Ronald Beaver v. John and Jane Does 1–10

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00454
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 RONALD BEAVER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00454-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. DISMISS 13 JOHN AND JANE DOES 1–10, 14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on the United States’ second motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17 No. 20. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 In February 2025, Plaintiff Ronald Beaver received notices from his bank that it had 20 received two “legal order[s]” from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) requiring the bank “to 21 provide [the IRS] with a copy of [various] requested records” concerning two bank accounts with 22 which Mr. Beaver is associated. Dkt. No. 1 at 13 (citing id. at 74–75). On March 13, 2025, Mr. 23 Beaver filed his initial complaint in this action, alleging that the IRS and various unknown IRS 24 employees, John and Jane Does 1–10, violated his rights to “financial privacy” and “due process” 1 “as provided by 12 U.S.C. Chapter 35”; i.e., the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”). Id. at 2 1, 16–18; see also id. at 9–10 (discussing summons authority conferred on IRS by 26 U.S.C. § 3 7602 et seq.). 4 The Court subsequently substituted the United States for the Defendants listed in the

5 complaint and granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 6 and for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 17. The Court granted Mr. Beaver limited leave to amend 7 his RFPA claim “to the extent he c[ould] plausibly allege that there exists a valid waiver of the 8 United States’ sovereign immunity.” Id. at 8. On August 4, 2025, Mr. Beaver timely filed an 9 amended complaint. Dkt. No. 19. 10 In his amended complaint, Mr. Beaver alleges that Revenue Agent (“RA”) Sandy 11 Bachman—the revenue agent who “accessed [his] financial records after issuing a third-party 12 administrative summons to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. dated December 19, 2024”—“apparently 13 failed to serve Beaver notice of the Summons as required by § 7609.” Dkt. No. 19 at 2 (footnote 14 omitted). While Mr. Beaver acknowledges that the United States is immune from suit under RFPA

15 “if procedures authorized by title 26 were followed - or per §§ 3403(c)-(d), 3404, 3413, or 3414 if 16 some other exception applies,” he alleges that RA Bachman failed “to follow procedures 17 authorized by title 26,” and therefore the United States is not immune from his RFPA claim. Id. at 18 2–3 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Mr. Beaver “is not in receipt 19 of Bachman’s purported notice of the Summons to Beaver,” and “[e]ven if Bachman did mail 20 Beaver notice of the Summons,” she sent it to his old address despite Mr. Beaver notifying the IRS 21 of a new address in September 2024. Id. at 8, 11–12. Mr. Beaver also accuses RA Bachman of 22 falsely stating that she “served Beaver notice of the Summons by certified mail on December 19, 23

24 1 2024 in accordance with § 7609” in a declaration in a related case. Id. at 7–8.1 As in his initial 2 complaint, Mr. Beaver continues to allege that, although he “maintains his only abode within the 3 territorial boundaries of the county named King within the organic Union state named 4 Washington” and “was born in the organic Union state named Iowa,” he “is not in receipt of any

5 document that verifies that either (a) [he] has ever been a citizen or resident of any federal territory, 6 possession, or property or (b) [he] has elected to be treated as if he were a citizen or resident of a 7 federal territory, possession, or property[.]” Dkt. No. 19 at 5. 8 On August 20, the United States again moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 9 jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 20. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 A. Legal Standard 12 A jurisdictional dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is warranted “where the alleged claim under 13 the constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose 14 of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood,

15 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946). In a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction, “the challenger 16 asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 17 jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “The district 18 court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)[.]” Leite v. Crane 19 Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 20 Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal when a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which 21 relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under this standard, the Court construes the 22 complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon 23 1 On March 28, 2025, Mr. Beaver filed a petition to quash two summonses that RA Bachman later issued to Wells 24 Fargo and Bank of America. Beaver v. United States of America, 2:25-cv-00557-LK, Dkt. No. 1. Those summonses are not the subject of this action. See Dkt. No. 19 at 2 n.1. 1 Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and asks whether the complaint contains 2 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” 3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 4 570 (2007)). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions or “formulaic

5 recitations of the elements of a cause of action.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 7 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 8 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 9 B. Mr. Beaver States a Claim Under RFPA 10 The United States argues that the Court should dismiss Mr. Beaver’s claims against it 11 because his complaint again fails to identify a waiver of the United States’ immunity. Dkt. No. 20 12 at 4. Specifically, the declaration of RA Bachman attached to Mr. Beaver’s complaint “establishes 13 that the IRS issued an enforceable summons under procedures authorized by title 26”; therefore, 14 RFPA cannot provide a waiver of sovereign immunity here. Id. at 5–6. The United States further

