Rolandis Chatmon v. Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
This text of 2020 Ark. 155 (Rolandis Chatmon v. Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2020 Ark. 155 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-19-56
Opinion Delivered: April 23, 2020 ROLANDIS CHATMON APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE V. LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; MOTION FOR JUDICIAL WENDY KELLEY, DIRECTOR, NOTICE OF VOID JUDGMENT AND ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF NOTICE TO THE COURT [NO. CORRECTION 40CV-18-150] APPELLEE HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice
Rolandis Chatmon appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se
petition to proceed in forma pauperis. The circuit court found that Chatmon failed to state
a colorable cause of action in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Chatmon
argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the grounds asserted in his petition are
not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.
After briefing was completed in this case, but before it was submitted, Chatmon
filed two motions. The first, filed December 3, 2019, styled “Judicial Notice of a Void
Judgment,” asked this court to take judicial notice of three documents attached to his
habeas petition. The second, filed February 27, 2020, styled “Notice to the Court,”
attempts to bolster the grounds asserted in his habeas petition. I. Motions
We first deny Chatmon’s motions. Neither motion is cognizable under our rules.
The December 3 motion purports to rely on Rule 201 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence,
which is inappropriate, and unnecessary because, on appeal, we are limited to the material
contained in the circuit court record. The February 27, 2020 motion is likewise not
cognizable under our rules. It attempts to introduce additional factual and legal support for
his habeas petition that was not first raised to the circuit court.
II. Denial of the In Forma Pauperis Petition
Chatmon was found guilty by a Faulkner County Circuit Court jury of three counts
of aggravated robbery and one count of theft of property. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender with a firearm enhancement to a total term of three life sentences plus 360
months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively. We affirmed. Chatmon v. State, 2015
Ark. 28, 467 S.W.3d 731. Chatmon filed his habeas petition in the county in which he is
incarcerated.
In his petition, he alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because circuit
judge Michael Maggio presided over the trial in violation of amendment 29, section 2 of
the Arkansas Constitution. Amendment 29, section 2 prohibits a person who is appointed
to a vacancy in a division of a circuit court to succeed himself or herself. Chatmon alleged
that Judge Maggio was elected to the same judicial position that he had held as an
appointment to fill a vacancy, and therefore, he did not have the authority to preside over
his criminal trial. In denying Chatmon’s habeas petition, the circuit court found that his
2 habeas petition alleged that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction in that he was a usurper of
office, lacked authority, and held title by trespass.” It concluded that “[p]etitioner’s
allegations are not cognizable in habeas [and therefore] no colorable cause of action has
been presented.”
On appeal, Chatmon argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to
assert a colorable cause of action in his habeas petition. Our standard of review of a
decision to grant or deny a petition to proceed in forma pauperis is abuse of discretion.
Muldrow v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 126, 542 S.W.3d 856. The circuit court’s factual findings in
support of its exercise of discretion will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id.
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chatmon’s in
forma pauperis petition. A colorable cause of action is a claim that is legitimate and may
reasonably be asserted given the facts presented and the current law or a reasonable and
logical extension or modification of it. Morgan v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 189, 575 S.W.3d 108.
Chatmon has not asserted a colorable cause of action.
In his habeas petition, Chatmon raised the same issue that he raised to this court in a
recent petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for a writ of
error coram nobis. Chatmon v. State, 2019 Ark. 112. In denying his petition, we rejected his
allegation that Judge Maggio had “usurped” the power of a circuit judge when he presided
over his trial. We noted that Judge Maggio was appointed to serve in Division 4 in the
Twentieth Judicial Circuit and was subsequently elected to Division 2 of the same judicial
circuit. Accordingly, when “a person who runs as a candidate for circuit judge in a division
3 of a judicial circuit, who was appointed in the previous term to serve out a vacancy in
another division of the same judicial circuit, is not succeeding himself or herself in
violation of amendment 29, section 2, if elected.” Id. at 4 (citing Brewer v. Fergus, 348 Ark.
577, 79 S.W.3d 831 (2002)). For the same reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s decision
in this case.
WOOD and WOMACK, JJ., concur without opinion.
Rolandis L. Chatmon, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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