Romo, Carlos Jr.

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 15, 2022
DocketPD-0456-21
StatusPublished

This text of Romo, Carlos Jr. (Romo, Carlos Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Romo, Carlos Jr., (Tex. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0456-21

CARLOS ROMO JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS WEBB COUNTY

WALKER, J., filed a concurring opinion. OPINION I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. I write

separately, however, because I believe the majority’s analysis under the sixth Dost factor creates

a standard that would have reviewing courts examine alleged child pornography through the lens

of the “pedophile viewer” in determining whether material constitutes a “lewd exhibition of

genitals.” This standard is unnecessarily difficult to apply, too broad, and unnecessary to resolve

the sufficiency question we are being asked to determine. Accordingly, I concur only in the

result of the majority opinion.

I. The New Standard As the majority discusses, this Court may utilize the factors in United States v. Dost 1 to

determine whether a visual depiction of a child contains a “lewd” exhibition of the genitals.

State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The sixth Dost factor asks

“whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the

viewer.” Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832; Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 140. In analyzing this factor, the

majority states that “Dost pointed out that in determining whether the combined effect of the

setting, attire, pose, and emphasis on genitals is designed to elicit a sexual response in the

viewer,” the relevant viewer may not be the “average viewer” but instead may be the

“pedophile viewer.” Majority op. at 9 (quoting Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832). The majority goes

on to note that the appellate court “did not consider whether the video was designed to elicit

a sexual response in a pedophile[,]” and “the video’s exhibition of naked girls does appear to

be designed to elicit a sexual response in a viewer who is specifically looking for videos

featuring young, naked girls.” Id. In so stating, the Court effectively asks reviewing courts to

look at depictions of alleged child pornography with the mind, and through the lens, of a

pedophile. I believe this is incorrect.

A. The Relied-Upon Quotation from Dost Is Taken Out of Context

First, the majority opinion takes the Dost quotation it uses out of context. Dost, directly after

listing the six factors, continues:

Of course, a visual depiction need not involve all of these factors to be a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.” The determination will have to be made based on the overall content of the visual depiction, taking into account the age of the minor. For example, consider a photograph depicting a young girl reclining or sitting on a bed, with a portion of her genitals exposed. Whether this visual depiction contains a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” will depend on other aspects of

1 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), and aff’d, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987).

2 the photograph. If, for example, she is dressed in a sexually seductive manner, with her open legs in the foreground, the photograph would most likely constitute a lascivious exhibition of the genitals. The combined effect of the setting, attire, pose, and emphasis on the genitals is designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, albeit perhaps not the “average viewer”, but perhaps in the pedophile viewer. On the other hand, if the girl is wearing clothing appropriate for her age and is sitting in an ordinary way for her age, the visual depiction may not constitute a “lascivious exhibition” of the genitals, despite the fact that the genitals are visible. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832. 2 Contrary to the majority’s possibly unintended implication, Dost

does not advocate for reviewing courts to put themselves in the shoes of a pedophile and attempt

to determine if the alleged child pornography is something that elicits a sexual response. See id.

Rather, as the above paragraphs show, the Dost court is pointing out that the alleged child

pornography, while perhaps designed to elicit a sexual response, will not elicit a sexual response

in the average, non-pedophile viewer. See id. Whether a sexual response is actually elicited is not

the focus. The focus is on whether the depiction is designed or intended to elicit a sexual

response. See id.; see also United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Although

it is tempting to judge the actual effect of the photographs on the viewer, we must focus instead

on the intended effect on the viewer.”) (emphasis in original). 3 The Dost opinion did not suggest

that we view alleged child pornography as a pedophile might; it merely noted that the materials

at issue, even if designed to elicit a sexual response, will not necessarily do so in the average

viewer.

B. The Standard is Unnecessarily Difficult to Apply and Too Broad

2 “[I]t has been widely understood that the terms ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ are ‘virtually interchangeable.’” Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 139 (citations omitted). 3 While I recognize that the decisions of the circuit courts are not binding on this Court, child pornography charges are often dealt with at the federal level. Because numerous circuit courts have employed the Dost factors, federal law is persuasive in this matter. See Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 139 (noting federal and state law can be used to assist in interpreting what “lewd” means in the child pornography context).

3 Further, even if the majority is not taking the Dost quotation out of context, I still find the

standard to be unworkable and overly broad. By noting that the court of appeals failed to

consider whether the DVD was designed to elicit a sexual response in a pedophile, the majority

appears to be saying that each time a reviewing court attempts to apply the sixth Dost factor, 4

that court should view the depiction as a pedophile would. However, the majority does not

describe the average pedophile viewer. Should we assume this hypothetical pedophile will have a

sexual response only if the depiction shows children in sexual positions? Or will the hypothetical

pedophile be one who has a sexual response if there is merely a child in the depiction at all?

There is no one-size-fits-all gauge for reviewing courts to use to determine what might elicit a

sexual response in a pedophile, making the majority’s standard difficult—if not impossible—to

apply. Further, because the term “pedophile” is so broad, using this standard could allow

essentially any depiction containing children to fit into the sixth Dost factor. 5

For example, perhaps there is a picture of a baby taking a bath. If that photo is reviewed

through the eyes of a pedophile, it is entirely possible that a reviewing court will find that the

picture is “designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.” See id. This is true even if the

picture was not designed to elicit a sexual reaction and rather was a run-of-the-mill baby photo

taken by a parent to capture what they find to be a cute moment of their child. The majority’s

standard—asking reviewing courts to look at this photo through the lens of the pedophile—could

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Larkin
629 F.3d 177 (Third Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Amirault
173 F.3d 28 (First Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Steen
634 F.3d 822 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Edwin E. Wiegand
812 F.2d 1239 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Robert David Villard
885 F.2d 117 (Third Circuit, 1989)
United States v. David Kemmerling
285 F.3d 644 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Malik v. State
953 S.W.2d 234 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
United States v. Dost
636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. California, 1986)
Alfaro-Jimenez v. State
577 S.W.3d 240 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2019)
State v. Bolles
541 S.W.3d 128 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2017)
Zuniga v. State
551 S.W.3d 729 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2018)
United States v. Barry
634 F. App'x 407 (Fifth Circuit, 2015)

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