Rollins v. Commonwealth

177 S.E.2d 639, 211 Va. 438, 1970 Va. LEXIS 267
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 30, 1970
DocketRecord 7004
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 177 S.E.2d 639 (Rollins v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rollins v. Commonwealth, 177 S.E.2d 639, 211 Va. 438, 1970 Va. LEXIS 267 (Va. 1970).

Opinion

Cochran, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

*439 This is another case arising from racial demonstrations which occurred in Danville in the spring and summer of 1963.

On June 6, 1963, the City of Danville filed in the Corporation Court of Danville its verified motion for a temporary restraining order against certain named defendants and “other unknown parties similarly situated,” for the purpose of preventing mob violence. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of the City Manager setting forth various unlawful acts and threats of violence which had occurred since May 31, 1963. Pursuant thereto the court entered an order on June 6, 1963, temporarily restraining Lawrence George Campbell, Alexander Isiah Dunlap, Julious Emanuel Adams and Arthur Pinchback, Jr., “their servants, agents and employees, their attorneys and all other persons acting in concert therewith” from “participating” in certain acts or conduct therein specified. 1 Also on June 6, 1963, copies of the restraining order were personally served on the four named defendants.

On June 10, 1963, Avon William (Williams) Rollins and many others were arrested for violating the injunction in the presence of the arresting officers. An order was entered on that date directing that rules be issued requiring various persons, including Rollins, to appear on June 17, 1963, to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court for failing to comply with the injunction order, and further ordering that capiases be issued for their immediate attachment. A rule and a capias were thereupon served on Rollins, whose address was given as Knoxville, Tennessee.

After several years of delay, during which unsuccessful efforts were *440 made by the defendants to have the federal courts assume jurisdiction of the cases involving alleged violations of the injunction order, 2 Rollins was tried by the court and found guilty of violating the restraining order of June 6, 1963. Rollins appeals from the judgment order entered December 20, 1966, sentencing him to a fine of Thirty Dollars ($30.00) and thirty (30) days confinement in jail, with fifteen (15) days suspended upon condition of his good behavior for a period of four (4) years.

The temporary injunction order of June 6, 1963, with which we are here concerned, contained provisions similar but not identical to those of the permanent injunction order entered August 2, 1963, against the same named defendants. The permanent injunction, and the events which preceded its entry, including those of June 10, 1963, were considered by us in Thomas v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 656, 152 S. E. 2d 265 (1967).- There we upheld, as valid restrictions upon First Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the provisions of the injunction order except for paragraphs 4 and 6, and the word “suggested” in paragraph 7. 3

*441 As Rollins did not in the lower court question the validity of the show cause order of June 10, 1963, the rule or the capias, we will not now consider for the first time any attack on these. Rule 1:8, Rules of Court. See Williamson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 57, 61, 175 S. E. 2d 285, 288 (1970); Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176 S. E. 2d 309 (1970). Moreover, the arrest itself is not pertinent here because even though Rollins was subsequently convicted it was not on the basis of any evidence acquired as a result of his arrest.

The crucial questions, therefore, raised by Rollins’ assignments of error, relate to the sufficiency of the evidence upon which he was convicted.

Admittedly, Rollins was not a named defendant in the ex parte proceeding in which the temporary injunction order was entered nor had he been served with a copy of that order. It was necessary, therefore, for the Commonwealth to prove that he had actual notice or knowledge of the injunction before he committed prohibited acts. Calamos v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 397, 403, 35 S. E. 2d 397, 399 (1945); In Re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 S. Ct. 658, 41 L.Ed. 1110 (1897).

The evidence as to notice consists of the uncontradicted testimony of J. E. Towler, Captain of Detectives, Danville Police Department. This officer testified that on June 10th, a business day, at about 9:00 a.m. he was dispatched in a car with two other policemen to the Spring Street parking lot to inform a group assembling there of the injunction prohibiting violations of law. He there found 75 to 100 persons organizing into small groups and instructing each other with hand movements and directions. Their “two main leaders were Rev. Dunlap and Avon Rollins.”

Captain Towler stopped his car at the fringe of the gathering. Using his loud speaker, which could be heard for at least two blocks, he called Dunlap and Rollins by name and asked them to come to his car. Both declined to do so, Dunlap saying “If you can’t give me what I want, then I don’t want to take up any time talking with you.”

Captain Towler then spoke to the assembled crowd, which had quieted down at his request. He informed them that under the court’s injunction they could not march without a permit, block doorways *442 or streets, impede traffic or impede the normal flow of business, or create a disturbance by noise or disorderly conduct. If they marched, Captain Towler warned them, they would be arrested.

While Captain Towler admitted that he did not read the injunction order to the crowd, and, indeed, had not then read it himself, he asserted that he had been instructed as to its provisions in many sessions at police headquarters.

We conclude that Towler’s testimony was sufficient to show that Rollins had actual notice of those provisions of the injunction which were broadcast to the crowd that he and Dunlap were leading. Knowledge of the substance rather than exact words of the injunction order was sufficient. See Harriet Cotton Mills v. Local No. 578, 251 N. C. 218, 229, 111 S. E. 2d 457, 464 (1959).

It was also necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that Rollins violated terms of the injunction to which he was amenable while acting as an agent of or in concert with one or more of the named defendants, Campbell, Dunlap, Adams and Pinchback.

Captain Towler’s testimony was sufficient to place Rollins with Dunlap as a leader of the gathering crowd on the Spring Street parking lot. As Towler left he saw the group resume its organizing. Shortly thereafter, he met the same crowd on Union Street, arms linked and marching eight or ten abreast, completely blocking the street. Towler saw Avon Rollins with the crowd, but he was on the sidewalk and not in the street.

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Bluebook (online)
177 S.E.2d 639, 211 Va. 438, 1970 Va. LEXIS 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rollins-v-commonwealth-va-1970.