Roland Anderson v. General Motors LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 2, 2024
• Docket: 23-3107
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-110 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-3107 __________

ROLAND C. ANDERSON, Appellant

v.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00621) District Judge: Honorable Gregory B. Williams ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 18, 2024 Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 2, 2024) ___________

OPINION* ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Roland Anderson, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District

Court for the District of Delaware denying his motions to alter or amend a judgment

under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We will summarily affirm the

order.

Anderson filed a complaint against General Motors, LLC, in Delaware state court,

alleging that he was owed retirement benefits under the company’s pension plan.

Anderson Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Following service of process, General Motors filed a

notice of removal to the District of Delaware, because the questions presented by

Anderson’s petition were in part governed by a federal statute, the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 1-3. In 2019, the District Court

granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because the statute of

limitations had run and collateral estoppel precluded Anderson’s claims. Ord. Granting

Def. Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, ECF No. 31 at 5-8.

Since that time, Anderson has filed six motions for reconsideration, see ECF Nos.

33, 39, 51, 60, 61; all have been denied. See ECF Nos. 50, 55, 64. Anderson today

appeals the District Court’s October 25, 2023 order denying his fifth and sixth motions

for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Notice of Appeal, ECF

No. 1. In these motions, Anderson continues to challenge the District Court’s statute-of-

limitations ruling.

2 We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review

the denial of a reconsideration motion for an abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood

Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). As a pro se

appellant, Anderson is afforded a liberal construction of his pleadings. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).

We affirm the District Court’s order because Anderson’s motion under Rule 59(e)

was untimely. Motions under that Rule must be made within 28 days of the entry of

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). As the District Court correctly recognized, Anderson

filed his most-recent motions for reconsideration about three-and-a-half years after the

Court granted judgment on the pleadings. Ord., ECF No. 64. And while Anderson’s

motions could be construed as arising under Rule 60(b), such a motion would likewise be

untimely because the motions were not “made within a reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1);

see Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that a

Rule 60(b) motion made almost two years after the district court’s initial judgment was

not made within a reasonable time for the purposes of the Rule). Anderson has not

asserted any unusual circumstances that might render his filing timely, and all arguments

now raised by Anderson could have been raised on direct appeal of the original order. See

generally Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999).

1 Although Anderson has had motions for reconsideration pending for most of the time since the District Court granted judgment on the pleadings, his motions for “re- reconsideration” did not “postpone the time for appeal” of the initial judgment. Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984).

3 Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District

Court’s ruling. Accordingly, we will affirm its judgment.2

2 Anderson’s motion for a stay of his appeal is denied.