Ronald Coogler v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: November 18, 2013
• Docket: A13A1410
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MCFADDEN and BOGGS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

November 18, 2013

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A13A1410. COOGLER v. THE STATE. DO-053 C

DOYLE , Presiding Judge.

In August 2006, Ronald Coogler was found not guilty by reason of insanity

(“NGRI”) of criminal damage to property,1 criminal trespass,2 and criminal damage

to property in the second degree.3 Thereafter, he was adjudicated NGRI and civilly

committed to the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities

(“the Department”) for involuntary treatment pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-7-131 and 37-

3-1. In April 2011, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) (5) (B), Coogler filed a petition

for full release from the verdict of NGRI, which the trial court denied in a July 18,

1 OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 16-7-21 (a). 3 OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1). 2011 order. Coogler now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his

petition. We agree and reverse.

Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) (5) (A) & (B),

If a[n Acquittee] appears to meet the criteria for outpatient involuntary treatment . . . for release on a trial basis in the community in preparation for a full release, the court may order a period of conditional release subject to certain conditions set by the court. The court is authorized to appoint an appropriate community service provider to work in conjunction with the Department . . . to monitor the [Acquittee]’s compliance with these conditions and to make regular reports to the court. . . . If the [Acquittee] successfully completes all requirements during this period of conditional release, the court shall discharge the individual from commitment at the end of that period. Such individuals may be referred for community mental health, mental retardation, or substance abuse services as appropriate. The court may require the individual to participate in outpatient treatment or any other services or programs authorized by Chapter 3, 4, or 7 of Title 37.4

“After a plea of insanity has been successfully entered, a presumption of

continuing insanity arises.”5 When reviewing an order denying the petition for full

release from the verdict of NGRI, this Court determines whether any rational trier of

4 (Emphasis supplied.) 5 Newman v. State, 314 Ga. App. 99, 100 (722 SE2d 911) (2012).

2 fact could have found that the acquittee failed to prove his burden by a preponderance

of the evidence.6 “In addition, the trial court must supply specific findings of fact

regarding the presented evidence and its conclusions based thereon. The court must

consider all credible and relevant expert and other evidence presented at the hearing

and contained in the trial record on the issue . . . .”7

Pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-1 (12.1), an outpatient is a mentally ill person,

(A) [w]ho is not an inpatient but who, based on the person’s treatment history or current mental status, will require outpatient treatment in order to avoid predictably and imminently becoming an inpatient; (B) [w]ho because of the person’s current mental status, mental history, or nature of the person’s mental illness is unable voluntarily to seek or comply with outpatient treatment; and (C) [w]ho is in need of involuntary treatment.8

Thus, we review the trial court’s order to determine whether a rational trier of

fact could have found that Coogler failed to establish by a preponderance of the

6 See Nelor v. State, 309 Ga. App. 165, 165-166 (709 SE2d 904) (2011) (reversing an order denying release from inpatient treatment to conditional, involuntary outpatient treatment). See also Newman, 314 Ga. App. at 100. 7 (Footnote omitted.) Gray v. State, 295 Ga. App. 737 (673 SE2d 84) (2009). See also OCGA § 37-3-1 (12.1). 8 (Emphasis supplied.)

3 evidence that he was sane,9 and more specifically to the issue of moving from an

involuntary outpatient to full release from the NGRI verdict, that (1) he did not

require outpatient treatment to avoid predictably and imminently becoming an

inpatient; (2) he could voluntarily seek and comply with outpatient treatment; and (3)

he does not need involuntary treatment.10

The record reveals that in 2003, several of Coogler’s neighbors at an apartment

complex contacted police after a firearm was discharged. Approximately five shots

were fired, including one into an apartment and the remainder at vehicles around the

complex. Coogler was seen by neighbors hiding behind trees and eventually

disposing of a weapon in a grassy area; his arrest took some time because he was

spending the night at various hotels around the area. Although Coogler had a

competency hearing set for September 30, 2005, he absconded and boarded a plane

for Russia, where he was taken into custody based on statements to Russian officials

and hospitalized at that time for 30 days. Thereafter, he was returned to the United

9 See Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 (2) (b) (427 SE2d 490) (1993), citing Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71-72 (2) (c) (295 SE2d 727) (1982). 10 See OCGA § 37-3-1 (12.1). This inquiry, we note, is not whether it is a benefit to the acquittee to have the NGRI verdict lifted or whether the NGRI is infringing on the acquittee’s life.

4 States based on his bench warrant for the 2003 incident. In 2006, he underwent a

psychological evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. In August 2006,

the trial court entered an order finding Coogler NGRI.

In late March 2007, Coogler was granted a 30 day conditional release to a

supervised residential facility. In early May 2007, Coogler was given a six-month

conditional release from inpatient treatment to a supervised residential facility with

outpatient treatment. In October 2007, Coogler was released from the portion of his

conditional release order requiring that he reside in a residential treatment facility,

and since that time, he has lived on his own in an apartment; he remains under the

NGRI verdict, however, and pursuant thereto, an involuntary outpatient commitment

plan.

