COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Lemons ∗ and Senior Judge Cole Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RONALD CLYDE IVERSON MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY v. Record No. 0314-99-2 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS APRIL 25, 2000 THERESE ROSE IVERSON
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY John R. Cullen, Judge
Donald K. Butler (Ann Brakke Campfield; Rae H. Ely; Morano, Colan & Butler; Rae H. Ely & Associates, on briefs), for appellant.
Annie Lee Jacobs (Tracey C. Hopper; Parker, McElwain & Jacobs, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Ronald Iverson ("husband") appeals certain portions of a
divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court of Madison County.
Incorporated into that court's November 4, 1998 decree were the
findings of fact and conclusions of law from an opinion letter
dated September 10, 1998.
∗ Justice Lemons prepared and the Court adopted the opinion in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia. ∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. I. BACKGROUND
Therese Iverson and Ronald Iverson married on July 9, 1966
in Chicago, Illinois. Husband owned Iverson Perennial Gardens
("IPG"). Wife worked outside the home from the time of the
parties' marriage through 1989, the last six years working for
IPG as an employee.
In 1996, husband sold IPG to Hines Horticulture for
$10,250,000 plus payments of $75,000 per year pursuant to a
three-year consulting agreement, under which husband worked
approximately 20-30 days per year and was prohibited from
selling plants in the United States for the three-year period
beginning August 30, 1996.
The subject of this appeal concerns either the valuation or
distribution of the following properties:
1. Edgewood Farm, an 1853 Greek revival home that the
Iversons purchased and renovated in Madison County, Virginia.
Upon divorce, it was valued at $1,500,000 and was subject to two
mortgages totaling $694,793.94. Wife sold Edgewood Farm after
the September 10, 1998 opinion letter, but before entry of the
final decree on November 4, 1998.
2. Three tracts of land in Illinois, including: a 34.286
acre property located in Lake County and valued at $1,300,000; a
24.59 Lake County property valued at $4,000,000; and a 69.62
acre Kane County property valued at $975,000, less a mortgage
balance of $264,080, resulting in $710,920 net equity subject to
- 2 - division. After the hearing, husband sold a portion of the Kane
County property.
3. A villa in St. Martin valued at $900,000.
4. Property in Trenton, South Carolina valued at $65,000,
less a mortgage balance of $46,000 resulting in $19,000 net
equity subject to division.
Wife filed a Bill of Complaint for divorce on August 2,
1996. In the divorce decree of March 2, 1998, the court
reserved jurisdiction to resolve equitable distribution and
spousal support. At the time of the hearing, the parties'
primary assets derived from the sale of IPG that was invested in
Oppenhiemer accounts, the Illinois real estate, a villa in St.
Martin and Edgewood Farm.
After taking evidence ore tenus over five days, the court
found that the marital assets had a total value of approximately
$9,872,000. The trial court ordered that the value of assets
not connected with IPG be divided equally between the parties
and that assets related to IPG be allocated 65% to husband and
35% to wife. The court further found that husband had wasted
certain assets during the parties' separation and charged him
with the value of those assets. Husband received net assets
(exclusive of tangible personal property) which the trial court
valued at approximately $5,903,000, and wife received assets
(exclusive of tangible personal property) which the trial court
valued at approximately $3,873,000.
- 3 - On appeal, husband contests certain portions of the decree
entered November 4, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Madison County. 1
II. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732,
396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990); Code § 8.01-680. In matters of
equitable distribution, a court must classify the property as
separate or marital, assign a value to the property based on the
evidence presented by both parties and, finally, distribute the
property to the parties, considering the factors present in Code
§ 20-107.3(E). See Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 665, 401
S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991).
On appeal, husband maintains that the trial court erred by:
(1) valuing the 24.59 acre parcel of land in Lake County,
Illinois at $4,000,000; (2) allocating certain tax liabilities
to him; (3) failing to consider the liquidity of certain assets;
and (4) awarding spousal support without proper consideration of
his change in income in 1999, wife's expenses and the income
earning character of the assets distributed. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm the decree.
