R! ! 0 ', * :
STATE OF LOUISIANA
1; 14 IX 1- Iff
2024 CA 0776
RONALD BIAS
Judgment Rendered:
On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. 687496
Honorable Richard " Chip" Moore, Judge Presiding
zars Plaintiff/Appellant 01151 Pro se
John B. Wells Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Slidell, Louisiana Carl J. Foster
Robert D. McMillin Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Slidell, Louisiana Military -Veteran Advocacy, Inc.
Connell L. Archey Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Allena W. McCain John B. Wells
Madaline King Rabalais Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND LANIER,. 33. McCLENDON,, J.
The plaintiff sought leave to file a fifth amended and supplemental petition in order
to re -name a defendant previously dismissed from the underlying litigation with prejudice; and to to add two previously unnamed defendants; to plead a supplemental claim;
remove a previously pled and dismissed claim. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The pro se plaintiff, Ronald Bias, initiated this suit in the 19th Judicial District Court
on September 6, 2019 against Carl Foster, a former colleague with whom Bias has a long-
standing conflict, and John B. Wells, an attorney who represented Foster in prior litigation between Bias and Foster ( collusion suit). In Bias's collusion suit, he alleged that, in
connection with the long- standing conflict between Bias and Foster, Wells and Foster conspired to harm Bias in retaliation for complaints he initiated against Wells and for the
prior litigation involving Foster. As the convoluted and lengthy history of the dispute between the parties underlying the collusion suit is pertinent to the appeal before us, we
begin by reviewing same.
The dispute between Bias and Foster arose while they were both employed at
Amite High School in Tangipahoa Parish as Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC)
instructors for the United States Marine Corps ( USMC) and United States Navy ( Navy).
Foster was Bias' s subordinate. In 2009, Bias was recalled to active duty due to a
miscalculation regarding his retirement eligibility, but was permitted to keep his position as a JROTC instructor. Foster voiced concerns about Bias holding the two positions
simultaneously. Subsequently, in 2009 and 2010, Bias reported Foster to the JROTC
Regional Director and the Amite High principal for alleged misconduct. In 2010, as a result
of Bias"s misconduct allegations, the Navy and the USMC both decertified Foster as a
I Portions of the facts and procedural history presented herein are borrowed and summarized from this court's previous opinion in this matter, Bias v. Foster, 2022- 0408 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 356 So -3d 49, writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 515, and from this court's opinion in the related case of Foster v. Bias, 2022- 0329 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 520, writ denied 2023- 00090 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 503.
2 JROTC instructor, and Foster's employment at Amite High School was terminated. In the
aftermath, both Bias and Foster flied multiple lawsuits.
Foster' s Decertification Suit
In November 2011, represented by Wells, Foster flied suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking review of his decertification as a JROTC
instructor ( decertification suit). Named as defendants in the decertification suit were the
Secretary of the Navy and the Commanding General of the USMC Training and Education
Command. See Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135 ( D. D. C. 2012); Foster v. Mabus,
103 F. Supp. 3d 95 ( D. D. C. 2015). The District of Columbia dismissed the decertification
suit with prejudice in June 2015 pursuant to a " Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal"
stipulation), in exchange for a $ 12, 000. 00 settlement payment to Foster and Foster's
recertification as a JROTC instructor. The stipulation also included terms providing that
Foster would not sue former employees of the Marine Corps regarding events complained
of in the decertification suit ( waiver of claims). Pertinent to the litigation that followed,
the waiver of claims was limited by language stating that nothing in the stipulation " Shall
affect: ( i) any rights or claims that may arise after the date [ Foster] signs this Stipulation;
and ( ii) any right or claims against third parties not covered by this agreement."
Bias' s False Claims Act Suit
While Foster's decertification suit was pending, Bias filed suit in the United Stated
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in September 2012 asserting claims
arising under state and federal law, including the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. 3729, et
seq. ( false claims suit), against Foster, the Tangipahoa Parish School Board, and the
principal of Amite High School. See U. S. ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board, 2012- 2202, 2014 WL 1512001 ( E. D. La. Mar. 26, 2014); United States ex rel.
Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 2012- 2202, 2014 WL 12675261, at * 2 ( E. D.
La. May 15, 2014). Wells did not represent Foster in the false claims suit. Ultimately, the
Eastern District dismissed Bias' s 31 U. S. C. 3729 claim on the basis of judicial estoppel,
because Bias had not disclosed the false claims suit in pending bankruptcy proceedings
as required. Bias's other claims were also dismissed as untimely. See United States ex
rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 2012- 2202, 2017 WL 4049596 ( E. D.
3 La. 2017), affd sub nom. United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board, 766 F. Appx 38 ( 5th Cir. 2019).
Bias's Complaints against Wells
In September 2013, Bias filed complaints against Wells with two separate entities
collectively, " Bias' s complaints against Wells` ). Bias's first complaint, which was filed with
the United States Department of Defense, Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office
DPCLO), alleged Wells illegally gained access to Bias's military records and disclosed contents of same. In an April 2015 letter, DPCLO confirmed both that Bias's personally
identifiable information was released without authorization, and that Bias's personally
identifiable information was in the possession of a staff investigator for Wells prior to an
authorized release. However, DPCLO was unable to determine the source or
circumstances of the unauthorized release. Bias's second complaint against Wells, which
was filed with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, asserted that Wells violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with his representation of Foster. The
Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board dismissed Bias' s complaint in April 2014. Foster's Defamation Suit
While Bias' s false claims suit remained pending, Foster, again represented by
Wells, sued Bias for defamation in the 19th Judicial District Court ( defamation suit) in
November 2015. Therein, Foster alleged that Bias made defamatory statements about
Foster during a deposition taken in connection with Bias's false claims suit. In response, Bias filed a special motion to strike pursuant to LSA-C. C. P. art. 971( F)( 1)( a). The trial
court denied Bias' s special motion to strike, and Bias sought this court's review. On
December 28, 2016, this court granted Bias's writ application, reversed the district court's
judgment, and granted Bias' s special motion to strike. This court explained that Bias was
afforded absolute immunity from civil defamation liability regardless of malice or falsity"
because the alleged defamatory statements were made during a deposition and were
directly related to Bias's false claims suit. See Foster v. Bias, 2016- 1376 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 28/ 16), 2016 WL- 7470012 ( unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2017- 0181 ( La.
3/ 24/ 17), 216 So. 3d 793.
0 Foster's Abuse of Process Suit
After learning that Bias' s false claims suit had been dismissed on the basis of
judicial estoppel, Foster, again represented by Wells, filed a second suit against Bias in
the 19th Judicial District Court in August 2018. Therein, Foster sought damages for abuse
of process based on Bias's failure to disclose his false claims suit to the bankruptcy trustee
exceptionS2 abuse of process suit). Bias filed peremptory raising the objections of no
cause of action, no right of action, and prescription, which the district court sustained.
On appeal, this court in Foster v. Bias, 2022- 0329 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d
520, writ denied, 2023- 00090 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 503, affirmed that portion of the
trial court's judgment that sustained Bias' s peremptory exception of no cause of action
and dismissed Foster's abuse of process suit with prejudice. Id. at 527- 528.
Bias' s Collusion Suit
As set forth above, Bias flied this pro se suit alleging that Wells and Foster colluded
to retaliate against Bias for his complaints against Wells and the prior litigation between
Bias and Foster. Bias' s initial allegations against Wells included claims for: abuse of
process; breach of the stipulation; malicious prosecution; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; violating Bias's constitutional right of free speech; and aiding and
abetting Foster in the commission of tortious acts. Wells removed Bias's collusion suit to
federal court, and Bias apparently amended the suit to remove the sole federal claim.
