ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
In this case, the plaintiff, Richard Rolland, a teacher formerly employed by the defendant, Grand Forks Public School District No. 1, appeals from a judgment that dismissed Rolland’s complaint, which sought an injunction prohibiting the school district from hiring any other person to replace him, or in the alternative, sought damages in the sum of $35,000. We affirm.
Near the end of his first year of employment with the school district as a librarian, Rolland received a letter from the school board informing him that the district contemplated not renewing his teaching contract for the coming year.
On receipt of the letter informing him of the board’s contemplated nonrenewal of his contract, Rolland requested that the board meet in executive session for the purpose of discussing and acting upon the contemplated nonrenewal of his contract.
Although
Rolland asked that he be permitted to have present with him at the meeting Mrs. Joanne McCaffrey, his wife, Mrs. Rolland, his attorney, Mr. Carlton G. Nelson, and his associate attorney, Dwight F. Kalash, the board permitted him to have present with him only two representatives and accordingly he elected to have present with him at the meeting Nelson and McCaffrey. The meeting commenced at 12:30 p. m. on April 7, 1976, and concluded shortly after midnight on April 8, 1976.
At the beginning of the meeting, the procedure to be followed at the meeting was agreed to. A written agreement had been prepared in advance as to procedure, and although it was not signed by the parties, the parties agreed to be bound by it.
There are three significant facts to be noted before the specific issues on appeal are considered: (1) the letter informing Rolland of the board’s contemplated nonre-newal of his contract informed him that the meeting would be closed to the public unless he requested that it be opened to the public and it further informed him that the board would “accede” to his request, (2) the transcript of the meeting discloses that the chairman of the board, Dr. Hamerlik, after announcing a quorum present, announced that Rolland had requested that the meeting be an executive session, and (3) after the issue of representation had been settled, the chairman announced the purpose of the meeting and guidelines.
Although counsel for Rolland has enumerated many issues in his brief, we believe
that the issues highlighted in counsel’s oral argument are the crucial issues and we shall restrict ourselves to those issues in our discussion of this appeal. As counsel at the beginning of his oral argument conceded that the evidence was sufficient to justify a nonrenewal pursuant to Section 15 -47-38, N.D.C.C., if the law had otherwise been complied with, we shall not recite the evidence either in support of the nonrenewal or in opposition to it.
Suffice it is that counsel for Rolland concedes that Rolland’s principal, assistant principal, immediate supervisor, the person with whom he shared the supervisory responsibilities in the library, and other teachers expressed the view that there was a lack of communication between him and the students, teaching staff members, and library staff members, an unwillingness to cooperate with library staff members, student dissatisfaction based upon a view of his unfairness and inconsistency, and, in contrast, other teachers in the school system who were not on the administrative level testified on Rolland’s behalf to the effect that Rolland was doing a good job as librarian.
The first issue is whether or not the school board violated Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., in limiting Rolland’s representation at the meeting to two people which had the effect of excluding from the meeting, his wife and one of his attorneys, Mr. Ka-lash.
As the board had informed Rolland in its letter of nonrenewal that it would accede to his wishes as to whether or not the meeting should be an executive session, and as Rolland requested an executive session, he cannot now complain that he was not permitted to have his wife and other counsel present at the meeting.
Section 15-47-38(5), N.D.C.C., limits the teacher’s representation at such a meeting to two representatives of the teacher’s choosing. It not only places a limit on the representatives a teacher may have present at the meeting, but it places a limitation on the number of representatives the board may have present at the meeting. Because of the importance of such a meeting to the family of the teacher, it would be appropriate for the Legislature to consider amending the law to permit the spouse of a teacher to attend such a session in addition to the two representatives now contemplated by the statute, but this is a policy matter, wholly within the function of the Legislature and thus not within the purview of our office.
Counsel for Rolland contends that Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., subsection (1), (particularly the language that asks the board in determining whether or not to renew a teacher’s contract to take action with consideration and dignity, giving the maximum consideration to basic fairness and decency), requires the board to permit a person’s spouse and an additional attorney to be present, notwithstanding the limitations provided in subsection (5) of Section 15-47— 38, N.D.C.C.
Our view is that the specific language must prevail over the general language of the statute, and that therefore the limitations contained in subsection (5) control.
See
Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C.
It should be noted that subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 15-47-38 were all included in Chapter 167 of the Session Laws of 1975, thus the old parts of the statute were reenacted and the amended parts became a part of the section at the same time.
The second issue is whether or not the duration of the meeting, almost 12
hours, although interrupted for recesses including a break for the supper hour, offends that part of subsection (1) of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., which requires that “all actions of the board be taken with consideration and dignity, giving the maximum consideration to basic fairness and decency.”