15 argues that the notice of the summons was sent to Mr. Beaver’s “last known address” within the 16 meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a), and even if it should have been sent to a “new” address, the IRS 17 still substantially complied with the procedures authorized by title 26 such that the summons is 18 still enforceable (and there is no waiver of sovereign immunity) for purposes of RFPA. Id. at 8– 19 12. Mr. Beaver disagrees that the latter scenario constitutes substantial compliance, arguing that 20 “the summons sans notice was not a ‘procedure authorized by title 26[.]’” Dkt. No. 24 at 2. He 21 contends that “a pre-Twombly pleading standard” applies to his complaint, making his allegation 22 that he did not receive the notice sufficient to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 4–5, 11 23 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) as the correct pleading standard for pro se litigants).

24 As for RA Bachman’s declaration, Mr. Beaver contends that without supporting documentation, 1 it “is not granted the presumption of truth in the present context,” and he “has plead sufficient 2 ‘specific, circumstantial evidence’ of conduct ‘contrary’ to proper procedure and bad faith to 3 warrant discovery of evidence about mailing of notice[.]” Id. at 11–12. 4 1. The Pleading Standard

5 As an initial matter, the Conley pleading standard has been abrogated, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 at 670 (“Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test”), and the liberality rule does not operate 7 to resuscitate Conley for pro se litigants, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (applying 8 Twombly to pro se complaint). Instead, a pro se complaint is liberally construed under the correct 9 pleading standard (i.e., Twombly/Iqbal). Id.; see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th 10 Cir. 2010) (“[W]e continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”). 11 2. The United States’ Motion to Dismiss is a Facial Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction 12 Review of a motion to dismiss is “generally limited to the face of the complaint,” but a 13 court may consider “materials incorporated into the complaint by reference[.]” In re Rigel 14 Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2012). A document can be considered

15 “incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or 16 the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 17 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has distilled the “incorporated by reference” inquiry into a three- 18 part test: (1) the complaint must refer to the document; (2) the document must be central to the 19 plaintiff’s claim; and (3) the document’s authenticity must be undisputed. Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l 20 Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); accord Segar v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 21 C21-1526-JLR, 2022 WL 102035, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 11, 2022). 22 Here, RA Bachman’s declaration and the attached exhibits are incorporated by reference 23 into Mr. Beaver’s complaint. He refers extensively to the declaration and exhibits, they are central

24 to his claim, and the documents’ authenticity is undisputed (although the parties dispute the 1 veracity of the statements therein). See, e.g., Dkt. No. 19 at 1 (“Bachman appears to have later 2 published in a declaration one or more materially false statements under penalty of perjury to 3 conceal Bachman’s failed duty to serve notice[.]”); id. at 7 (“Bachman admitted in a declaration 4 dated May 28, 2025 (the ‘Declaration’) authored for a separate action (then entitled No. 25-cv-

5 00557-JLR and since reassigned to this Court) that Bachman issued the Summons about December 6 19, 2024.” (citing Exhibit 3 to the complaint—Bachman’s declaration)); id. at 9 (citing to the 7 declaration and associated exhibits in arguments that “Bachman may be misrepresenting 8 Bachman’s service of notice to Beaver” (some capitalization removed)). Indeed, all nine of the 9 exhibits to Mr. Beaver’s complaint are incorporated by reference. See id. at 5 (relying on exhibit 10 1); id. at 7 (relying on exhibits 2 through 4); id. at 9 (relying on exhibits 3, 4, 7); id. at 10 (relying 11 on exhibit 8); id. at 11 (relying on exhibits 5 and 6); id. at 12 (relying on exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9); id. at 12 13 (relying on exhibit 3). 13 Because the United States asserts that the allegations contained in Mr. Beaver’s complaint 14 and the incorporated documents are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, it does