The collusion suit was then remanded to state court, where Bias filed his second amended
petition. See Bias v. Foster, 2022-0408 ( La. App. I Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 356 So. 3d 49, 55 n. 2,
writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 515. As amended, the collusion suit
alleged that Wells and Foster conspired to file the defamation suit and abuse of process
suit in order to retaliate against Bias; that Bias was a third -party beneficiary of the
stipulation in Foster's decertification suit, and therefore, Foster's waiver of claims against
former Marine Corps employees precluded Foster's suits against Bias, as a former Marine
2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 922 recognizes only three exceptions: the declinatory exception, the dilatory exception, and the peremptory exception. In this case, numerous peremptory exceptions pleading the objections of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action are referenced. See LSA- C. C. P. art. 927. Subsequently herein, for brevity, we sometimes refer to said exceptions as exceptions of prescription, exceptions of no cause of action, or exceptions of no right of action.
9 Corp employee; that Wells admitted Foster's claims against Bias arose out of Foster's decertification suit and Bias's FCA Suit; that Wells's representation to Foster in his suits
against Bias exceeded the scope of Wells's position as an attorney, and was done
intentionally and with malice for the purpose of retaliation; that because Wells knew of the stipulation and Foster' s waiver of claims, Wells was acting as a co- conspirator rather
than an attorney and attempted to use his status as an attorney to avoid liability; that Wells's actions constituted negligence; and that Wells and Foster conspired to violate 42
U. S. C. § 1985( 2) by attempting to intimidate Bias from testifying.
In response to Bias's second amended petition, Wells filed an exception asserting
that Bias failed to state a cause of action based solely on Wells's representation of Foster.
The trial court denied the exception, and Bias sought supervisory writs. On review, this
court issued the following:
WRIT GRANTED WITH ORDER. The trial court's January 21, 2021 judgment denying the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by the relator, John B. Wells, is reversed. The original and amending petitions filed by the plaintiff, Ronald Bias, fail to state a cause of action against Wells, the attorney of Bias[ s] adversary, Carl J. Foster. In particular, Bias fails to state a cause of action against Wells for breach of the '"Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal" because Wells was not a party to that agreement.
Bias fails to state a cause of action against Wells for negligence because Wells, the attorney for Bias[ s] adversary, owed no legal duty to Bias. See Penalber v. Blount, 550 So. 2d 577, 581 ( La. 1989); Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127, 130 ( La. 1994). The remainder of the allegations contained in Bias[ s] petitions refers to Wells'[ s] representation of Foster in a defamation suit and an abuse of process suit filed by Wells on Foster' s behalf. In bringing a cause of action against an attorney based on intentional tort, it is essential for the petition to allege facts showing specific malice or an intent to harm on the part of the attorney. Montalvo, 637 So. 2d at 130 ( La. 1994). Legal or factual conclusions, absent facts which support such conclusions, are insufficient. See Id. at 131. We find that Bias[ s] original and amending petitions fail to allege specific actions evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict direct harm. Additionally, Bias fails to state a cause of action against Wells based on the filing of the abuse of process suit because there has been no " bona fide termination" of the abuse of process suit in Bias'[ s] favor. See Id. Accordingly, the exception of no cause of action filed by Wells is granted, and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions to afford Bias an opportunity to amend his petition, if he can, to state a cause of action against Wells. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 934.
See Bias v. Foster, 2021- 0172 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 12/ 2021), 2021 WL 1910987
unpublished writ action) ( Bias I).
R After this court's order in Bias I Bias amended the collusion suit 8 third tj0M2.
Wells filed an exception Of OO C8U88 Of BCti0M BS to the third amended petition. Bias
sought leave tOfile a fourth amended and supplemental petition in the collusion SUML
which was.]
Following a November 29, 2021 hearing, the trial court signed a December 20,
2021 written ' nHnmeOƒ granting VVells' s exception of OO C8USe of action as to the third
amended petition and dismissing "' all claims by DlaiOtiff, ROOak1 Bias, against ] OhO B.
Wells," with prejudice. Bias appealed.
