Romig v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided March 1, 2017·No. 15-942·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 15-0942V

Filed: November 15, 2016

TO BE PUBLISHED

********************************* LEIGHA ROMIG, *

*

Petitioner, * v. * Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;

* Appropriate Hourly Rate; Rate for SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Travel; Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

Respondent. *

*

**************************** Isaiah Kalinowski, Maglio, Christopher & Toale, PA, Washington, DC, for petitioner. Michael Patrick Milmoe, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On August 28, 2015, Leigha Romig (“petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she received a Tetanus-Diphtheriaacellular Pertussis (“Tdap”) vaccine on August 2, 2014, and thereafter suffered a Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (“SIRVA”). Petition at 1, 3. On March 21, 2016, the undersigned issued a decision awarding $82,000.00, in compensation to petitioner based on respondent’s proffer to which petitioner agreed. (ECF No. 24). Judgment entered on March 25, 2016. (ECF No. 26).

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012).

On September 21, 2016, petitioner filed a motion requesting $16,006.00, in attorneys’ fees and $804.65, in attorneys’ costs for a total amount of $16,810.65 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Pet. Motion”) at ¶¶ 2- 3 (ECF No. 30). Petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses.3 Thus, petitioner seeks a total award in the amount of $16,810.65.

For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned reduces this amount and awards $14,642.30, in attorneys’ fees and $804.65, in attorneys’ costs for a total award of $ 15,446.95 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Procedural History

Petitioner filed her petition and medical records on August 28, 2015. See Exhibits 1-6 (ECF No. 3). Approximately two weeks later, she filed her affidavit and statement of completion. See Exhibit 7; Statement of Completion (ECF Nos. 9-10). An initial status conference was held on October 22, 2015.

During the call, respondent’s counsel indicated that respondent was likely to concede the case but asked for updated records to establish petitioner’s current condition and future prognosis. See Order, issued Oct. 22, 2015 (ECF No. 13). Petitioner filed her updated records on November 5, 2015. See Exhibits 8-10 (ECF No. 14). Approximately three weeks later, respondent filed her Rule 4 report. (ECF No. 15). A Ruling on Entitlement, finding compensation appropriate in the case, was issued on December 1, 2015. (ECF No. 16).

Over the next three to four months, the parties informally discussed the appropriate amount of damages in this case. A proffer was filed on March 21, 2016. (ECF No. 22). The same day, petitioner filed a notice indicting she accepted respondent’s proffer. (ECF No. 23). The undersigned awarded compensation in the amount proposed in the proffer, $82,000.00. (ECF No. 24). Judgment entered on March 25, 2016. (ECF No. 26).

Petitioner filed his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on September 21, 2016.

(ECF No. 30). Respondent filed her response approximately three weeks later. See Respondent’s Response to Pet. Motion (“Res. Response”), filed Oct. 11, 2016 (ECF No. 31). Respondent’s response contains standard language that she has included in numerous vaccine cases since early February 2016, arguing that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that she “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. Respondent further “asserts that a reasonable amount for fees and costs in the present case would fall between

3 In compliance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating she incurred out-ofpocket expenses in the amount of $588.76. See Exhibit 13, filed as an Attachment to Pet. Motion. Additionally, in accordance with General Order #9, petitioner’s counsel indicated in the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs that petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. See Pet. Motion at ¶ 4.

$12,000.00 to $14,000.00” but provides little basis or explanation for how she arrived at this proposed range. Id. at 3.

On October 20, 2016, petitioner filed a reply, disagreeing with respondent’s assertion that she has no role in the resolution of attorneys’ fees and costs and criticizing the range of fees and costs proposed by respondent as meaningless. (ECF No. 58). Petitioner contends that “[t]he Respondent’s position has caused the Court to occasionally, sua sponte, conduct its own inquiry into petitioners’ motions for fees and costs [which] puts the Court in the problematic position of serving as inquisitor as well as the finder of fact.” Id. at 2. Petitioner argues that “this scenario can deny petitioners the opportunity to address specific issues with the requested fees and costs . . . [u]nless the Court requests clarification from petitioner before issuing a decision.” Id.

The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Legal Standard for Determining the Amount of Fees and Costs

Since petitioner was awarded compensation for her injury, she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. § 15(e)(1) (emphasis added). As the Federal Circuit noted, attorneys’ fees and costs were “not expected to be high” due to the “no-fault, non-adversarial system” set forth in the Vaccine Act. Saxton ex rel. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 36 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6377). Reasonable attorneys’ fees are calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours expended on litigation, the lodestar approach. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)); Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521.

A petitioner’s counsel in the Vaccine Program is paid the forum rate unless the bulk of the work is performed in a locale other than the forum (District of Columbia) and the local rate is very significantly lower than the forum rate. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. If these two requirements are met, the Davis exception applies, and that petitioner’s counsel is paid according to the local rate. Id.; see Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 169 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

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