Romonica D. McNeal v. James Jackson Car City LLC

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 56,348-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered July 16, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 56,348-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

ROMONICA D. MCNEAL Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

JAMES JACKSON Defendant-Appellant CAR CITY LLC

Appealed from the Monroe City Court for the Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana Trial Court No. 2024-CV-01197

Honorable Tammy D. Lee, Judge

JAMES JACKSON In Proper Person, Agent for Car City LLC

ROMONICA D. MCNEAL In Proper Person

Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.

James Jackson, owner of Car City LLC, appeals a judgment of the

Monroe City Court ordering him and Car City to pay the buyer, Romonica

McNeal, a refund of her down payment on a car plus incidental costs. For

the reasons expressed, we amend the judgment to conform to the

documentary proof of the down payment and to cast only Car City in

judgment, not Jackson individually.

THE PARTIES’ ALLEGATIONS

McNeal’s handwritten petition alleged she went to Car City, on

Winnsboro Road in Monroe, and bought a 2010 Camaro, canary yellow,

with 188,000 miles, for $11,800, paying $6,000 down and financing the rest.

The day she bought it, the headlights would not come on; Jackson told her

they would cut on eventually. The next day, when she cranked the car up, it

made all manner of noise and took 10 minutes to start; she then brought it to

a mechanic, who found “so many” diagnostic codes in the transmission and

motor. She then called Jackson, who told her the vehicle just needed a tune-

up and oil change; she brought it in, and Jackson carried it to Ink’s

Firestone, on Breard Street in Monroe, where they did some work on the car

but could not get the lights to work right. For two months she continued

trying to get Jackson to fix the car, but he kept putting her off. Meanwhile,

she lost her job with a trucking company, she asked for her down payment

back, and Jackson refused, so she filed this suit in Monroe City Court.

Jackson, also pro se, answered that McNeal bought the Camaro “as

is,” refusing to buy any warranty, on April 4, 2024. He denied she paid

$6,000 down, and asserted he refused to return her down payment because, under the contract, all deposits were nonrefundable. He felt the car drove

“very good,” and on April 18, 2024, McNeal posted to Facebook a picture of

herself standing in front of the car, bragging on it and saying how much she

loved the car. The problem, Jackson asserted, was that McNeal never made

one single payment on the car, so the lender repossessed it.

TRIAL EVIDENCE

The matter came to trial in Monroe City Court on July 29, 2024. Both

sides were self-represented, often testifying narratively and repetitively.

McNeal testified the sale price of the car was $11,800, she made a

down payment of $5,500, and, after costs, she still owed $8,381.92, which

she financed through Western Funding. From the impassive record, her

testimony is digressive and inconsistent; at various times, she said her down

payment was $5,000, $5,500, or $6,200. She admitted her first note was due

in June, but the car was still in the shop at the time, so she made no payment

and eventually returned the car. She added that Jackson subsequently placed

the same car for sale, on Facebook Marketplace, for $5,500 or $5,000, and

she thought he had sold it by the time of trial. She concluded that she

wanted her $6,000 deposit, a $275 “flag” on her license for failing to return

the tags, and $20 for the fine she paid for lack of registration.

McNeal offered three items of evidence. Ex. P-1, the bundle of

papers she signed when buying the car, includes a “Buyer’s Order” which

lists the down payment as $5,500 and the seller as Car City LLC (not

Jackson personally). Ex. P-2, papers from the Office of Motor Vehicles,

shows that she paid $20.00 to register the car, on April 8, 2024; her

registration and driver’s license were “blocked” because, as of May 20,

2024, she had dropped her liability coverage, with Progressive Paloverde 2 Insurance, and she would owe $275.00 for reinstatement. Ex. P-3, the

receipt from Ink’s Firestone, dated April 8, 2024, lists the customer as Car

City, shows work on the crankshaft, sensor, and spark plugs for a total of

$324.00, and is marked “Paid Cash.” It also bears the handwritten notation,

“Low beams are working properly – high beams are not.”