Oappeal, this court found its rulings iOBias I—specifically, that° BiaU3fail[ pd] to
state a G3US2 of action 8g@iMSƒ Wells for breach Of the [ stipulation] hpraU88 Wells was
not @ D8M« to that agreement" and that " Bias fail[ ed] to state a CBUSe of action against
Wells for negligence because Wells, the attorney for owed no legal
duty to Bias"— were law of the case. Thus, the only issue remaining for review NBS
whether Bias ha[ d] alleged specific facts evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict
direct harm sufficient to state 8 C2U88 of action against Wells based OO an intentional
tort." Bias v. ( L8Ann^ 1 Cir. 1 356 x o. 3d 49/ writ
denied, 2023- 00007 y[ 8, l, 358 Sn, 3H 515 / Bias 11l. This court agreed with the
trial court' s conclusion that Bias had failed to state a G3USe of action against Wells in
intentional tort, and further found:
Based UO our thorough ReV8VV Of the record before US we CaOOOt
DDMt2O0[ l8{£ any amendment that Bias could make to his petition to remove the grounds of the objection as it relates to his intentional tort claim against
For the above and foregoing F8GSDMS we affirm the district court's December 20, 2021 judgment, sustaining the peremptory exception raising
Initially, Bias flied apleading captioned " Plaintiff's ExParte Motion toFile Plaintiffs Fourth Amended and Supplemental Petition[ l" which did not include a request for leave to file the fourth amended and supplemental petition or an order to seta contradictory hearing dote. In response, Wells filed a motion to strike the fourth amended and supplemental petition. Bias then sought towithdraw his erparte motion and filed a pleading captioned " Plaintiff; Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Fourth Amended and Supplemental Petition[ J "According to the November 29, 2021 hearing transcript, while certain allegations contained in Bias's fourth amended and supplemental petition were discussed, the trial court explicitly noted that Bias did not provide facts supporting those allegations. The November 29, 2021 hearing transcript also contained mention of Wells' s motion to strike Bias' s fourth amended and supplemental petition. However, the December 20, 2O21judgment did not mention either the motion for leave orthe motion to strike. Silence in ajudgmmnt as to any issue, claim, or demand placed before the court is generally deemed a rejection of the claim, and the relief sought is presumed to be denied; thus, Bias' s motion for leave to file the fourth amended and supplemental petition was deemed denied. See Bias v. Foster, 2022- 0408 La. App. 1Cir. 11/ 4/ 32), 356So. 3d49, 57 n. 4, writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358So. 3d 515. the objection nfOOcause Of action filed h« John B' Wells, and dismissing, mith' nd' | C Ol flkud hm ODBk1 B 8iME John B. Wells.. ~ . . -
Bias U, 356 Sn, 3d at 61- 62.
On March 28, 2023, the supreme court denied writs in both Bias's C011USioKl suit
and abuse of process suit. See Bias v. ([ a' ), 358
So^3H515and Foster v, Bias, 2023 / L8. 3l/ 358 SO. 3d 503'
Giving rise to this 8DO83L Bias SOUghf | 88Ve to 8D0em1 the collusion suit for the fifth time DMDecember 21/ 2027| over nine months after the trial court denied writs in
Bis H and abuse of process qi+1The fifth amended and supplemental petition
sought tDre-name Wells 8S@defendant; hOadd 8S defendantsthe "[ aVV Offices of John
B. \ A/ ei| s" ( VUp| ls' s LBVV , B SOl8 proprietorship owned and operated by Wells, and
MilOS ( MVA Inc.), a non- profit law firm operated
by Wells; to remove claims for breach of the stipulation; and to add claims for abuse of process " haspdOOthe recent, final dismissal ofFoster's lawsuit against Bias." Bias argued
he should be permitted tOfile the fifth @[ DeOdpd and SUDD|eD1enfal petition heraUS8 his
claims for D1BlijOUS prosecution and abuse of process BO8iDSt Foster and Wells based
4W note that shortly before Bias moved for leave tofile the fifth amended and supplemental petition, LSA- C. C. P. art. 1153, which governs supplemental pleadings, was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 5, § 1 eff. Aug. 1, 2023). Prior to the amendment, LSA- C. C. P. art. 1153 provided: The court, on motion of a party, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, may permit mover tofile a supplemental petition oxanswer setting forth items of causes ofaction ordefenses which have become exigible since the date offiling the original petition or answer, and which are related to or connected with the causes of action or defenses asserted therein.