1 The finality of that decree was suspended by subsequent orders of the court to allow husband time to transfer real estate and post an appeal bond.
- 4 - A. Valuation of the 24.59 acre tract at $4,000,000
The trial court accepted wife's expert's opinion that the
24.59 acre Lake County tract was valued at $4,000,000.
Approximately 68% of the 24.59 acres is located within the
Village of Long Grove and is zoned R-2 (residential) which
permits residential use with a maximum density of one lot per
two acres. 2 The remaining 7.84 acres is in unincorporated Lake
County and is currently zoned C (countryside/agricultural).
James Gibbons, a Chicago real estate appraiser, testified as
wife's expert in valuation. He testified that these 24.59 acres
had a value of $4,000,000 based on a sales comparison valuation
approach and other factors. He arrived at this conclusion
assuming the highest and best use of the property would require
the owner to annex the unincorporated portion into the Village
of Long Grove, demolish the existing improvements, and develop
the site with a mixed-use commercial development plan
commensurate with Long Grove's comprehensive plan. He also
based his conclusion in part on sales comparisons, financial
statements given by Mr. Iverson to a bank and a farm credit
organization, and an offer to purchase.
In reaching the "Fee Simple Market Value" opinion wife's
expert stated, "the three commonly-used approaches to value are
2 Long Grove is a small affluent community with an average household income of $160,000 and an average home price of $365,000. Houses built within the past three years have been in the $1,000,000 range.
- 5 - the Cost, Income Capitalization, and Sales Comparison
Approaches. Since the improvements were determined to not have
contributory value to the underlying land value, the Cost and
Income Approaches were not applicable."
Under "purpose and intended use of appraisal" the expert
stated: "The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the
Market Value (as defined on the following page) of the subject
property. The intended use of this appraisal is to provide the
Client with a Market Value estimate for purposes of a division
of marital assets."
"Market Value" is defined in the expert's report as:
The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by any undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated:
2. Both parties are well informed or well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests;
3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;
4. Payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and
5. The price represents the normal consideration for the property sold
- 6 - unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.
The expert further noted:
Although currently zoned low-density residential, per the Village of Long Grove's Comprehensive Plan (dated 8/27/91), the subject property is one of 4 commercially-oriented planning subareas that are covered by detailed plans within the Comprehensive Plan. The Plan states that "these special subarea plans also should serve as a guide for the future development of such important Village areas."
Husband contends that the valuation is speculative because:
1. Development of the land requires the widening of a
neighboring highway, the addition of turning lanes and the
addition of signal lights.
2. Municipal water and sewer is not currently available on
the site.
3. Based on its soil type, there would be additional costs
to establish proper foundations for construction.
4. A portion of the property is in a wetland and could not
be developed without a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.
Husband's expert witness, Ronald Keating, a real estate
broker from Chicago, testified as to his familiarity with this
property, both as a prospective purchaser and as the listing
real estate agent. His firm was initially interested in
developing these 24.59 acres for retail, office and industrial
use and spent three years exploring its development potential.
- 7 - However, according to Keating, officials from the Village of
Long Grove refused to support any type of commercial development
on this property. Keating explained that Long Grove is an area
of the state where growth is neither encouraged nor wanted. His
firm spent over $100,000 in preparing site plans and engineering
studies to determine its development potential.
Keating listed the property for sale and marketed it for
two years. Hamilton Partners eventually submitted an offer to
purchase this land plus 3.15 acres of Iverson's 34.286 acre
tract. This offer was contingent upon husband's cooperation in
obtaining new zoning and upon the annexation and rezoning of
another 25 acres owned by a third party so that the total
acreage could be developed together into a single family
residential subdivision. The offer was rejected in part because
of contingencies and in part because of price.
Keating testified that after two years as the listing
agent, no viable purchasers had come forward for the property.
