Rolland R. Ladyga v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
This text of Rolland R. Ladyga v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Rolland R. Ladyga v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 07 2018, 10:15 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Randy A. Elliott George P. Sherman Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Rolland R. Ladyga, September 7, 2018 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-595 v. Appeal from the Grant Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Warren Haas, Appellee-Respondent Judge Trial Court Cause No. 27D03-1608-PC-8
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 1 of 6 [1] Rolland Ladyga appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent because he had not been advised of his right to a jury trial before
waiving it. Finding no error in the post-conviction court’s ruling, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On January 8, 2002, the State charged Ladyga with Class A misdemeanor
operating while intoxicated and Class C infraction driving on the wrong side of
the road. Later that day, the trial court advised a large group of defendants—
Ladyga among them—about their constitutional right to a trial by jury, their
right against self-incrimination, and their right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses at trial. PCR Resp. Ex. 2 p. 2-3. The trial court also advised those
charged with misdemeanors that they must demand a jury trial, in writing, no
later than ten days prior to their first scheduled trial date or else they would
waive that right and would only be entitled to a bench trial thereafter. Id.
[3] On January 23, 2002, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent
Ladyga. Ladyga requested a bench trial, which was eventually set for June 3,
2002.
[4] On June 3, 2002, Ladyga agreed to plead guilty in accordance with a written
plea agreement. The trial court advised Ladyga once again that he would be
waiving his constitutional rights by pleading guilty but did not specifically
mention the right to a trial by jury. PCR Pet. Ex. A p. 2-3. Ladyga affirmed that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 2 of 6 he understood his rights, that he had waived them, and that he had reviewed
the drafted plea agreement with his attorney and understood its contents. PCR
Pet. Ex. A p. 2-3.
[5] Pursuant to the written plea agreement, the State would dismiss the driving on
the wrong side of the road charge, Ladyga would pay a fine of $300 as well as
attorney and court costs, Ladyga would be sentenced to one year in jail
suspended to probation, and Ladyga’s driving privileges would be suspended
for ninety days.
[6] On August 25, 2016, Ladyga filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
On November 1, 2017, Ladyga filed an amended petition for post-conviction
relief with the aid of counsel. The amended petition argued that Ladyga’s guilty
plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not readvised
of his constitutional right to a jury trial at the guilty plea hearing.
[7] On February 23, 2018, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied
Ladyga’s petition, finding that the trial court had properly advised Ladyga of
his constitutional rights and that Ladyga had waived his right to a jury trial by
the time of the guilty plea by virtue of Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.
Ladyga now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 3 of 6 Discussion and Decision
[8] Ladyga’s sole argument on appeal is that he did not plead guilty knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently because the trial court did not readvise him of his
constitutional right to a trial by jury at the time he pleaded guilty.
[9] When reviewing a petitioner’s claim for improper denial of post-conviction
relief, we will disturb a post-conviction court’s decision as being contrary to law
only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion,
and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion. Dewitt v.
State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 170 (Ind. 2001). Moreover, we accept the post-
conviction court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Ben-Yisrayl v. State,
738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000).
[10] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(a) provides as follows:
(a) The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant: . . .
(2) has been informed by the defendant’s plea the defendant waives the defendant’s rights to:
(A) a public and speedy trial by jury;
(B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against the defendant; [and] . . .
(D) require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself or herself [.]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 4 of 6 (Emphasis added).
[11] Ladyga concedes that he was advised of all three constitutional rights at the
January 8, 2002, en masse hearing. But he asserts that the trial court should
have readvised him of the rights he was waiving at the guilty plea hearing.
[12] Both parties come to us with constitutional arguments, but we need not decide
the case on constitutional grounds. Instead, this matter can be easily decided on
procedural grounds.
[13] Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 states:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand trial by jury by filing a written demand therefore not later than ten (10) days before his first schedule trial date. The failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as required by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury unless the defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days notice of his scheduled trial date and of the consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.
(Emphasis added). This Court “has consistently held that, under [Rule 22], a
misdemeanant waives his right to a jury trial by not making the proper request
after having been duly advised of his rights and the consequences for failure to
make a timely demand.” Stevens v. State, 689 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998); see also Fiandt v. State, 996 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(emphasizing that while right to a jury trial is guaranteed by Indiana and
United States Constitutions, the right “is not self-executing” in misdemeanor
cases).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 5 of 6 [14] In this case, the highest level of offense with which Ladyga was charged was a
Class A misdemeanor. As such, Rule 22 required him to make a formal
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