As amended, LSA- C. C. P. a± 1153 provides:
The court, upon written consent ofthe parties, may permit the mover tofile a supplemental petition or answer setting forth items of damage, causes of action or defenses that have become exigible since the date of filing the original petition or answer, and that are related to or connected with the causes of action or defenses asserted therein. If the parties do not consent, the court may grant leave to file a supplemental petition or answer only upon contradictory motion.
The 2023 comments to LGA- C. C. P. art. 1153 :
a) This Article changes procedural law by providing that party who wishes Uofile a supplemental pleading must either have the consent of all parties or file a contradictory motion. Previously, a party was permitted to file supplemental pleading after obtaining leave of court and providing " reasonable notice," the meaning of which was uncertain. The filing ofacontradictory motion will guarantee that other parties are afforded anopportunity to object to the filing of a supplemental pleading and will therefore alleviate concerns with respect bowhat constitutes " reasonable noLica."
b) With this change to Article 1155, the practice of filing an " Amending and Supplemental Petition" should be avoided unless the petition contains causes of action that have become exigible since the filing of the original petition. Whereas the filing of an amending petition under Article 1152 requires only leave of court, the filing of a supplemental petition under this Article will require acontradictory hearing ifall parties donot consent.
K. on their filing of the dismissed Abuse of Process Lawsuit against Bias [ became] ripe for adjudication" upon the supreme court's March 28, 2023 denial of writs in Foster's abuse
of process suit.
Wells opposed Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental
petition. Wells argued that because this court entered a final judgment dismissing " all" of
Bias' s claims against Wells with prejudice, and the supreme court denied writs, the
judgment in Bias Il had become final and definitive, and was not subject to amendment
by any court. Wells further argued that Bias was precluded from filing the fifth amended
and supplemental petition by resjudicata, because the claims asserted therein arose from
the same transaction or occurrence as the claims previously asserted in the collusion suit
and dismissed with prejudice in Bias 11.
Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition was
heard on March 11, 2024. During the hearing, Bias argued that the only claims he sought
to assert against Wells in the fifth amended and supplemental petition were those " based
on Foster's abuse of process lawsuit," which he maintained " became ripe for adjudication
as of the Supreme Court decision [ in] March of last year." In support of this position, Bias
cited this court's finding in Bias I that he " fail[ ed] to state a cause of action against Wells
based on the filing of the abuse of process suit because there has been no ' bona fide
termination' of the abuse of process suit in Bias'[ s] favor." Thus, Bias contended that his
claims against Wells based on Foster' s abuse of process suit were not before the court at
the time the judgment in Bias U was rendered, and consequently, Bias 11 did not
preclude him from asserting claims against Wells based on Foster' s abuse of process suit.
After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court orally denied Bias's motion for
leave, stating, in pertinent part:
I] t's my feeling, sir, that these claims that you've asserted against Mr. John Wells, they are final. They are over. I think the First Circuit spoke - - affirmed me. The Supreme Court didn't need to talk about it. They thought it was correct. And so your motion to amend and supplement the fifth petition is denied.
Es The trial court memorialized its oral ruling in a written judgment dated March 25,
2024, which provided, in pertinent part:
Considering the pleadings, law, and arguments, and upon finding that the dismissal of the claims against John B. Wells was with prejudice, final and definitive;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion to File Plaintiff's Fifth Amended and Supplemental Petition be and is hereby DENIED, with Plaintiff bearing costs.
From this judgment, Bias appealed. 5
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte,
even when the parties do not raise the issue. This court' s appellate jurisdiction extends
only to final judgments, which determine the merits in whole or in part, and to
interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by law. See LSA-C. C. P. arts. 1841
and 2083; Bias v. Haley, 2023- 0281 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 3/ 23), 383 So. 3d 175, 181.
On August 26, 2024, this court issued an ex proprio motu order noting that the
March 25, 2024 judgment before us on appeal appeared to be a non -appealable ruling.
