Romero v. Lucero

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedJuly 2, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-00684
StatusUnknown

This text of Romero v. Lucero (Romero v. Lucero) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Romero v. Lucero, (D.N.M. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO _____________________

BOLESLO ROMERO,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-cv-0684-KWR-JMR

FNU LUCERO, et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Boleslo Romero’s Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 2) (Complaint). Plaintiff is incarcerated and proceeding pro se. He alleges prison officials served contaminated food. Having reviewed the matter sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court will dismiss the Complaint but grant leave to amend. BACKGROUND1 Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Penitentiary of New Mexico (PNM). See Doc. 2 at 2. The Complaint alleges that in 2023 or 2024, the PNM kitchen served contaminated meat to inmates. Id. at 4-5. It further alleges “[t]he kitchen staff knew,” and the “other defendant[s] did not inspect the food.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff developed stomach and digestive issues after eating the contaminated food. Id. He filed a grievance, but PNM officials allegedly failed to answer or provide a resolution. Id. at 7. Based on these facts, the Complaint raises a conditions-of-confinement claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Doc. 2 at 3. The Complaint also

1 For the purpose of this ruling, the Court assumes the facts in the Complaint (Doc. 2) are true. raises a claim under unspecified “state laws.” Id. Plaintiff seeks at least $240,000 in damages from four Defendants: (1) Summit Foods; (2) an Unnamed PNM Warden; (3) Captain Rosenbaucher; and (4) Deputy Warden Lucero. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the Complaint is ready for initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). STANDARDS GOVERNING INITIAL REVIEW

Section 1915(e) of Title 28 requires the Court to conduct a sua sponte review of all in forma pauperis complaints. The Court must dismiss any such complaint that is frivolous, malicious, or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court may also dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) if “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing [plaintiff] an opportunity to amend [the] complaint would be futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). The plaintiff must frame a complaint that contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Because Plaintiff is pro se, his “pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. While pro se pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to represented litigants, the Court can overlook the “failure to cite proper legal authority, … confusion of various legal theories, … poor syntax and sentence construction, or … unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Id. However, it is not the “proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the

2 pro se litigant.” Id. DISCUSSION The Complaint raises federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “requires the deprivation of a civil right by a ‘person’ acting under color of state law.” McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must allege that each government

official, through the official’s own individual actions, personally violated the Constitution. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). There must also be a connection between the official conduct and the constitutional violation. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008); Trask, 446 F.3d at 1046. Essentially, “a successful § 1983 complaint must make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claim against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2008). Applying these standards, the Complaint does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim. The Complaint fails to connect any specific Defendant to the alleged wrongdoing. See Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (the plaintiff’s ... passive-voice [allegations] showing that

his rights ‘were violated’ will not suffice [to state a claim]. Likewise insufficient is a plaintiff's more active-voice yet undifferentiated contention that ‘defendants’ infringed his rights.”). To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue any entity or supervisory defendant based on a theory of respondeat superior, such liability is not available under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Prison supervisors and entity-defendants are only liable under § 1983 where the plaintiff shows: “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of

3 constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011) (addressing prison supervisors). See also Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the same standard to entity-defendants). There are no facts showing any prison supervisor or entity defendant promulgated a policy/custom that caused a constitutional violation.

The Complaint therefore fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against any Defendant. Alternatively, even if the allegations connected each Defendant to the wrongdoing, the Complaint fails to state a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. Such claim can arise when prison officials deprive an inmate “of essential food, medical care, … [or] sanitation.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). “Conditions-of-confinement claims have two prongs: (1) an objective prong, under which the alleged injury must be sufficiently serious, and (2) a subjective prong, under which the prison official who imposed the condition must have done so with deliberate indifference.” Redmond v.

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mapp v. Uphoff
199 F.3d 1220 (Tenth Circuit, 1999)
McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges
215 F.3d 1168 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
DeSpain v. Uphoff
264 F.3d 965 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Dubbs Ex Rel. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.
336 F.3d 1194 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
Bliss v. Franco
446 F.3d 1036 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Fogarty v. Gallegos
523 F.3d 1147 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Green v. Atkinson
623 F.3d 278 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Lewis v. McKinley County Board of County Commissioners
425 F. App'x 723 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Brown v. Montoya
662 F.3d 1152 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Pahls v. Thomas
718 F.3d 1210 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Redmond v. Crowther
882 F.3d 927 (Tenth Circuit, 2018)

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Romero v. Lucero, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/romero-v-lucero-nmd-2025.