second accident (but not the second lawsuit), it “was also instructed that it could

not award any damages caused by the second accident.” Id. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,

one of the defendants argued that the jury must have been unable to apportion damages

between the first and second accidents. Stafford, 754 F. App’x at 243. But the Fifth Circuit

disagreed and rejected the defendant’s theory. Id. at 244.

¶12. We have already found that Stafford did not take inconsistent positions, so the third

element of judicial estoppel cannot be met.

¶13. Because we find judicial estoppel does not apply here, we find the trial court’s

decision to grant summary judgment was erroneous. As a result, we reverse and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶14. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

5 BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.