Ronald Cohn, Inc. v. Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided February 14, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-00848·Unknown

Opinion

RONALD COHN, INC. d/b/a SPROUTS Case No.: 19cv848-JAH (RBB) FARMERS MARKET, a California corporation, ORDER: Plaintiff, (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Doc. No. 22); AND SPROUTS FARMERS MARKETS, INC., a Delaware corporation; f/k/a and d/b/a (2) SETTING BRIEFING SPROUTS FARMERS MARKETS, LLC, SCHEDULE AND HEARING FOR a Delaware limited liability company, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Defendant. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff, Ronald Cohn, Inc.’s, Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) enjoining Defendants Sprouts Farmers Markets, Inc., and Sprouts Farmers Markets, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) from (1) taking any additional audits of Plaintiff’s stores until after it has (a) completely disclosed all current safety auditing standards to Plaintiff, and (b) allowed Plaintiff a reasonable period of not less than thirty (30) days to bring its stores into compliance under those standards; (2) conducting additional safety audits based on standards not disclosed to Plaintiff; (3) terminating the Trademark License Agreement (“TLA”) based on any safety audits conducted on Plaintiff’s stores if the operative safety audit standards were not disclosed to Plaintiff in advance; and (4) instructing its vendors, including its sign vendors, to cease doing business with Plaintiff and advising each of its vendors of the Court’s order with respect to this issue. See Doc. No. 22. On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff, Ronald Cohn, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Cohn”) filed this action against Defendant Sprouts Farmers Markets, Inc, f/k/a and d/b/a Sprouts Famers Market, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging claims for violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference, among other claims. In October 1990, Sprouts’ predecessor, Boney’s Services, Inc., entered into a Trademark License Agreement with Plaintiff for the operation of a grocery store in Chula Vista, California. Boney’s Services, Inc., and Plaintiff entered into a second Trademark License Agreement in September 1995 allowing Plaintiff to open and operate a second grocery store in Chula Vista, California. In 2011, Sprouts Farmers Market acquired the brand and amended the TLA. Plaintiff now alleges, since the filling of this action, Defendant has taken increasingly aggressive retaliatory action against the Cohn stores, including but not limited to performing various unannounced safety audits based on undisclosed standards and subsequently threatening to terminate the current TLA between the Parties. The purpose of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (noting that a TRO is restricted to its “underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”). As such, an applicant for a TRO is required to demonstrate “immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see also Caribbean Marine Serv. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). The standard for issuing a TRO is similar to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Ninth Circuit recognizes two tests for demonstrating preliminary injunctive relief: the traditional test or an alternative sliding scale test. Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the traditional test, a party must show: “1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a party demonstrates that a public interest is involved, a “district court must also examine whether the public interest favors the plaintiff.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992). Alternatively, a party seeking injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 must show either (1) a combination of likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions going to the merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party. Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. County of Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 873 (9th Cir. 2002); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). “‘These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.’” Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402 (quoting United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Thus, ‘the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability of success must be shown.” Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Ninth Circuit makes clear that a showing of immediate irreparable harm is essential for prevailing on a TRO. See Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff must show the presence of an “immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Id., (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). First, through the Emergency Motion and supporting Declaration, Plaintiff sufficiently demonstrates that Plaintiff will suffer immediate irreparable injury if the Court denies the request for a TRO. On January 22, 2020, Defendant issued Plaintiff a Notice of Default demand that required Cohn’s store[s] to be brought to “acceptable operational level” within fifteen (15) days of receiving the notice to avoid the possibility of “termination of the TLA.” (Cohn Decl. ¶ 44, Exhs. 11 and 12). Defendant provided the notice without regard as to whether a 15-day cure was practicable, nor did Defendant provide Plaintiff with any information as to how to be in full compliance. Id. Additionally, on February 7, 2020, Defendant indicated to Plaintiff, both verbally and in writing, there would be a “hold off on any further audits of Mr. Cohn’s stores until 30 days after” a meeting between Cohn a

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Ronald Cohn, Inc. v. Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2020).

Ronald Cohn, Inc. v. Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. (Ronald Cohn, Inc. v. Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related