15 not rely on extrinsic evidence, and the Court resolves the facial attack as it would a motion to 16 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. 17 3. Mr. Beaver’s Complaint Alleges that the IRS Failed to Comply with Title 26 18 The parties’ dispute centers on whether the IRS properly notified Mr. Beaver of the 19 December 2024 summons to his bank (Wells Fargo). A chronology of the relevant 20 correspondence—and the associated addresses—is helpful to contextualize the parties’ arguments: 21 Date Document Address Sept. 4, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 57 (Exhibit 5): USPS change of address submission • “Old address” 26450 NE 22 2024 70th St. Redmond WA 98053-2647-50 • “New address” 23515 NE 23 Novelty Hill Rd Ste B221 PMB 393; Redmond WA 24 98053-1996-21 1 Sept. 30, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 59–62 (Exhibit 6): Letter titled “Notice of Conditional September 16, 2024 Notice 2024 Acceptance, Notice of Liability for Ultra Vires Acts, and Opportunity of Penalty Charge of 2 to Prevent Suit,” stating that Mr. Beaver was “in receipt” of an which Mr. Beaver was “unverified ‘Notice of Penalty Charge’” dated September 16, 2024, “in receipt”: 26450 NE demanding that “Trustees or an agent” respond to his “Demand for 70th St., Redmond WA 3 Proof of Authority” or else he would “deem[]” the failure to respond as 98053-2647 (id. at 59, 62) “Trustees’ . . . admission that Trustees and Trustees’ agents have no 4 authority to make determinations about Beneficiary’s ‘tax returns,’” September 30, 2024 Letter setting Mr. Beaver’s “fee for protecting Beneficiary against unlawful “from” address: “c/o 23515 administrative arrests (such as the Letters and the Assessment) at $100 NE Novelty Hill Rd, B221- 5 per hour, and noting, “Please note Beneficiary’s new mailing address 393 Redmond, Washington supra.” [98053]” (id. at 59) 6 Oct. 31, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 64 (Exhibit 7): Letter from RA Bachman to Mr. 26450 NE 70th St 2024 Beaver stating that the IRS “ha[s] no record of receiving your tax Redmond, WA 98053- 7 returns for the form and tax periods shown above,” asking to meet with 2647 him to discuss, and informing Mr. Beaver of his rights Oct. 31, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 67 (Exhibit 7): Letter from RA Bachman to Mr. 23515 NE Novelty Hill 8 2024 Beaver stating that the IRS “ha[s] no record of receiving your tax Road, B221-393 returns for the form and tax periods shown above,” asking to meet Redmond, WA 98053 9 with him to discuss, and informing Mr. Beaver of his rights (duplicate of the above but sent to a different address) 10 Oct. 31, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 65–66 (Exhibit 7): Letter from RA Bachman to Mr. 26450 NE 70th St 2024 Beaver informing him that the IRS “intend[s] to contact other people” Redmond, WA 98053- to obtain information regarding his federal tax liability, and informing 2647 11 him of his rights Oct. 31, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 68–69 (Exhibit 7): Letter from RA Bachman to Mr. 23515 NE Novelty Hill 12 2024 Beaver informing him that the IRS “intend[s] to contact other people” Road, B221-39 to obtain information regarding his federal tax liability, and informing Redmond, WA 98053 him of his rights (duplicate of the above but sent to a different address) 13 Nov. 15, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 94 (Exhibit 9): Letter from RA Bachman to Mr. 26450 NE 70th St 2024 Beaver following up after non-response to prior letter (see id. at 64, 67) Redmond, WA 98053- 14 2647 Nov. 15, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 89, 93 (Exhibits 8 and 9): Letter from RA Bachman to 23515 NE Novelty Hill 15 2024 Mr. Beaver following up after non-response to prior letter (see id. at Road, B221-393 64, 67) (duplicate of the above but sent to a different address) Redmond, WA 98053 16 Nov. 22, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 99–101 (Exhibit 9): Letter from RA Bachman 26450 NE 70th St 2024 responding to “recent correspondence” (possibly Mr. Beaver’s Redmond, WA 98053 September 30, 2024 letter) 17 Nov. 22, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 96–98 (Exhibit 9): Letter from RA Bachman 23515 NE Novelty Hill 2024 responding to “recent correspondence” (possibly Mr. Beaver’s Road, B221-393 18 September 30, 2024 letter) (duplicate of the above but sent to a Redmond, WA 98053 different address) 19 Dec. 19, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 7 (Exhibit 3): Bachman declaration stating she served 26450 NE 70th St. 2024 notice of the December 19, 2024 Wells Fargo summons on Mr. Beaver Redmond, WA 98053 by certified mail on December 19, 2024 20 Jan. 27, Dkt. No. 19-1 at 4 (Exhibit 2): Wells Fargo notice to Mr. Beaver of a 26450 NE 70th St. 2025 “Legal order to release Wells Fargo records” by January 24, 2025. Mr. Redmond WA 98053-2647 21 Beaver states that he “received [this] notice[.]” Dkt. No. 19 at 7. March Dkt. No. 19-1 at 8 (Exhibit 3): Bachman declaration stating she served 26450 NE 70th St. 14, 2025 notice of the March 2025 Wells Fargo summons to Mr. Beaver on Redmond, WA 98053 22 March 14, 2025; see also id. at 21 (Exhibit 4: certification of notice to Mr. Beaver via certified mail), 53 (Exhibit 4: notice letter to Mr. 23 Beaver dated October 31, 2024). Mr. Beaver states that he received this notice and the one below regarding Bank of America. Dkt. No. 24 19 at 10. 1 March Dkt. No. 19-1 at 9 (Exhibit 3): Bachman declaration stating she served 26450 NE 70th St. 14, 2025 notice of the March 2025 Bank of America summons to Mr. Beaver on Redmond, WA 98053 2 March 14, 2025; see also id. at 38 (Exhibit 4: certification of notice to Mr. Beaver via certified mail), 53 (Exhibit 4: notice letter to Mr. Beaver dated October 31, 2024) 3 Because RA Bachman sent various documents to Mr. Beaver’s “new” Novelty Hill address 4 (i.e., the correspondence in italics above) after he updated his address with USPS and sent the IRS 5 another notice of his updated address in his “Notice of Conditional Acceptance, Notice of Liability 6 for Ultra Vires Acts, and Opportunity to Prevent Suit,” Mr. Beaver argues that RA Bachman’s 7 subsequent mailing of the December 2024 summons notice to only his “old” NE 70th Street 8 address (i.e., not his “last known address”) demonstrates bad faith and failure to comply with the 9 procedures authorized by Title 26. Dkt. No. 19 at 7–12; Dkt. No. 24 at 8–11. 10 The procedures the IRS must follow when issuing third-party summonses pursuant to 11 Section 7602 are set out in Section 7609. Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th 12 Cir. 2001). Section 7609(a)(1) provides that notice of a third party summons shall be given to any 13 person identified in the description of the records contained in the summons within three days of 14 the day on which service is made, “but no later than the 23rd day before the day fixed in the 15 summons as the day upon which such records are to be examined.” 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(1). Service 16 of the summons must be either personally delivered or “mailed by certified or registered mail to 17 the last known address of such person . . . entitled to notice.” 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(2). A taxpayer’s 18 “last known address” is defined in 26 C.F.R. § 301.6212-2 as “the address that appears on the 19 taxpayer’s most recently filed and properly processed Federal tax return, unless the Internal 20 Revenue Service (IRS) is given clear and concise notification of a different address.” With respect 21 to changes of address with USPS, “if the taxpayer’s name and last known address in IRS records 22 match the taxpayer’s name and old mailing address contained in the NCOA [(the United States 23 Postal Service (USPS) National Change of Address)] database, the new address in the NCOA 24 1 database is the taxpayer’s last known address, unless the IRS is given clear and concise notification 2 of a different address.” 26 C.F.R. § 301.6212-2(b)(2)(i). “Clear and concise written notification” 3 is “a written statement signed by the taxpayer . . . informing the Service that the taxpayer wishes 4 the address of record changed to a new address,” and containing the new address, the taxpayer’s

