Rollyson v. County Court of Summers County

167 S.E. 83, 113 W. Va. 167, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 290
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 6, 1932
Docket7498
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 167 S.E. 83 (Rollyson v. County Court of Summers County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rollyson v. County Court of Summers County, 167 S.E. 83, 113 W. Va. 167, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 290 (W. Va. 1932).

Opinion

Maxwell, Judge:

This proceeding in mandamus involves a Republican membership of the board of education of the Independent School District of Hinton.

The board consists of four members, of whom, under legislative inhibition in the act creating said independent district, not more than two shall be members of the same political party. Thus, there have been two Republicans and two Democrats on the board. This year, two members were to be elected, of opposite politics. At the primary election held in the month of May, the Democrats nominated one W. W. Jackson for membership on the board. He is not involved in this proceeding. The Republicans nominated R. R. Keller. Though the relator, Prince E. Rollyson, was not nominated for said office by any political party or any organization or in any manner, a large number of voters expressed preference, for Rollyson over Keller by writing Rollyson’s name on the ballot, in most instances cancelling the name of Keller, but in some not cancelling it.

There are eight election precincts in the Hinton Independent School District. The election returns as certified by the election officials were canvassed by the principal respondents, the president and commissioners of the county court of Summers county, ex officio the canvassing board of election of the said independent district. The board first ascertained that Rollyson had received 1355 votes and Keller 1337, a majority of 18 for Rollyson. Keller demanded a recount. Upon completion thereof, the board of canvassers found that Keller had received 1344 votes and Rollyson 1218, a majority of 126 for Keller. A certificate of election was issued .Keller over the protest of Rollyson.

One hundred and forty-five votes are involved in this proceeding, some coming from each precinct. The original ballots are before us, having been delivered here by their proper custodian, the clerk of the county court of Summers county. Of the number stated, there are 144 which Rollyson contends *169 should have been counted for him. Presumably none of these were counted for Keller either. The other ballot (No. 1 of ward 8) was counted for Keller on the recount, and Rollyson contends it should not have been counted for either. Keller, of course, maintains the negative of these assertions.

The threshold inquiry presents a question of the right of voters, whether Democrats, Republicans or otherwise, to write the name of Rollyson on the ticket as their preference for Republican membership on the board of education.

The act creating the Hinton Independent School District is chapter 43 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1921. Section 5 of that act, as amended by chapter 100 of the Acts of 1923, reads:

“There shall be elected by the qualified voters of the independent school district of Hinton at an election to be held in the said district on the second Tuesday of December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two, four school commissioners, or members of the board of education of said district, two members of the said board of education shall be elected for a term of two years, and two members of said board of education for a term of four years; the two persons of opposite politics receiving the highest number of votes for school commissioner at the said election shall be declared elected for the 'full term of four years, and the two persons of opposite politics receiving the next highest number of votes for said office at said election shall be declared elected for the short term of two years; and biennially thereafter, at each general election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, in "the said independent district, there shall be elected by the qualified voters of the said independent district two school commissioners, or members of the board of education for a full term of four years. The term of office shall commence on the first day of July, next after their election, and they shall hold their said office for a term of four years and until their successors have been elected and qualified.
‘‘Provided, that after the first election of the said board of education as herein provided for, not more than one person whose name appears on the ticket of any party being voted for at an election for member of the said board of education, shall be elected to *170 office. The two candidates of opposite polities receiving the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected, it being the intention of this act to make and keep the said board of education non-partisan, and that no political party at any time, shall have on said board of education more than one-half of the members to be elected thereto.”
Section 7 of the original act (not changed) reads:
“Candidates to be voted for at any election for members of said board of education may be nominated by convention, primary or petition in the manner and under the provisions now or hereafter prescribed by the state laws relating thereto. Provided, however, that no political party shall nominate more than the number of members of said board to be elected, and that no candidate shall be nominated who is a resident of the same voting precinct in which either of the holdover members of said board of education resides.”

It is contended on behalf of R. R. Keller, who is also a respondent in this proceeding, that under the statutory provisions quoted, there can be no voting at an election for a member of the school board for any persons other than the nominees of the several political parties (that is, vote for one nominee of each of two parties), and that where there are only two nominees — one by each of the two dominant parties —nomination is tantamount to election. We cannot adopt this view. We are of opinion that it is not consistent with the quoted language that “not more than one person whose name appears on the ticket of any partjr being voted for at an election for member of said board of education, shall be elected to said office. The two candidates of opposite politics receiving the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected. * * *.” Nor is said contention consistent with the language, “provided, however, that no political party shall nominate more than the number of members of said board to be elected, * * *.” The necessary inference from the phrase that not more than one person whose name appears on the ticket of any party being voted for at an election for membership on said board shall be elected to said office is that the name of more than one person may appear on the ticket of any party as a candidate of that party for said *171 board. Again, the provisions, “The two candidates of opposite politics receiving the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected”, also implies that more than two persons may be voted upon. And, further, the said provision of section 7, that no political party shall nominate more than the number of members of said board to be elected, means, of course, that if there are to be two members of the board elected at a given election, each political party many nominate two candidates. Voters at the election could then support any two of the several candidates of the different parties; the two of opposite polities receiving the highest number of votes would be the successful candidates.

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Bluebook (online)
167 S.E. 83, 113 W. Va. 167, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rollyson-v-county-court-of-summers-county-wva-1932.