Thus, the order directed the parties to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should
or should not be dismissed. Upon receipt and review of the parties' briefs, we referred
the matter to the merits panel. Accordingly, we now consider whether our appellate
jurisdiction extends to the March 25, 2024 judgment at issue before us.
This court has previously found that a judgment denying leave to file a
supplemental and amending petition constitutes an interlocutory judgment that is
generally not appealable. See Barringer v. Robertson, 2015- 0698 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
12/ 2/ 15), 216 So. 3d 919, 926 n. 7, writ denied, 2016- 0010 ( La. 2/ 26/ 16), 187 So. 3d 1004.
However, such an interlocutory judgment is subject to review by an appellate court when
an appealable judgment is rendered in the same case. Id. In this matter, the March 25,
2024 ruling denying Bias leave to file a fifth amended and supplemental petition
5 On March 20, 2024, Bias filed a pleading captioned " Petition for Devolutive Appeal and to Stay Proceedings" and which sought review of the trial court's " March 11, 2024" judgment. Although we note that Bias's motion for appeal referenced the date of the trial court's oral ruling, rather than the date on which the written judgment was signed, it is clear from Bias' s motion for appeal that he sought to appeal the March 11, 2024 judgment which was later memorialized in the March 25, 2024 judgment. See Wilson v. Whitfield, 2022- 0488 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 24/ 23), 361 So. 3d 512, 515 n. 2.
I maintained the previous dismissal of all of Bias's claims against Wells. Thus, there are
presently no unresolved or pending issues between Bias and Wells. Accordingly, we find that the March 25, 2024 judgment is final for purposes of appeal, and we maintain the
appeal. 6
LAW AND DISCUSSION
At the outset of this discussion, we note several well- settled points of law regarding
prose litigants such as Bias: first, that pro se litigants are accorded greater leeway in the
interpretation of their pleadings, see Kling v. Hebert, 2023- 00257 ( La. 1/ 26/ 24), 378
So. 3d 54, 59; and second, that pro se litigants nevertheless assume responsibility for
their own inadequacy and lack of knowledge of both procedural and substantive law. Clark v. Byers Engineering Company Contractors, 2016- 0907 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
4/ 20/ 17) 2017 WL 1424069, * 3 n. 4 ( unpublished), titin Rader v. Department of
Health and Hospitals.,Office of Public Health,, Engineering Services, 94- 0763 ( La
App. 1 Cir. 3/ 3/ 95), 652 So. 2d 644, 646. We further note that, in all cases, Louisiana
courts are obligated to look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their
substance and to construe every pleading so as to do substantial justice. LSA- C. C. P. art.
865; see Armstrong v. ARCCO Company Services,, Inc., 2021- 0131 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
10/ 18/ 21), 331 So. 3d 939, 945. Thus, while it is sometimes difficult to discern Bias' s
arguments from his prose pleadings, and although we do not address each assignment
of error or issue for review individually, we consider all of the substantive issues Bias
raises on appeal with these legal precepts in mind.'
6 We further note that Bias sought his appeal within the supervisory writ delays. Thus, even if we had found that the March 25, 2024 judgment was not final for purposes of appeal, we could have converted the appeal to a supervisory writ application and address the merits. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005- 0074 ( La. 6/ 29/ 05), 914 So. 2d 34, 39 ("[ T] he decision to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs is within the discretion of the appellate courts.").
7 On appeal, Bias assigns three errors: ( 1) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on claims where it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims were not ripe for judicial determination; ( 2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Bias an opportunity to amend his petition; ( 3) the trial court committed legal error in its application of the standard set forth in Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127 La. 1994), in an unconstitutional manner to deny Bias his constitutional right to petition the court for redress of wrongs. Bias also identifies five issues for review: ( 1) Is LSA- C. C. P. art. 2083 constitutional? ( 2) Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on premature claims? ( 3) If the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on premature claims, should the premature claims have been dismissed without prejudice? ( 4) As applied to the facts of this case by the trial court, is the standard set forth in Montalvo,
637 So. 2d 127, for stating tort claims against an adversary' s attorney constitutional? ( 5) Should judicial estoppel apply to bar the argument that Bias' s claims were previously dismissed with prejudice?