McNeal’s cousin, Talvin Eleam (Jackson called him a “friend” of

hers), tried to corroborate her testimony. He testified Jackson called McNeal

several times, begging her to make the first payment, so he (Jackson) would

not have to retake the car and refund Western Funding. However, the car

was such a lemon that she refused and returned the car to Car City.

Jackson’s testimony, like McNeal’s, was narrative and inconsistent,

and unreconcilable with McNeal’s. He said the buyer was aware the vehicle

was a sports car, with a “cam” in it, a “bumblebee Camaro,” all souped up;

she posted a picture of herself with the car on April 3, plainly showing the

lights were working. At various times, Jackson said the down payment was

$5,500 or $4,800. He described his financing arrangement with Western

Funding: if a borrower failed to make the first payment, he (Jackson) would

have to take back the car and repay Western Funding its advance (here,

$5,567). He was also out of pocket $1,393 for registration and plates.

Almost every other page of the trial transcript, he called McNeal a “liar” or a

“compulsive liar.”

Jackson also introduced several items of evidence. Ex. D-1 is a

screenshot of McNeal posing in front of the car, at night and with the lights

on; the picture is not dated. Ex. D-4 is a “funding notice” from Western

Funding, undated, but saying Car City’s sale to McNeal was “booked” and

Jackson would be receiving a net check of $5,567.00 within 30 days. Ex. D- 3 5 is a “notice of payment default and reassignment demand” from Western

Funding to Car City, dated May 26, 2024, saying the customer “failed to

tender one (1) payment * * * by the due date in the Contract,” and

demanding that Car City remit to Western Funding the advance plus a fee,

totaling $5,817.00. Ex. D-6 is a copy of Car City’s wire transfer of this

amount to Western Funding, dated May 28, 2024. Ex. D-12 is a screenshot

of McNeal’s Facebook page, April 18, 2024, with a picture of the Camaro

and her message, “Thanks bae /bd/bff 4 my new whip … loving it[.]” Ex.

D-13 is another screenshot from McNeal’s Facebook page, June 22, 2024,

saying, “Please do not purchase anything from this Carlot … he will take

your down payment … and lie to you and say it is A1 … He is a crook and

call himself a God fearing man. * * * u a low down dirty dog[.] * * * Didn’t

no bank repo no car. I told the bank to come get the car before the payment

was due.”1

ACTION OF THE CITY COURT

The City Court ruled from the bench that Jackson was “not telling the

truth.” The court found the sale was April 3, 2024, for a 2010 Chevy

Camaro, mileage 181,878, at a price of $11,800; however, the “book value”

was only $3,600, and it was “crazy” that Jackson would sell a car in this

condition at this price.2 The court initially stated the down payment was

$5,500 and rejected Jackson’s testimony that the car was surrendered for

1 Three-dot ellipses are on the original FB post; three-asterisk ellipses are this court’s redaction of the profanity in the post. 2 This court notes that nobody asked the City Court to take judicial notice of the car’s value, nobody offered a copy of NADA, Kelley Blue Book, Edmunds, or any other standard price guide, and nobody had the chance to traverse the City Court’s “finding” as to value. We question whether the value of a used car is “not subject to reasonable dispute” and thus a proper matter for judicial notice, La. C.E. art. 201 (B)(2), but, in light of our resolution of the case, we decline to address this issue. 4 nonpayment; rather, the court found, McNeal returned it because it was a

“lemon.” The court further found Jackson was dishonest in telling McNeal

the car needed only an oil change; the court labeled the whole deal a

“scheme.” The court awarded McNeal damages of (1) $275 for license tags

she never received, (2) $324 for repairs at Ink’s Firestone, (3) $6,000 for the

down payment, and (4) $20 for the duplicate registration.

The clerk of court prepared the judgment, in favor of McNeal and

against “Mr. James Jackson, owner, representing the Defendant herein, Car

City LLC, appearing as a Self-Represented Litigant,” for $6,619.00.

Jackson took this pro se suspensive appeal.