Keating's opinion was that he could market the 24.59 acre parcel
and the 34.286 acres parcel together with no contingencies to
sell within one year for a price of $500,000. 3
Wife's other evidence of the value of the property
consisted of the offer by Hamilton Partners in August, 1997 to
purchase the 24.59 acre parcel (together with 3.15 acres of the
3 This represents an average value of approximately $8,492 per acre.
- 8 - 34.286 acre parcel) for the sum of $3,652,506. In addition,
husband had signed a financial statement on August 15, 1995,
under penalty of federal criminal prosecution certifying that
the value of the Long Grove real estate was $3,500,000 and a
second financial statement on February 1, 1996, showing the
value of the Long Grove property at $3,500,000. Furthermore,
husband had previously offered $62,500 per acre for an adjoining
property similarly situated, and an earlier listing of the 24.59
acres for sale at $170,000 per acre or $4,180,300. Finally,
there was a current listing of the same 24.59 acres, plus an
additional 22.41 acres, at $5 per square foot or $6,087,510.
The trial judge noted:
Each of the experts testified extensively as to his valuation of the properties and the basis for his opinion. In addition, numerous exhibits were introduced to support the position of the parties and the experts as to value. Mr. Keating's opinion as to the values for the properties is far less than the current listing price on the 34.286 acre parcel and the 24.59 acres, and the listing price on the 69.62 acre parcel when that listing expired a year ago. Mr. Keating's values are also much less than the market values placed on the properties by Mr. Iverson as contained in his financial statements for Nations Bank dated August 15, 1995, and Palmetto Farm Credit dated February, 1996.
On appeal the evidence is considered in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing in the trial court. "'Where
the trial court's decision is based on an ore tenus hearing, its
determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
- 9 - wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Gamble v. Gamble, 14
Va. App. 558, 563, 421 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1992) (quoting
Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d
28, 30 (1989)). "Where experts offer conflicting testimony, it
is within the discretion of the trial court to select either
opinion." Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 140, 480 S.E.2d 760,
768 (1997).
Husband maintains that the valuation placed upon the
property by wife's expert was speculative and should have been
rejected. Husband notes that the valuation is based in part
upon an offer to purchase that required rezoning, annexation by
the Village of Long Grove, acquisition of property not belonging
to husband and other contingencies. Additionally, husband
points to the use of comparable properties for valuation and
argues that the properties utilized were dissimilar in nature.
However, wife's valuation is based on much more than these
factors.
Wife's expert, Gibbons, possessed the designation "MAI"
(Member of the Appraisal Institute) and presented detailed
written appraisals of the property in addition to his testimony.
Among the factors utilized by Gibbons were:
a. Husband's two financial statements under oath listing
the value of the property at $3,500,000, two years prior to
the date of valuation in this case;
- 10 - b. Husband's offer to purchase adjacent property at
$62,500 per acre;
c. Husband's earlier listing for the sale of the property
at $170,000 per acre for a total of $4,180,300;
d. Husband's current listing for the sale of the property
at $6,087,510;
e. The Hamilton Partners' offer to purchase the property
(plus 3.15 acres of adjoining property owned by husband)
for $3,652,506 (with many contingencies) which was rejected
in part because of contingencies and in part because of
price, and
f. Comparable properties.
Husband's expert was the listing agent for the property and
valued the property at $500,000 despite a current listing price
of $6,087,510. We cannot say that the trial judge was plainly
wrong or without evidence to support his judgment accepting the
valuation of wife's expert.
B. Allocation of tax liability
The trial court divided the marital assets so that wife
received 35% and husband 65% of those assets connected with IPG,
including the value of the real estate in Illinois and South
Carolina, the accounts receivable from the sale, other IPG
related assets and the bank and stock accounts containing the
remaining proceeds from the sale of the business. The trial
court ordered that wife pay 35% of the 1998 income taxes
- 11 - attributable to marital accounts and that husband pay the
remainder of the income taxes for 1998. The trial court further
ordered husband to pay all remaining income taxes, penalties or
interest for 1997 and prior years for the "parties jointly, for
himself personally, for the corporations, partnerships, or other
business entities in which he then had any interest," and also
entitled him to any refund due. Husband contends that he is now
facing a potential tax liability of $2,000,000.
When considering valuation of the marital estate, "Code
§ 20-107.3 'mandates' that trial courts determine the ownership
and value of all real and personal property of the parties."
