Roller v. Roller

4 Va. Cir. 239, 1984 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23

This text of 4 Va. Cir. 239 (Roller v. Roller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Lee County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roller v. Roller, 4 Va. Cir. 239, 1984 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1984).

Opinion

By JUDGE S. W. COLEMAN, III

In this divorce proceeding the wife, Frances Marie Hobbs Roller, has filed a bill of complaint seeking a divorce on the grounds of cruelty, wilful desertion and abandonment, and adultery. The husband, Paul Wrightly Roller, has filed an answer and cross-bill denying that his wife has grounds for divorce and requesting that he be granted a divorce on the grounds that the parties have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for a period of one year. Both the evidence and several amendments to the pleadings indicate that prior to June 9, 1983, the parties had been separated, a prior divorce proceeding had been instituted and various complaints of misconduct were made; however, both parties acknowledged that the last separation of the parties occurred on June 9, 1983, and the incident occurring on that occasion was the culmination of their problems which led to the final dissolution of the marriage.

[240]*240This marriage lasted for ten years at the time the parties finally separated on June 9, 1983. No children were born of the marriage. It appears that this was the second marriage for both parties. Frances Marie Roller is fifty-seven years of age and was a part-time employee at Carter Hall Nursing Home until she sustained certain injuries on June 9, 1983. Additionally, it appears that she did some part-time cleaning work for a Dr. Holland. While the evidence does not disclose what the prior earnings of Frances Marie Roller were, it appears that at present she has no earnings from employment. Paul Wrightly Roller is forty-seven years of age and is currently operating a grocery store. His tax returns for the year 1983 indicate that he had wages from the grocery store in the amount of $5,200.00 and additionally received $2,117.74 from interest paid by Powell Valley National Bank and Lee Bank and Trust Company. The evidence further indicates that he does have other unspecified rental income from properties which he inherited. The evidence further indicates that Paul Wrightly Roller has in the past been involved in several business ventures including trucking, coal hauling and the operation of a motor vehicle dealership or garage, all of which the evidence suggests were business failures. According to the testimony of Paul Wrightly Roller his indebtedness is in the range of $55,000.00. From the record, Mr. Roller’s income would appear to be within the range shown on his 1983 income tax return together with the additional rental income.

As to the grounds for divorce, Mrs. Roller testified as to prior acts of verbal abuse, excessive use of alcohol and frequent "arguing and fighting.” She stated that he had threatened her life and the life of her children. Mr. Roller denies the accusations and indicates that she was difficult to get along with. The incident on June 9, 1983, resulted from an argument or disagreement after Mr. Roller arrived home late from his grocery business after Mrs. Roller had his dinner prepared after having worked all day. She indicated that he was drinking at the time. An argument erupted for which both parties blame the other. The argument culminated in Mrs. Roller’s being struck by the pick-up truck operated by Mr. Roller and receiving personal injuries. Mrs. Roller claimed the incident to be intentional; Mr. Roller contends it was accidental. A neighbor, Juanita Orr, was summoned to the scene and transported Mrs. Roller to the emergency [241]*241room. Mrs. Orr offered no evidence which clearly assisted the court in determining whether the incident was intentional or accidental but it is clear from her evidence that the incident occurred during a time when the parties were involved in a confrontation. Mr. Roller indicated that he was told on that occasion to leave the home and not come back if he knew what was good for him. He acknowledged that he had not returned since that date due to a criminal warrant which Mrs. Roller subsequently had issued against him and due to a protective injunction issued on July 19, 1983. A mere demand to "get out" is not sufficient to justify a person’s withdrawing from the marriage, and not returning. Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1974). Here, there was more than just a mere demand, such was accompanied by longstanding problems between the parties and the recent confrontation involving the injury. Further, Mr. Roller indicated his willingness to return to the marriage and effect a reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation except for the criminal warrant and injunction imposed against him. However, Mrs. Roller would not be required to accept his offer of reconciliation if she were justified in such refusal and there existed reason to fear further recriminations or cruelty. The court is of the opinion that the evidence does establish cruelty and reasonable apprehension of bodily harm by Paul Wrightiy Roller against Frances Marie Hobbs Roller which resulted in the separation on June 9, 1983, and will award her a divorce pursuant to § 20-91(6) of the Code of Virginia. While Paul Wrightiy Roller expressed his desire of reconciliation, no such offer appears to have been made and under the circumstances Mrs. Roller would have been justified in refusing such offer. Even had the evidence been insufficient to establish fault on behalf of Paul Wrightiy Roller, Mrs. Roller would not have been precluded from seeking spousal support and maintenance pursuant to § 20-107.1 of the Code or equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to Section 20-107.3 of the Code. See, Breschel v. Breschel, 221 Va. 208 (1980).

Equitable Distribution

Frances Marie Hobbs Roller seeks to have the marital property of the parties equitably distributed pursuant to § 20-107.3 of the Code. While the evidence does indicate [242]*242that Paul Wrightly Roller does own certain real estate and rental property, the record fails to disclose sufficient information for the court to determine that such property is classified as marital property. In fact, the implications from the evidence are that most of the property was either acquired by him before the marriage and maintained as separate property or was acquired during the marriage by devise or descent and was maintained as separate property and therefore was not marital property. Despite the lack of evidence from which the court can classify the property as either marital or separate property, there is additionally no evidence as to the valuation of such property to permit the court to make an award based upon those factors and guidelines provided for by statute.

The only evidence of any marital property is the residence acquired by the parties which is titled in the name of Frances Marie Hobbs Roller. The evidence indicates that Mr, Roller consents to her retaining the property and makes no claim therefor.

Frances Marie Hobbs Roller indicated that she had during the marriage paid from funds which she had inherited $18,000.00 which Mr. Roller used in one of his business enterprises and $20,000.00 which he purportedly intended to use to purchase cocaine in Florida. Mr. Roller denies both transactions. No supporting evidence of withdrawals or checks were offered to substantiate such transaction. Nevertheless, assuming that the transactions did in fact occur, it is acknowledged that the funds were utilized for ventures that have not resulted in any assets or properties available to the parties as a result of the transactions.

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Related

Breschel v. Breschel
269 S.E.2d 363 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1980)
Rowand v. Rowand
210 S.E.2d 149 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
4 Va. Cir. 239, 1984 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roller-v-roller-flacirct20lee-1984.