5 full name and old address, and his social security number, individual taxpayer identification 6 number, or employer identification number. Rev. Proc. 2010-16, 2010-19 I.R.B. 664, § 5.04(1)(a) 7 (2010). “In all cases, clear and concise written notification must be specific as to a change of 8 address.” Id. 9 Here, Mr. Beaver does not expressly allege that the IRS did not send notice of the 10 December 19, 2024 Wells Fargo summons to his NE 70th Street address; he instead alleges that if 11 the notice was sent, he did not receive it, and that the IRS should have sent the notice to his Novelty 12 Hill address because that is his “last known address.” See Dkt. No. 19 at 7–13. “When a notice or 13 document is sent to a taxpayer’s ‘last known address,’ it is legally effective even if the taxpayer 14 never receives it,” Rev. Proc. 2010-16, 2010-19 I.R.B. 664 § 2.01 (2010); thus, the key issue is

15 whether the NE 70th Street address is Mr. Beaver’s “last known address.” The United States argues 16 that the IRS need not have updated Mr. Beaver’s address in response to his NCOA update because 17 the addresses did not match: “the alleged NCOA submission shows Plaintiff’s name as ‘Beaver 18 Ronald D,’ and the zip code for his ‘old address’ includes 11 digits,” whereas “[t]he documents 19 from the IRS attached to the Amended Complaint (e.g., letters, notice copies of summons) show 20 Plaintiff’s name as either ‘Ronald Beaver’ or ‘Ronald D. Beaver’ and the zip code for his ‘old 21 address’ with only five digits.” Dkt. No. 20 at 9 (citing Dkt. No. 19-1 at 57, 73, 99). 22 The Court disagrees with the United States, at least based on the record available in Mr. 23 Beaver’s complaint and exhibits. Nothing in the NCOA records indicates that Mr. Beaver

24 mistakenly inverted his first and last name on the USPS address update form. And with respect to 1 zip codes, the available documents indicate that only two digits separated the address in the IRS 2 files and the old address Mr. Beaver listed with NCOA: the IRS repeatedly used “98053-2647,” 3 see, e.g., Dkt. No. 19-1 at 62, 64, 65, 94, while the NCOA address used “98053-2647-50,” id. at 4 57. The IRS “is bound to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the taxpayer’s correct

5 address.” Wallin v. Comm’r, 744 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. 6 Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 (1974)). “[W]hether the IRS exercised reasonable diligence in 7 complying with the ‘last known address’ rule . . . . is essentially a question of fact that turns on the 8 information available to the IRS at the time it issued the notice.” Gaw v. Comm’r, 45 F.3d 461, 9 465 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, the differences in the zip codes and name (at least on the limited record 10 before the Court) are not so stark as to indicate irrefutably that the IRS exercised reasonable 11 diligence in determining Mr. Beaver’s last known address. And while the United States argues that 12 the Court should still find that it substantially complied with the title 26 service requirements, Dkt. 13 No. 20 at 12, the Court can only do so where “the IRS acted in good faith and there is no prejudice 14 to the taxpayer,” United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2011). Mr. Beaver’s

15 complaint is not devoid of support for his allegation that the IRS did not act in good faith, see Dkt. 16 No. 19 at 7–12 (alleging that the IRS acted in bad faith as demonstrated by the fact that it mailed 17 the summons notice to only his old address after repeatedly sending prior correspondence to both 18 his old and new addresses), and he also plausibly alleges that he “was deprived of notice and 19 opportunity to quash the Summons as a consequence of Bachman’s failure to follow ‘procedures 20 authorized by title 26,’” id. at 2. 21 While Section 3413(c) of RFPA states that it does not “prohibit[] the disclosure of financial 22 records in accordance with procedures authorized by title 26,” 12 U.S.C. § 3413(c), here, Mr. 23 Beaver has plausibly alleged that the procedures followed by the IRS were not “in accordance with

24 procedures authorized by title 26.” Furthermore, the parties do not dispute that Wells Fargo is a 1 “financial institution” of which Mr. Beaver is a “customer,” and from which the IRS obtained 2 “financial records.” 12 U.S.C. § 3402. Thus, Mr. Beaver has stated a claim under RFPA. This is 3 not to say that Mr. Beaver will ultimately succeed in this lawsuit; only that at this juncture, the 4 Court cannot conclude that the disclosure at issue is exempt from RFPA and its waiver of the

5 United States’ immunity. Hohman v. Eadie, No. 16-CV-11429, 2016 WL 10906875, at *2 (E.D. 6 Mich. Nov. 7, 2016) (“[B]ecause the alleged service of the summonses was not ‘in accordance 7 with procedures authorized by Title 26,’ that service is not exempt from the RFPA.”).2 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the United States’ motion to dismiss. 10 Dated this 25th day of November, 2025. 11 a 12 Lauren King United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 2 The Court rejects Mr. Beaver’s RFPA theory to the extent it is based on his assertion that he “is not in receipt of any document that verifies that either (a) [he] has ever been a citizen or resident of any federal territory, possession, or 23 property or (b) [he] has elected to be treated as if he were a citizen or resident of a federal territory, possession, or property[.]” Dkt. No. 19 at 5. This assertion is directly contradicted by his birth certificate showing that he was born in Iowa. Dkt. No. 19-1 at 2. “All persons born . . . in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States,” U.S. 24 Const. amend. XIV, §1, and Mr. Beaver has provided no evidence that he has formally renounced his citizenship.