11 The judgment before us on appeal is the trial court's March 25, 2024 judgment
denying Bias's motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition. An
amended pleading either restates the allegations of a claim or defense which were
imperfectly stated, or adds a new claim or defense which existed, but was not pleaded,
when the original pleading was flied. In contrast, a supplemental pleading sets forth a new claim or defense, or an item of damages, which arose after the filing of the original
pleading. Harris v. Union National Fire Insurance Company, 2014- 1603 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 18/ 15), 175 So. 3d 1008, 1012, dtft 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 6: 10
2d ed.). Amendment of pleadings should be liberally allowed provided that the movant
is acting in good faith, the amendment is not sought as a delaying tactic, the opponent
will not be unduly prejudiced, and trial on the issues will not be unduly delayed.
Pallowsky v. Cork, 2019- 0148 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 20/ 20), 304 So. 3d 867, 875. In contrast,
supplementation of pleadings is permissible only if there is sufficient connexity with the
claim or defense initially asserted, and only after a contradictory hearing against the
opposing party. Harris, 175 So. 3d at 1012, gWng 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure 6: 10 ( 2d ed.). The decision whether to grant leave to amend or supplement a pleading
is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal except where an abuse of discretion has occurred and indicates a possibility of
resulting injustice. Pallowsky, 304 So. 3d at 875.
Having carefully considered the record before us and the applicable law, we find
the trial court properly denied Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and
supplemental petition. As set forth above, the judgment rendered in Bias II explicitly
dismissed " all" of Bias's claims against Wells. A judgment that decides the merits of the
case in whole or in part is a final judgment. LSA-C. C. P. art. 1841; Batson v. South
Louisiana Medical Center, 2006- 1998 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 13/ 07), 965 So. 2d 890, 895-
96, writ denied, 2007- 1479 ( La. 10/ 5/ 07), 964 So. 2d 945. A final judgment becomes final
and definitive and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is
sought within the time fixed by law, if the supreme court denies an application for
certiorari, or if the judgment is confirmed on further review. LSA- C. C. P. arts. 2166( E) &
2167; Batson, 965 So. 2d at 895- 896. Once a final judgment becomes final and definitive
12 and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense
of power and authority, to modify, revise, or reverse the judgment, regardless of the
magnitude of the error in the final judgment. Id. at 896.
Because this court affirmed the trial court's December 20, 2021 judgment and the
supreme court denied writs, the December 20, 2021 judgment has acquired the authority
of a thing adjudged. Therefore, no court has the power or authority to modify, revise, or
reverse the dismissal of "all" of Bias' s claims against Wells. This is true regardless of the
magnitude of any alleged or actual error in the final judgment.8 See Batson, 965 So. 2d
While we note Bias's argument that the only claims he sought to assert against
Wells in the fifth amended and supplemental petition were his claims based on Foster's
abuse of process suit, the record plainly reflects that Bias asserted claims for abuse of
process in his original petition in the collusion suit, in his second amended petition in the
collusion suit, and in his third amended petition in the collusion suit, which was the
petition before the court in Bias U. See Bias U, 356 So. 3d at 55- 56. As set forth above,
in Bias U, this court explicitly considered " whether Bias ha[ d] alleged specific facts
evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict direct harm sufficient to state a cause of
action against Wells based on an intentional tort[,]" and found that he had not. We further
stated, " we cannot contemplate any amendment that Bias could make to his petition to
remove the grounds of the objection as it relates to his intentional tort claim against
Wells[,]" and affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims filed by Bias against
Wells. Bias U, 356 So. 3d at 60- 62. Consequently, the judgment dismissing all of Bias' s
claims against Wells in Bias U dismissed Bias' s claims against Wells based on Foster' s
abuse of process suit, and the finality of that judgment, now precludes Bias from reviving
8 We note Bias' s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss his claims against Wells based on the abuse of process suit. However, the Louisiana Constitution, Article V, § 16( A), states that except as otherwise authorized by this constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. Bovia v. Ledig, 2009- 0900 ( La. App. I Cir. 3/ 2/ 10), 36 So. 3d 287, 288. Bias' s collusion suit against Wells and Foster asserted causes of action in contract and tort, which are classified as civil matters traditionally adjudicated by district courts in Louisiana. See Woolley v. AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc., 2005- 2025 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 25/ 06), 944 So. 2d 668, 676. Accordingly, the 19th Judicial District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
13 claims based on Foster's abuse of process suit against Wells.9 Likewise, Bias 11 precludes
Bias from amending his petition in the collusion suit to remove the claims based on breach
of the stipulation, as they have already been dismissed.