In December 2009, Coogler filed a petition for full release from the NGRI

verdict and involuntary outpatient status. The transcript from this hearing established

that Coogler was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type with a history

of psychotic episodes, although he is also a highly functioning individual with an

MBA in accounting. Coogler has lived alone in his own apartment since October

2007, and he has been compliant with taking his prescribed medication (a mood

stabilizer and an anti-psychotic) and has never missed his monthly appointments with

5 his doctors or social worker. Although Coogler went to a hospital in June 2008 in

order to modify his medication regimen, the testimony presented shows the

hospitalization was not a result of an infraction or non-compliance by Coogler, nor

did he exhibit any violent behavior at that time. Coogler’s mother and sister lived

close to him, they had daily phone contact with him, and his mother had physical

contact with him approximately three times a week.

At a March 2010 hearing on this petition, two treating psychiatrists and

Coogler’s assigned social worker all testified that Coogler was not a threat to himself

or others, he no longer fit the criteria for involuntary commitment, and they

recommended Coogler be fully released from the NGRI verdict. Nevertheless, the

trial court denied the petition on the ground that it would be beneficial to have

Coogler monitored for another year of involuntary outpatient treatment because he

had been stable for such a short period of time.

In July 2011, another hearing was held, at which time his treating psychiatrist

and social worker again testified that Coogler no longer met the criteria for

involuntary commitment, should be released from the NGRI verdict, and was not a

threat to himself or others. The experts testified that there was no less restrictive level

of involuntary treatment than that which Coogler had been monitored under for the

6 past two years, and Coogler had only monthly contact with his social worker and

psychiatrist or an equivalent nurse practitioner. Nevertheless, the trial court denied

the petition, finding that Coogler should continue under the NGRI verdict for another

year so that the court could continue to supervise him and that he still met the criteria

for involuntary commitment.

Coogler contends that the trial court erred by not releasing him from the NGRI

verdict because he rebutted the presumption of insanity and the need for continued

involuntary outpatient commitment. We agree.11

As an initial matter, the trial court’s order contains a number of factual findings

that are contrary to the record. First, the trial court found that the treating psychiatrist

would “feel more comfortable having a longer amount of time to assess the likelihood

of the [Acquittee] discontinuing his medications.” Although in response to the trial

court’s hypothetical the doctor stated that generally a longer time period of review

over a patient could be helpful in determining the likelihood of another incident, he

nowhere testified that he thought Coogler specifically needed more time in

involuntary care to assess this issue. Instead, he testified that Coogler had “good

insight into his condition,” was “coping well,” was “compliant,” independently cared

11 See Nelor, 309 Ga. App. at 169.

7 for himself, and could be responsible for complying with his treatment without the

aid of an involuntary order. This was supported by the testimony of the social worker

and by the fact that Coogler had minimal contact with officials during each month but

still remained compliant with his treatment.

The trial court also found that the psychiatrist testified that Coogler “would

decompensate rapidly if his medications were not taken daily”; however, this again

was based on statements by the psychiatrist regarding general time frames of non-

compliance during which different patients may begin to show symptoms; he stated

that “[i]t’s hard to predict because there are some patients that can decompensate in

two to three days; other patients that can take up to four, six months or even a year

to decompensate.” Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that Coogler “doesn’t take

much . . . to come back from a decompensation. There are some patients [who] would

take three or four months to bring them back. . . . [H]e responds . . . quickly.”

The trial court also found that Coogler’s mother and sister only had contact

with him “about [two] times a week.” This finding is belied by the record in which

Coogler’s sister stated that she sees her brother three times per week, every week, and

he sees their mother once every week. Other portions of the testimony established that

the family had daily phone contact with Coogler. The trial court’s order went on to

8 conclude that the family’s lack of frequent contact did “not give the court any

assurance that the [Acquittee] will have the appropriate supervision to catch any

missed doses at this time.” But this conclusion, again, is completely at odds with the

record, which shows that Coogler is only in contact with his physician and social

worker on a monthly basis, and during the past two years, he has been independently

responsible for taking his medications and appearing at appointments without any

further supervision by anyone other than himself and his family. Indeed, the only

support for the trial court’s order appears to be the trial court’s own interjections of

unsupported, generalized hypothetical questions posed to the experts.

While it is clear that Coogler does have a serious mental illness that led to his

actions in 2003, after carefully reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the State, we conclude that no rational trier of fact could conclude based on the facts

before us that Coogler failed to overcome the presumption of insanity and the

continued need for involuntary outpatient treatment. Coogler has shown that he is

able to voluntarily comply and seek out individual treatment for his condition, which

he has done for the last two years, and based on the testimony by the experts about

Coogler’s insight into his diagnosis, there is no evidence to support a finding that

without involuntary treatment that he would be in danger of imminently becoming an

9 inpatient again. Thus, he does not fit the definition of a mentally ill outpatient under

OCGA § 37-3-1 (12.1). Moreover, the only record evidence that Coogler continues

to meet the criteria for involuntary treatment is the presumption of insanity, and that

is not sufficient evidence when faced with the evidence of sanity presented at the

hearings. “[T]he trial court [. . .] may not disregard expert medical evidence and rely

solely on the presumption of insanity.”12

If no amount of evidence offered at a release hearing by an insanity acquittee could rebut the presumption of insanity, the processes of proof in the due process hearing would be an empty ritual. The sole basis for argument would be an appeal to judicial discretion or mercy rather than to a process of proof.13

Here, there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Coogler failed to

rebut the presumption of insanity, and the trial court therefore erred by denying his

petition for full release from the NGRI verdict.

Judgment reversed. McFadden and Boggs, JJ., concur.

12 Nagel, 262 Ga. at 891 (2) (a). 13 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 890 (1).