Johnson v. Johnson, 25 Va. App. 368, 373, 488 S.E.2d 659, 662
(1997). The litigants, however, have the burden of presenting
sufficient evidence for the court to discharge its duty. See
id. The court will "look to current circumstances and what the
circumstances will be 'within the immediate or reasonably
foreseeable future,' not to what may happen in the future."
Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. at 735, 396 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Young
v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81-82, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986)).
At the time of trial, husband had not completed his 1996
and 1997 tax returns. Husband's accountant testified that the
IRS was "delving into" certain issues, that the IRS had
requested documents, and that he had discussed certain matters
with an IRS agent. He also put the tax liability at about
$200,000 to $300,000 for 1992 and about $40,000 for 1995. The
- 12 - only other information on this subject before the court was a
Motion to Reconsider Allocation of Tax Liabilities and Expenses
to the Parties filed by husband's counsel, together with an
attached letter from husband's accountant asserting that, as of
September 12, 1998, he was still "working with" the IRS and that
husband "[is] looking at a potential tax liability of almost
$2,000,000." The motion was filed after the court rendered its
decision.
On January 6, 1998, the trial court gave the parties leave
to present additional evidence about outstanding tax matters.
Evidence was presented that $1,656,000 of marital funds had been
paid to the IRS and the Virginia Department of Taxation for
corporate taxes potentially owed for 1996. On June 20, 1998,
the trial court ordered, prior to its equitable distribution
ruling, that $474,115 of marital funds be paid toward husband's
individual federal and state income tax returns for 1997. By
letter to counsel of June 26, 1998, the court requested
additional evidence of tax consequences. The September 10, 1998
opinion letter expressly mentioned the court's having asked the
parties post-trial to present their respective positions to the
court about tax matters.
The trial judge, in his letter opinion and in court prior
to the entry of the decree, specifically stated that he had
considered all of the factors of Code § 20-107.3 in fashioning
the equitable distribution award and explained his reasoning
- 13 - about the various factors. While it is true that husband has
received a significantly higher percentage of the tax liability,
this alone does not indicate an improper division between the
parties. Virginia's statutory scheme of equitable distribution
does not have a presumption favoring an equal distribution of
assets or liabilities. See Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App.
130, 132-33, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1986).
Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
support it. See Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. at 732, 396 S.E.2d at
678. In making his equitable distribution award the trial judge
issued a written letter opinion and further explained his ruling
orally to the parties prior to the entry of the decree. The
twenty-three page letter opinion clearly demonstrates
consideration of the statutory factors required in making an
equitable distribution award. The court specifically requested
counsel to provide evidence concerning potential tax
consequences. The burden is upon the parties to provide
sufficient evidence to the trial court from which to make an
equitable distribution award. See Johnson, 25 Va. App. at 373,
488 S.E.2d at 662.
Prior to its letter opinion, evidence regarding tax
consequences in the record in response to the invitation of the
trial court was limited to "federal and state income taxes for
- 14 - the years 1996 and 1997 may not be finalized" although
substantial "payments ha[d] been made," and "the 1996 tax year
[was] being audited." After the trial judge issued his letter
opinion, husband filed a "Motion to Equalize the Equitable
Distribution Valuation Risks to Each Party and to Value all Real
Estate Consistent with their Net Values" and "Motion to
Reconsider Allocation of Tax Liabilities and Expenses to the
Parties." At a hearing on the motions, the trial court stated:
The Court considered the tax liability of the parties on the evidence that was presented to it, and back in June the Court was ready at that time to finalize its opinion, this opinion went through several drafts, the Court reviewed all the evidence in what I would call great detail, . . . . And the Court is not going back now and recalculate these figures. . . . The Court believes that its ruling was supported by the evidence, and I'm not going to reconsider the allocation of either the tax liabilities or the expenses of the parties, particularly in light of the fact that the Court awarded a distribution that was not a 50/50 distribution, all those issues were before the Court when it ruled.
