Roland Peachie Andrew M. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 20, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-01216
StatusUnknown

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Bluebook
Roland Peachie Andrew M. Saul, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ROLAND P.,1 ) Case No. EDCV 19-1216-JPR 11 ) Plaintiff, ) 12 ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. ) AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER 13 ) ANDREW M. SAUL, ) 14 Commissioner of Social ) Security, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 ) 17 18 I. PROCEEDINGS 19 Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying his application for Social Security supplemental security 21 income benefits (“SSI”). The parties consented to the 22 jurisdiction of the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The 23 matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Submission, 24 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in line with 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the 26 recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 27 Although his first name sometimes appears in the record as “Ronald,” it is in fact Roland. (See, e.g., AR 194 (Plaintiff or 28 his wife writing his name as “Roland”).) 1 1 filed February 24, 2020, which the Court has taken under 2 submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, 3 the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiff was born in 1968. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 6 173.) He completed sixth grade (AR 47), having attended special- 7 education classes since first grade (AR 184). He worked “odd 8 jobs” from 1997 to 2008. (AR 175, 191.) On June 18, 2015, he 9 applied for SSI, alleging disability since January 1, 2008, 10 because of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, brain tumor, 11 asthma, seizures, and “rage and depression.” (AR 61, 183-84.) 12 After his application and reconsideration of it were denied (AR 13 79-80, 106-11), he requested a hearing before an Administrative 14 Law Judge (AR 113). A hearing was held on May 17, 2018, at which 15 Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational 16 expert. (AR 42-60.) In a written decision issued August 21, 17 2018, the ALJ found him not disabled. (AR 26-36.) On May 17, 18 2019, the Appeals Council denied his request for review. (AR 1- 19 3.) This action followed. 20 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 22 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and 23 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 24 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 25 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. 26 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence 27 means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as 28 adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; 2 1 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It 2 is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 3 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 4 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[W]hatever the 5 meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for 6 such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 7 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). To determine whether substantial 8 evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must review the 9 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 10 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 11 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 12 1998). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 13 or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not substitute its 14 judgment” for the Commissioner’s. Id. at 720-21. 15 IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 16 People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 17 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 18 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 19 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 20 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 21 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 22 1992). 23 A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process 24 An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to 25 assess whether someone is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); 26 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as 27 amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must 28 determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in 3 1 substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled 2 and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 3 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 4 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 5 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 6 impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work 7 activities; if not, a finding of not disabled is made and the 8 claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii) & (c). 9 If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 10 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 11 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 12 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments 13 (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R., part 404, subpart P, appendix 14 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are 15 awarded. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) & (d). 16 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the 17 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).2 18 § 416.920(e); see also Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 19 (9th Cir. 2017) (ALJ assesses claimant’s RFC between steps three 20 and four). The fourth step requires that the ALJ determine 21 whether the claimant’s RFC is sufficient to perform past relevant 22 work. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). When the claimant has no past 23 relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of 24 establishing that he is not disabled because he can perform other 25 substantial gainful work in the national economy, the fifth and 26 27 2 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. § 416.945(a)(1); see Cooper v. 28 Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 1 final step of the analysis. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c)(2); 2 Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 3 B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process 4 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 5 substantial gainful activity since June 18, 2015, the application 6 date. (AR 28.) At step two, he determined that he had the 7 severe impairments of “schizoid personality disorder, bipolar 8 disorder, history of a seizure disorder, chronic obstructive 9 pulmonary disease (COPD), and obstructive sleep apnea.” (Id.) 10 At step three, he concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did 11 not meet or equal any of the impairments in the Listing.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Berry v. Astrue
622 F.3d 1228 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Lingenfelter v. Astrue
504 F.3d 1028 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Kim Brown-Hunter v. Carolyn W. Colvin
806 F.3d 487 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Robbins v. Social Security Administration
466 F.3d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Lund v. Henderson
807 F.3d 6 (First Circuit, 2015)
Bernard Laborin v. Nancy Berryhill
867 F.3d 1151 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Lucia v. SEC
585 U.S. 237 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Moncada v. Chater
60 F.3d 521 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

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Roland Peachie Andrew M. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roland-peachie-andrew-m-saul-cacd-2020.