Counsel for Rolland contends that on two or three occasions, either Rolland or his attorney, Mr. Nelson, asked for relief. An examination of the record discloses and counsel for Rolland concedes that a demand for a continuance was never made and that Rolland did agree to proceed with the meeting until it was concluded, which resulted in a termination of the meeting at 12:23 a. m. the next day. Actually,. it was perhaps a benefit to both the school board and Rolland that the meeting not be continued to another day because the witnesses were present for both sides and a continuance would have most likely required the witnesses to return on another occasion, thus increasing the inconvenience to them.
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ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
In this case, the plaintiff, Richard Rolland, a teacher formerly employed by the defendant, Grand Forks Public School District No. 1, appeals from a judgment that dismissed Rolland’s complaint, which sought an injunction prohibiting the school district from hiring any other person to replace him, or in the alternative, sought damages in the sum of $35,000. We affirm.
Near the end of his first year of employment with the school district as a librarian, Rolland received a letter from the school board informing him that the district contemplated not renewing his teaching contract for the coming year.
On receipt of the letter informing him of the board’s contemplated nonrenewal of his contract, Rolland requested that the board meet in executive session for the purpose of discussing and acting upon the contemplated nonrenewal of his contract.
Although
Rolland asked that he be permitted to have present with him at the meeting Mrs. Joanne McCaffrey, his wife, Mrs. Rolland, his attorney, Mr. Carlton G. Nelson, and his associate attorney, Dwight F. Kalash, the board permitted him to have present with him only two representatives and accordingly he elected to have present with him at the meeting Nelson and McCaffrey. The meeting commenced at 12:30 p. m. on April 7, 1976, and concluded shortly after midnight on April 8, 1976.
At the beginning of the meeting, the procedure to be followed at the meeting was agreed to. A written agreement had been prepared in advance as to procedure, and although it was not signed by the parties, the parties agreed to be bound by it.
There are three significant facts to be noted before the specific issues on appeal are considered: (1) the letter informing Rolland of the board’s contemplated nonre-newal of his contract informed him that the meeting would be closed to the public unless he requested that it be opened to the public and it further informed him that the board would “accede” to his request, (2) the transcript of the meeting discloses that the chairman of the board, Dr. Hamerlik, after announcing a quorum present, announced that Rolland had requested that the meeting be an executive session, and (3) after the issue of representation had been settled, the chairman announced the purpose of the meeting and guidelines.
Although counsel for Rolland has enumerated many issues in his brief, we believe
that the issues highlighted in counsel’s oral argument are the crucial issues and we shall restrict ourselves to those issues in our discussion of this appeal. As counsel at the beginning of his oral argument conceded that the evidence was sufficient to justify a nonrenewal pursuant to Section 15 -47-38, N.D.C.C., if the law had otherwise been complied with, we shall not recite the evidence either in support of the nonrenewal or in opposition to it.
Suffice it is that counsel for Rolland concedes that Rolland’s principal, assistant principal, immediate supervisor, the person with whom he shared the supervisory responsibilities in the library, and other teachers expressed the view that there was a lack of communication between him and the students, teaching staff members, and library staff members, an unwillingness to cooperate with library staff members, student dissatisfaction based upon a view of his unfairness and inconsistency, and, in contrast, other teachers in the school system who were not on the administrative level testified on Rolland’s behalf to the effect that Rolland was doing a good job as librarian.
The first issue is whether or not the school board violated Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., in limiting Rolland’s representation at the meeting to two people which had the effect of excluding from the meeting, his wife and one of his attorneys, Mr. Ka-lash.
As the board had informed Rolland in its letter of nonrenewal that it would accede to his wishes as to whether or not the meeting should be an executive session, and as Rolland requested an executive session, he cannot now complain that he was not permitted to have his wife and other counsel present at the meeting.
Section 15-47-38(5), N.D.C.C., limits the teacher’s representation at such a meeting to two representatives of the teacher’s choosing. It not only places a limit on the representatives a teacher may have present at the meeting, but it places a limitation on the number of representatives the board may have present at the meeting. Because of the importance of such a meeting to the family of the teacher, it would be appropriate for the Legislature to consider amending the law to permit the spouse of a teacher to attend such a session in addition to the two representatives now contemplated by the statute, but this is a policy matter, wholly within the function of the Legislature and thus not within the purview of our office.
Counsel for Rolland contends that Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., subsection (1), (particularly the language that asks the board in determining whether or not to renew a teacher’s contract to take action with consideration and dignity, giving the maximum consideration to basic fairness and decency), requires the board to permit a person’s spouse and an additional attorney to be present, notwithstanding the limitations provided in subsection (5) of Section 15-47— 38, N.D.C.C.
Our view is that the specific language must prevail over the general language of the statute, and that therefore the limitations contained in subsection (5) control.
