Rolader v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Rolader v. State

547 S.E.2d 778, 249 Ga. App. 213, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1453, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 468

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 12, 2001

DocketA01A0692

StatusPublished

This text of 547 S.E.2d 778 (Rolader v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rolader v. State, 547 S.E.2d 778, 249 Ga. App. 213, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1453, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

Ruffin, Judge.

Johnny Chuck Rolader pled guilty to aggravated child molestation. The trial court sentenced Rolader to fifteen years, requiring him to serve ten years and probating the balance. Rolader appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked discretion to sentence him under OCGA § 17-10-1 (b), which would have made him eligible for parole prior to the completion of his sentenced incar[214]*214ceration. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Decided April 12, 2001 Moulton & Massey, John W. Moulton, Laura A. Rice, for appellant. Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Dabney Y. Kentner, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) permits the sentencing judge to determine whether the person being sentenced can be considered for parole prior to completion of the prison sentence. However, OCGA § 17-10-6.1, which defines aggravated child molestation as a “ ‘serious violent felony,’ ’1 prohibits the reduction of the mandatory minimum prison sentence for serious violent felonies by any form of pardon or parole. ² Because Rolader was convicted of a serious violent felony, the trial court had no discretion to sentence him under OCGA § 17-10-1 (b).³

Rolader also asserts that the trial court erred in applying OCGA § 17-10-6.1 because that section conflicts with OCGA § 17-10-1 (b). In Taylor v. State,⁴ we concluded that these two Code sections are not conflicting, and for the reasons expressed in that case, we reject Rolader’s argument here.

We also disagree with Rolader that application of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 renders OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) meaningless. Rolader’s argument is premised on his contention that, aside from serious violent felonies, there are no other crimes to which OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) can be applied. Because there are a host of other crimes to which OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) could be applied, this argument fails as well.⁵

Judgment affirmed.

Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.

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Ruffin, Judge.

Johnny Chuck Rolader pled guilty to aggravated child molestation. The trial court sentenced Rolader to fifteen years, requiring him to serve ten years and probating the balance. Rolader appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked discretion to sentence him under OCGA § 17-10-1 (b), which would have made him eligible for parole prior to the completion of his sentenced incar[214]*214ceration. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Decided April 12, 2001 Moulton & Massey, John W. Moulton, Laura A. Rice, for appellant. Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Dabney Y. Kentner, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) permits the sentencing judge to determine whether the person being sentenced can be considered for parole prior to completion of the prison sentence. However, OCGA § 17-10-6.1, which defines aggravated child molestation as a “ ‘serious violent felony,’ ’1 prohibits the reduction of the mandatory minimum prison sentence for serious violent felonies by any form of pardon or parole. ² Because Rolader was convicted of a serious violent felony, the trial court had no discretion to sentence him under OCGA § 17-10-1 (b).³

Rolader also asserts that the trial court erred in applying OCGA § 17-10-6.1 because that section conflicts with OCGA § 17-10-1 (b). In Taylor v. State,⁴ we concluded that these two Code sections are not conflicting, and for the reasons expressed in that case, we reject Rolader’s argument here.

We also disagree with Rolader that application of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 renders OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) meaningless. Rolader’s argument is premised on his contention that, aside from serious violent felonies, there are no other crimes to which OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) can be applied. Because there are a host of other crimes to which OCGA § 17-10-1 (b) could be applied, this argument fails as well.⁵

Judgment affirmed.

Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.

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547 S.E.2d 778, 249 Ga. App. 213, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1453, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rolader-v-state-gactapp-2001.

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