Based upon the evidence before the trial judge after
specific invitation to address tax consequences to the parties,
we cannot say that the trial judge was plainly wrong or without
evidence to support his ruling that the proceeds of the sale of
IPG would be split 65% to husband and 35% to wife with tax
liability for the 1998 federal and state income tax in
proportion to the division but with all other tax liability or
refund being the responsibility or the benefit of husband.
- 15 - Given the opportunity to present evidence on the issue prior to
the trial court's ruling, we do not consider it an abuse of
discretion to deny the motion to reconsider.
Having considered the tax consequences to each party in
making the equitable distribution award, the trial court was not
required to frame its ruling to minimize or eliminate all
negative tax consequences to husband. See Code
§ 20-107.3(E)(9). Accordingly, we find no reversible error on
these grounds.
C. Did the trial court err by failing to consider the liquidity of assets?
Pursuant to the trial court's equitable distribution award,
husband retained marital assets with a total value of
approximately $8,003,000, less payment to wife of a lump sum of
$2,100,000. The court permitted him to satisfy a portion of the
award by transferring to her the 34.286 acres in Lake County,
Illinois, valued at $1,300,000 and 20.05 acres in Kane County,
Illinois, valued at $280,700. 4 Husband elected to transfer these
portions to wife. After the transfers to wife and adjustment
for the lump sum payment, husband retains assets valued by the
court at approximately $5,903,000, and wife receives assets
4 This was the remaining acreage from the 69.62 acres in Kane County that existed at the time of the hearing. Husband sold a portion of this property prior to the entry of the decree.
- 16 - valued by the court at approximately $3,873,000 plus tangible
personal property. 5
On appeal, husband contends that he received illiquid
assets that may be worth less that the value established by the
court. According to husband, wife received assets with greater
liquidity.
The two largest assets transferred to wife were Edgewood
Farm and the St. Martin real estate. The court found the net
equity in Edgewood Farm to be $805,206. This property was sold
prior to the entry of the decree. The St. Martin real estate
was valued at $900,000. This was investment property in a
complex that had a rental manager. Wife also has received or
will receive a cash lump sum from husband of $519,300.
The trial court specifically found that all the parties'
real estate is non-liquid. The asset that husband received with
the greatest value was the 24.59 acre parcel in Lake County,
Illinois. Husband claims this land is illiquid because he has
unsuccessfully tried to sell it for approximately five years.
Edgewood Farm was sold after the judge's opinion letter but
prior to entry of the decree. Likewise, the majority of Kane
County property allocated to husband was sold prior to entry of
the decree. Husband received 65% of the bank and investment
account assets; as of the date of trial those accounts were the
5 She also retains 100% of her interest in a pension plan that will provide monthly payments at age 65.
- 17 - only liquid assets of the parties and husband received most of
them. The other assets allocated to husband included accounts
receivable from Josh Batist and Marlene Frisbee and a promissory
note from Karen Zaucha. 6
When fashioning an equitable distribution award, the trial
court is not required "to quantify or elaborate exactly what
weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory
factors [of Code § 20-107.3(E)]." Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va.
App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). The trial court's
allocation of liquid and non-liquid assets is a matter of
discretion. Nowhere does the law require parties to receive a
proportionate or equal share of the liquid and the non-liquid
assets. The court is required only to consider "the liquid or
nonliquid character of all marital property." Code
§ 20-107.3(E)(8). The record reflects that the trial court did
consider this factor.
D. Spousal Support
The trial court awarded wife $1,700 per month as spousal
support. Husband assigns error to that determination based on
three grounds. We dispose of each ground in turn.
First, husband claims that the court incorrectly considered
his earning capacity.
6 The value of the Accounts Receivable from Josh Batist and Marlene Frisbee are worth $12,000 and $40,000 respectively. The total debt of Karen Zaucha is worth $192,503.29.
- 18 - When considering the issue of spousal support, whether in a modification or initial award determination, the trial court must take into account the receiving spouse's needs and ability to provide for the needs, and balance those against the other spouse's ability to provide support, even when the payor spouse has retired in good faith at a "normal" retirement age.
Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va. App. 703, 710, 473 S.E.2d 72,
75 (1996) (en banc); see Code § 20-107.1. "The trial court
. . . may consider earning capacity as well as actual earnings
in fashioning the award so long as it applies 'the circumstances
in existence at the time of the award.'" Stubblebine, 22 Va.