We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
proposed amendment to name Wells's Law Office and MVA, Inc. as additional defendants
at this late stage in the litigation. The fifth amended and supplemental petition alleged
that it concerned " two malicious and retaliatory lawsuits filed in abuse of legal process
against Bias by [ Foster], in collusion with [ Wells] through his law firm, Law Offices of
John B. Wells," and was related to Foster' s decertification suit, which was " used to
retaliate against Bias" and was " filed through the nonprofit law firm, [ MVA, Inc., which]
has as its attorney [ Wells]." However, the third amended petition identified Wells as " a
natural person and Louisiana attorney domiciled in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana and
sole member of the Law Offices of John B. Wells[.]" Additionally, Bias attached a copy
of the stipulation flied in the decertification suit to the third amended petition, and the
signature page of the stipulation identified Wells, through Military -Veterans Advocacy,
Inc., as Foster' s counsel in that matter. This court considered similar facts in Carter v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 1076, 1081 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), wherein a personal injury
plaintiff sought to name the insured as a defendant two and one- half years after the
accident. The trial court rejected the amendment, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal,
this court wrote:
T] his is not a case of a closely related but incorrectly identified defendant, nor is this a case of a suit brought in the wrong capacity. Rather, the] plaintiff knew who [ the insured] was, he knew where to find him, and he knew [ the insured' s] daughter was involved in the accident. In short, the search for the truth ... would not be furthered by allowing [ the] plaintiff to amend to name [ the insured]. Amendment at this time would not serve any legitimate purpose other than to give [ the] plaintiff access to an additional source of funds that [ the] plaintiff delayed seeking from the beginning.
Under the facts in this case, we feel that permitting [ the plaintiff] to amend to name [ the insured] after final judgment, in a situation where he could have been cited since the inception of the case, would work
9 Moreover, with respect to Bias' s proposed amendment to re -name Wells as a defendant in the fifth amended and supplemental petition, this court's jurisprudence does not permit a party to " bring [ a previously dismissed party] back" into litigation by filing an amended or supplemental petition. See Templet v. Johns, 417 So. 2d 433, 435 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1982), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 981 ( La. 1982); Meadows v. Cross Gates, Inc., 2003- 1408 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 2/ 04), 878 So. 2d 674, 676, writ denied 2004- 1060 ( La. 6/ 18/ 04), 876 So. 2d 813; and Vance v. Edwards, 2023- 0016 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 30/ 23), 377 So. 3d 710, 715, writ denied, 2024- 00005 ( La. 2/ 27/ 24), 379 So. 3d 1266.
14 substantial prejudice to [ the insured]. Thus, we feel the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the amendment and we therefore affirm his decision.
Carter, 435 So. 2d at 1081.
In this matter, as in Carter, it is clear that Bias knew the identity of the two entities
he now seeks to add as defendants, and knew of their involvement in the events
underlying the instant suit, years before he sought to name them as defendants herein.
Consequently, granting Bias leave to amend his petition to name Wells's Law Office and
MVA, Inc. as defendants at this stage of the proceedings would not further the search for
the truth, nor would it serve any legitimate purpose other than to give Bias access to an
additional source of funds that he delayed seeking from the beginning. See Carter, 435
So. 2d at 1081. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's judgment
rejecting the amendment to the extent it sought to add Wells's Law Office and MVA, Inc.,
as defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's March 25, 2024 judgment denying
Ronald Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition is
affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Ronald Bias.
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