See
Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C.
It should be noted that subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 15-47-38 were all included in Chapter 167 of the Session Laws of 1975, thus the old parts of the statute were reenacted and the amended parts became a part of the section at the same time.
The second issue is whether or not the duration of the meeting, almost 12
hours, although interrupted for recesses including a break for the supper hour, offends that part of subsection (1) of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., which requires that “all actions of the board be taken with consideration and dignity, giving the maximum consideration to basic fairness and decency.”
Counsel for Rolland contends that on two or three occasions, either Rolland or his attorney, Mr. Nelson, asked for relief. An examination of the record discloses and counsel for Rolland concedes that a demand for a continuance was never made and that Rolland did agree to proceed with the meeting until it was concluded, which resulted in a termination of the meeting at 12:23 a. m. the next day. Actually,. it was perhaps a benefit to both the school board and Rolland that the meeting not be continued to another day because the witnesses were present for both sides and a continuance would have most likely required the witnesses to return on another occasion, thus increasing the inconvenience to them.
On one occasion, when a longer recess was to be taken so that the court reporter could rest, counsel for Rolland was asked if he would prefer an hour or an hour and a half recess, and to that counsel responded that an hour would be “just fine”. The transcript discloses that at about two minutes before 11:00 p. m. there was a discussion following Rolland’s request to sit down with his representatives to talk with them. The issue was over whether the board should recess and reconvene on that date or on a subsequent date. At that point, counsel for Rolland said:
“Excuse me, Mrs. McCaffrey advises me that if we could take a fifteen minute recess it’s possible that that would solve the problem and we could finish tonight.”
Thereafter, a fifteen minute recess was announced, but all persons returned to the room to reconvene two minutes before the recess expired. Following a return to the room, Mr. Nelson, on behalf of Rolland, made the following statement to which Rolland agreed:
“MR. NELSON: I want, because of the hour and so forth, and because of the tension at this hour, I want to say that as I understand Mr. Rolland at this point I think it would be prudent for him to also state in the record we desire to proceed and complete everything. Is that correct?
“MR. ROLLAND: Yes.”
In light of the record, we cannot conclude other than that Mr. Rolland, with advice of counsel, agreed to proceed with the hearing without a continuance. Accordingly, we find no merit in the contention that the failure to continue the hearing to another day or that the duration of the meeting violated the provisions of Section 15 — 47-38, N.D.C.C., subsection (1).
The next issue is over the meaning of the word “confirm” as used in subsection (5) of Section 15 — 47—38, N.D.C.C. (fn. 2,
supra).
Counsel for Rolland contends that the word confirm as used in the statute places upon the board a duty to substantiate the reasons for nonrenewal. Related to this issue is the issue of what is the burden of proof and upon whom does it lie? Our view is that it merely requires the board, after complying with the provisions of Section 15-47-38, subsections (1) and (5), to vote to nonrenew the contract for reasons stated in the notice of contemplated nonre-newal, thus in effect confirming the action by which it decided to send the notice of the contemplated nonrenewal of the contract.
Counsel for Rolland asserts that in light of the changes made in Section 15-47 — 38, N.D.C.C., by the 1975 session of the Legislature requiring the board, in addition to giving an explanation and discussing the reasons, to confirm its reasons for the contemplated nonrenewal of the contract, that the board has the burden of proof. Counsel sees this amendment as placing a responsibility on the board to establish some basis for its action.
Counsel further asserts that counsel for the school board inadvertently erroneously advised the board that neither side had any burden of proof.
Counsel for Rolland asserts that the views expressed by this court in
Dathe,
being prior to the amendments in 1975, do not state the law as it existed at the times pertinent to this lawsuit.
He further asserts that this court has taken a wholly different approach to nonre-newal meetings in
Baker v. Minot Public School District No. 1,
253 N.W.2d 444 (N.D. 1977).
In
Baker
we said:
“When the Legislature amended § 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., it changed the ‘pious hopes and exhortations’ contained therein into a statutory mandate that a school board give serious consideration to damage that can result to the professional stature and reputation of a teacher as a consequence of a board’s decision not to renew a teacher’s contract. Further, the amended statute requires that the reasons for non-renewal of a teacher’s contract be sufficient to justify nonrenewal and shall not be frivolous or arbitrary, and shall be related to the ability, competence, or qualifications of a teacher in his capacity as a teacher.” 253 N.W.2d at 450.
It is to be noted that counsel for Rolland apparently draws his conclusion that a burden of proof is placed upon the school board through that language, whereas counsel for the school board derives comfort from the next paragraph in
Baker
for his view that the reasons need not be proved by the school board but need only relate to the competence of the teacher so that the action that is taken is not arbitrary.