App. at 708, 473 S.E.2d at 74 (quoting Payne v. Payne, 5 Va.
App. 359, 363, 363 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1987)).
In Stubblebine, the husband was sixty-four years old, had
twice retired during the marriage, and was a part-time
consultant during his retirement when the marriage disintegrated
and the parties separated. During the divorce, both of his
consulting contracts were terminated. Nevertheless, this Court
held that Mr. Stubblebine was capable of gainful employment and
"regardless of whether [he] had chosen a more relaxed retirement
rather than pursuing an active retirement, the fact remain[ed]
that he [was] capable of gainful employment." Id. at 711, 473
S.E.2d at 76.
"In determining the amount of an award, the court must
consider all of the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1. The
court's decision is presumed correct and will not be disturbed
- 19 - unless some injustice has been done," or unless the decision is
contrary to the evidence or plainly wrong. Id. at 707, 473
S.E.2d at 74. At the time of the award, husband was employed
and earned $75,000 annually as a consultant. He admitted that
he earned that amount working 20 or 30 days over a twelve-month
period. He indicated his intention to work out of his home in
Madison County and once his income from the consulting contract
with Hines expired, so, too, did his non-competition agreement,
enabling him to work in the same line of work. Accordingly, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in its
determination of husband's earning capacity.
Second, husband claims that the court incorrectly assessed
wife's expenses with respect to the ownership of Edgewood Farm.
The two mortgages against the property totaled $694,793.94, and
the monthly payments totaled $7,327. Husband contends that the
court, in determining a monetary award, should not have
considered the amount of the mortgage payments. Husband is
especially concerned since wife sold Edgewood Farm prior to the
entry of the court's decree, thereby eliminating an expense of
$7,327 per month.
In its award of real property to wife, the trial judge
wrote, "Edgewood Farm with the adjoining 84 acres, . . . is to
be transferred to Ms. Iverson, and she will assume any
indebtedness secured by the same and hold Mr. Iverson harmless
from the [sic] these debts." Later, in the award of spousal
- 20 - support, the court considered wife's needs and wrote, "In
addition to the ongoing expenses and debts shown on the parties'
exhibits, Ms. Iverson, as the recipient of the marital home,
Edgewood Farm, will have reoccurring monthly payments due to the
mortgage on that property." The court then awarded her a sum of
$1,700 per month.
We have held that "while Code § 20-107.1 requires a
chancellor to consider the provisions made with regard to the
marital property under Code § 20-107.3, we view that requirement
as a practical means by which the chancellor may fix a proper
spousal support award in light of the financial result of the
monetary award." Gamble, 14 Va. App. at 577, 421 S.E.2d at 646.
In Gamble, this Court held that the chancellor abused his
discretion by fashioning a spousal support award that
effectively required the husband to satisfy the mortgage
obligations on the marital home he was required to convey to his
wife. See id. at 577, 421 S.E.2d at 647. However, in this
case, an award of $1,700 per month clearly does not equal the
$7,327 monthly mortgage payment assumed by wife for Edgewood
Farm. Accordingly, the trial court properly considered the
financial result of the monetary award of Edgewood Farm.
Changed circumstances may serve as a basis for future
modification; however, we cannot say that the trial court was
plainly wrong or without evidence to support its decision at the
time it was made.
- 21 - Finally, husband contends that the court failed to
determine the income that would be generated by the equitable
distribution award. According to husband, the court did not
consider the income that wife will receive from the monetary
award, from the rental or sale of the St. Martin villa, or from
the income earned on the proceeds of the sale of Edgewood Farm.
We disagree. The trial court noted that "each party will
realize income generated from the assets each receives under the
court's equitable distribution award." The court made a
comprehensive listing of the assets and specific findings of
value. It carefully considered the appropriate awards and
explained, to our satisfaction, its rationale in distributing
the income producing assets. Thus, the trial court did consider
the equitable distribution award in determining spousal support.
Finding no reversible error, the decree is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 22 -