Ronald A. Dishmon, Sr. v. Team Car Care, LLC/Jiffy Lube

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedSeptember 26, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01794
StatusUnknown

This text of Ronald A. Dishmon, Sr. v. Team Car Care, LLC/Jiffy Lube (Ronald A. Dishmon, Sr. v. Team Car Care, LLC/Jiffy Lube) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald A. Dishmon, Sr. v. Team Car Care, LLC/Jiffy Lube, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 RONALD A. DISHMON, SR., Case No. 2:25-cv-01794-APG-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 TEAM CAR CARE, LLC/JIFFY LUBE,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 11 which is complete and granted below. See ECF No. 2. In contrast, Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 12 2-1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, the Court dismisses the 13 Complaint without prejudice and with one opportunity to amend. 14 I. Screening Standard 15 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 16 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 17 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted 18 or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 19 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state 20 a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 21 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 22 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them 24 “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 25 would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 26 556 U.S. at 678). 27 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 1 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 2 standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide 3 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 4 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the 5 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given 6 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 7 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 9 Plaintiff asserts that he discovered coworkers were engaged in wrongdoing (alleged use of 10 illegal drugs and customer property) against whom no action was taken. However, when he joked 11 with a manager about teaching a supervisor to say “good job” to employees, he was fired. ECF No. 12 2-1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges these facts constitute a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 13 Plaintiff attaches a Notice of Rights (a “Right to Sue”) letter to his Complaint demonstrating it is 14 timely. Id. at 8. 15 To state a prima facie claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII Plaintiff must allege: 16 (a) he belongs to a protected class; (b) he was qualified for the job for which he applied; (c) he was 17 subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) similarly situated employees not in his protected 18 class received more favorable treatment. See Shepard v. Marathon Staffing, Inc., 2014 WL 2527149, 19 at *2 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014) (citing Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)). Title VII, 20 found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), states: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 21 employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, 22 any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for 23 employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Here, 24 Plaintiff does not identify to what protected class he belongs, and does not allege any facts 25 demonstrating similarly situated employees not in his protected class were treated more favorably. 26 ECF No. 2-1, generally. Moreover, assuming Plaintiff is able to identify a protected class and 27 similarly situated individuals not in protected class who were treated more favorably, Plaintiff has 1 he identified on such charge. Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated exhaustion of his administrative 2 rights, a prerequisite to bringing a claim in federal court under Title VII. B.K.B. v. Maui Police 3 Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s Complaint suffers from the same problem to 4 the extent he is asserting a claim of retaliation. To state a prima facie claim of retaliation, Plaintiff 5 must allege: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; 6 and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. 7 Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff does not allege he engaged 8 in protected activity as complaining about a supervisor’s failure to appropriately recognize a good 9 job by a subordinate is not activity protected by Title VII. A protected activity under Title VII 10 includes: (1) opposing employment practices prohibited under Title VII, and (2) filing a charge, 11 testifying, assisting, or participating in any way in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under 12 Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). 13 III. Order 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma 15 pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 2-1, is dismissed without 17 prejudice and with leave to amend. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint ECF No. 2-1 is to be filed on the 19 docket, but shown as dismissed. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the 21 document must be titled “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must contain a short and 22 plain statement of the grounds for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by 23 identifying what protected classes Plaintiff identified in his Charge of Discrimination, and what 24 factual allegation he made in that Charge (or Plaintiff can attach the Charge to his Amended 25 Complaint). Plaintiff must also provide a short and plain discussion of fact that describe Defendant’s 26 conduct constituting discrimination under Title VII based on a protected class. Plaintiff should 27 include his Right to Sue letter (ECF No. 2-1 at 8) with his amended complaint. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file an amended complaint no later than 2 October 27, 2025.

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Ronald A. Dishmon, Sr. v. Team Car Care, LLC/Jiffy Lube, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-a-dishmon-sr-v-team-car-care-llcjiffy-lube-nvd-2025.