The paragraph upon which the school board relies, follows:
“The findings of the district court are adequately supported by the record in the instant case. The transcript of the proceedings before the Board is void of any testimony or evidence to show that the Board had given serious consideration to the effect the nonrenewal of Mr. Baker’s teaching contract would have upon his professional stature and reputation; it also appears from the transcript that one, if not two, of the Board members based their decision on the school administrator’s recommendation, rather than upon the evidence before the Board, as is required by law; and, finally, it appears that the reaction of the Board to Mr. Baker’s commission of a breach of the rules contained in the Teachers’ Handbook (1975-1976) of the Minot High School as reported to the Board — when compared with his seven years of dedicated, enthusiastic, and cooperative teaching in the Minot public school system as the record discloses — is unduly harsh. We therefore affirm the findings of the district court that the Board acted unreasonably and arbitrarily and abused its discretion, and that the reasons given by the Board were not sufficient to justify the nonrenewal of Mr. Baker’s teaching contract.” 253 N.W.2d at 450.
Counsel for the school board points out that when Senate bill No. 2204 was introduced in the 1975 Legislative session, subsection (5) contained language which required that “the board must sustain the charges with evidence produced at such hearing” and that it further contained language which provided that witnesses should be subject to cross-examination by the teacher or his representative. Counsel fur
ther points out that the requirement that the board sustain the charges with evidence was deleted completely from subsection (5) and in lieu thereof, language was inserted requiring the board merely to explain and discuss its reasons and confirm them.
It appears to us that in taking out of the proposed amendment the requirement that the board sustain the charges with evidence and in retaining in the proposed amendment the language requiring that the reasons be sufficient to justify the contemplated action that the Legislature intentionally avoided placing an evidentiary burden of proof upon the school board. Incidentally, the language permitting cross-examination was also deleted from the bill.
In light of this background, it does not appear that counsel for the school board misled the members of the board or the other board persons present at the meeting when he advised all parties as he did.
When we said in
Baker
that the pious hopes and exhortations of the Legislature had been changed into a statutory mandate, we were speaking of the amendment in Section 15-47-38, subsection (1). It previously read that it was the “intent” of the legislative assembly that “recognition be given by school boards to the damage that can result to the professional stature and reputation of such teachers”. The North Dakota Education Association, in drafting Senate Bill No. 2204, for introduction in the 1975 session of the Legislature, proposed the word “directive” for the word “intent”. In amending the proposed bill, the Legislature rephrased the sentence to use neither of those words. The pertinent language, as finally adopted by the Legislature is that in this area the school boards “shall” give serious consideration to the damage that can result to the professional stature and reputation of such teachers.
From a study of the transcript of the meeting of the school board, which we shall later discuss in detail, it appears that serious consideration was given that matter.
The facts in
Baker
are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In
Baker,
the teacher received praise from the principal, the assistant principal, and department chairman, whereas in the instant case the principal, associate principal, his immediate supervisor, and four other teachers testified negatively. In
Baker,
the reason for nonrenewal was that the teacher had on one occasion left his room unattended for 20 minutes to shovel snow from his driveway, whereas in the instant case four reasons, all relating to the teacher’s ability
and competence, were given, and only one related to leaving his work station, and that was apparently on more than one occasion.
As counsel has conceded in the beginning that the evidence supports the board’s decision, we shall not further attempt to describe it.
Although counsel for Rolland has asked us to indicate the meaning of the next to the last sentence of subsection (5) of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., which reads: “The determination not to renew a contract if made in good faith shall be final and binding on all parties”, we find it inappropriate to do so in this case.
Counsel asserts that the board’s view is that failure to comply with other provisions of Section 15-47-38 is immaterial as long as the board acts in good faith. He takes issue with this view and asks us to determine its true meaning. As neither the trial court nor we have found a violation of any of the parts of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., we deem it inappropriate to attempt to ascertain what the significance of that sentence might be if other provisions of the section were not complied with. We hope that by the time such an issue is ripe for decision, the Legislature will have clarified its meaning.
Lastly, the final issue is over whether or not the record discloses that the board gave serious consideration to the damage that could result to the professional stature and reputation of Rolland in conjunction with its decision not to renew his contract.
A review of the transcript of the meeting discloses not only that the chairman of the school board made reference to the need to consider this matter at the beginning of the meeting (fn. 4, supra), but also that this matter was referred to later in the meeting and particularly near the end of the meeting following a motion by a board member that Mr. Rolland’s contract not be renewed.
In light of the record, it is obvious that all members of the board were made aware of their duty to give serious consideration to damage that could result to the professional stature and reputation of Mr. Rolland by a decision on their part not to renew his contract.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SAND, PAULSON and PEDERSON, JJ., and HEEN, District Judge,
concur.