DISCUSSION

We note at the outset that Jackson’s brief does not comply with

URCA 2-12.4 in several particulars – no jurisdictional statement, concise

statement of facts, assignments of errors, list of issues presented, statement

of relevant facts, argument, or conclusion stating the relief sought. In the

interest of justice, this court will read pro se filings indulgently and attempt

to construe a brief as though assignments were properly raised. Greenwood

Cmty. Ctr. v. Calep, 48,737 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So. 3d 470;

Capital One NA v. Walters, 47,157 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 94 So. 3d 972.

We therefore did not reject the brief for noncompliance. However, even

with the leeway or patience extended to a pro se litigant in the form of

liberally construed pleadings, the pro se claimant is required to meet his

burden of proof. Greenwood Cmty. Ctr. v. Calep, supra.

The bulk of Jackson’s brief is a reiteration of his own testimony, a

broadside on McNeal’s credibility, and a general sense that the City Court

got it wrong. The standard of appellate review, recently confirmed in 5 Hayden v. Boutte, 23-00864 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So. 3d 835, is that the

appellate court may not set aside the trial court’s finding in the absence of

manifest error or unless the finding is clearly wrong. “When findings are

based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest

error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact’s

findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor

and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding and

belief in what is said.” Id., quoting Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844

(La. 1989).3

Recognizing both witnesses’ credibility issues, we cannot find

manifest error in the City Court’s decision to credit McNeal over Jackson.

His testimony – like his handwritten brief – is defensive and recriminating to

such as degree as to diminish its reliability. The legal underpinning is

redhibition: the seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or

vices, in the thing sold. La. C.C. art. 2520. The thing sold must be

reasonably fit for its ordinary use. La. C.C. art. 2524. If the seller is unable

or fails to repair, remedy, or correct the defect, he is bound to return the

price to the buyer. La. C.C. art. 2531. On this record, the City Court was

fully justified in finding the Camaro was not reasonably fit for its ordinary

use, Jackson was unable or failed to repair it, McNeal returned it to him, and

Jackson was bound to restore the price. We perceive no manifest error in the

court’s general finding.

3 We acknowledge the vivid, nearly eidetic formulation in a federal case cited by McNeal in brief: “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” Parts & Elec. Motors Inc. v. Sterling Elec. Inc., 866 F. 2d 228, 233 (7 Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 141, 104 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1989). 6 There is, however, an important corollary to the manifest error rule:

when, among other things, documents or objective evidence contradict a

witness’s story to such an extent that a reasonable factfinder would not

credit the story, the appellate court “may find manifest error or clear

wrongness even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility

determination.” Jones v. Market Basket Stores Inc., 22-00841 (La. 3/17/23),

359 So. 3d 452, citing Rosell v. ESCO, supra. On close review, we find two

such errors in the judgment.

First is the amount of the down payment. The testimony was all over

the board, with McNeal stating it variously between $5,000 and $6,200,

Jackson between $4,800 and $5,500, and the City Court initially stating

$5,500. The Buyer’s Order, introduced in evidence as both Ex. P-1 and Ex.

D-11, states $5,500. The parties’ unreliable recollections of other amounts

simply do not alter this. The City Court was plainly wrong to award any

other amount. The judgment will be amended to this effect.

Second is the identity of the seller. The judgment ambiguously refers

to “Mr. James Jackson, owner, representing the Defendant herein, Car City

LLC, appearing as a Self-Represented Litigant.” The documents in evidence,

uniformly and consistently, list the seller as Car City LLC, not Jackson. No

member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company is

liable in such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited

liability company. La. R.S. 12:1230 (B). While the City Court labeled the

transaction a “scheme” and “fraudulent,” it did not find “fraud practiced

upon” the buyer sufficient to hold the member, manager, employee, or agent

personally liable. La. R.S. 12:1230 (D). The decree will be amended to cast

only Car City LLC in judgment. 7 CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, we amend the judgment to state as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff, ROMONICA D. McNEAL, and against the defendant, CAR CITY LLC, in the amount of Six Thousand, One hundred Nineteen dollars and 00/100 ($6,119.00), together with judicial interest thereon from June 10, 2024, until paid.

Appellate costs are to be paid one-half by Car City LLC and one-half

by Romonica McNeal.

JUDGMENT AMENDED.