Ronald A. Joseph, Jr. v. Stacy Jenkins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 2, 2025
• Docket: 25-10242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10242 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2025 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-10242 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

RONALD A. JOSEPH, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus STACY JENKINS, SGT. POWERS,

Defendants-Appellees,

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT,

Defendant. USCA11 Case: 25-10242 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10242

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cv-02167-SDM-TGW ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Ronald Joseph, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s order denying without prejudice his motion to appoint counsel. The appellees move to dismiss the appeal for lack of ju- risdiction because, they argue, the order is not final or otherwise appealable. We agree that we lack jurisdiction. The district court’s order denying Joseph’s motion to appoint counsel, which did not end the litigation on the merits, is not a final, appealable order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). The order is also not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine because it is not effectively un- reviewable on appeal from the final judgment. See Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal, 22 F.4th 979, 989 (11th Cir. 2022); Hodges v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ga., 895 F.2d 1360, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in a civil Title VII case is not immediately appealable under the collateral- order doctrine); Fleming v. United States, 127 F.4th 837, 852 (11th USCA11 Case: 25-10242 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2025 Page: 3 of 3

25-10242 Opinion of the Court 3

Cir. 2025) (“We have also emphasized the ‘narrow,’ ‘limited,’ ‘mod- est . . . [and] selective’ scope of the collateral-order doctrine.”). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of ju- risdiction is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED. All pend- ing motions are DENIED as moot.