Rojas Martinez v. Clake LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 2, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00685
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 ORQUIDEA ROJAS MARTINEZ; Case No.: 3:24-cv-00685-JAH-SBC RICARDO RUIZ, 13 ORDER: Plaintiffs, 14 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 15 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA CLAKE LLC; EDDI MATTI, 16 PAUPERIS; Defendants. 17 (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ 18 COMPLAINT;

19 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 20 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 21

22 (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 23 INTRODUCTION 24 On April 16, 2024, Orquidea Rojas Martinez and Ricardo Ruiz (“Plaintiffs”), 25 proceeding pro se, filed a complaint seeking relief against Clake LLC and Eddi Matti 26 (“Defendants”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs also filed a motion to proceed in forma 27 pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (ECF No. 2), and an affidavit in support 28 of a request for appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 1). After a review of the pleadings and 1 for the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP, 2 (2) DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice, and (3) DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for 3 appointment of counsel. 4 DISCUSSION 5 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 6 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States district 7 court, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay filing fees totaling $350.1 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), an action may proceed despite 9 a plaintiff’s failure to pay filing fees, but only if the district court grants the plaintiff IFP 10 status. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts may grant IFP 11 status if a plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all their assets, showing 12 the inability to pay the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 13 In their application, Plaintiffs assert their sole income source is social security 14 disability payments in the amount of $600, and $951 in monthly expenses for food, 15 clothing, laundry, transportation, and insurance costs, exceeding their $600 average 16 monthly income. ECF No. 2 at 2-4. Additionally, Plaintiffs list their 1997 Chevy sedan, 17 valued at $2,000, as their sole asset. Id. at 3. The information provided in the affidavit is 18 sufficient to establish Plaintiffs’ inability to pay the one-time fee to commence this suit. 19 Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed IFP. 20 II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 21 A. Standard of Review 22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a plaintiff seeking leave to proceed IFP, is subject 23 to sua sponte review and mandatory dismissal if the action “is frivolous, malicious, fail[s] 24 25 26 1 In addition to a $350 fee, civil litigants, other than those granted leave to proceed 27 IFP, must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). 28 1 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a 2 defendant immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. 3 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537-38 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall 4 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (ii) 5 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”). 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only a “short and plain statement of the 7 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal of 8 the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff’s complaint fails to present a cognizable legal 9 theory that shows the plaintiff may be entitled to the relief sought by the complaint, or 10 alternatively presents a legal theory, but fails to plead essential facts under that theory. 11 Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). “[A] 12 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 13 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations 15 permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 16 misconduct alleged.” Id. 17 B. Insufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Complaint 18 The Complaint is captioned as “Complaint for Fraud, Perjury and violation of 19 Constitutional Rights in Trial Court.” Compl. at 1 (capitalization normalized). The 20 Complaint requests “the court of appeals. [sic] To dismiss or annul the decision of the 21 eviction Judge” based on a series of alleged misconduct on the part of Defendants and the 22 trial judge concerning an unlawful detainer action. Id. at 2. The Complaint alleges that 23 the trial judge was prejudiced and violated a number of judicial canons related to integrity, 24 impartiality, outside influence, and the appearance of bias. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs further 25 assert witnesses at trial committed perjury for economic benefit, and “the two lawyers of 26 both parties agreed against our will and they hid from the judge important information 27 about criminal attacks that occurred in the traila [sic] or RV Parking lot against us[.]” Id. 28 at 3. The Complaint contains allegations of a defect in the service of documents, where 1 “the documents and exvites [sic] [were provided] 5 minutes before the hearing began” and 2 the “[t]he Judge . . . did not allow my wife to defend herself[.]” Compl. at 3-5. Even with 3 the benefit of liberal construction as Plaintiffs are afforded, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 4 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it is unclear how these factual contentions support a claim or provide 5 a basis for relief based on the allegations. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 6 (9th Cir. 2009) (the Complaint lacks sufficient facts for the “court to draw a reasonable 7 inference that defendant[s] are liable for the conduct alleged.”). The Complaint is generally 8 replete with vague, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, and legal conclusions with little 9 to no context as to how the allegedly infringing acts constitute a violation of the law. 10 Plaintiffs fail to provide short and plain statements demonstrating they are entitled to relief. 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiffs assert claims for perjury or 12 alleged violations of judicial canons, these are not actionable. See Meier v. Shinseki, 626 13 F. App'x 706, 708–09 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is no civil cause of action for perjury under 14 California law.”); Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, Preamble, p. 3:23-25 (noting the Code does not 15 provide a basis for civil liability). 16 More fatally, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Complaint. 17 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction over direct and de facto appeals 18 from state court judgments. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A 19 complaint] is a forbidden de facto appeal . . . when the plaintiff in federal district court 20 complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from 21 the judgment of that court.”). Federal claims that are inextricably intertwined with the 22 relevant state court judgement are also barred. Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. Cty. of 23 Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The doctrine also precludes a federal district 24 court from exercising jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges that are 25 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with claims asserted in state court.”) (citations omitted). The 26 doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 27 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 28 inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi 1 Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To determine whether an action is barred 2 under Rooker-Feldman, the Court “pay[s] close attention to the relief sought by the federal- 3 court plaintiff.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation 4 marks and citation omitted). 5 Plaintiffs’ Complaint is precisely the type of collateral attack against a state court 6 judgment barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 7 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs address this Court as the “court of appeals[,]” 8 Compl. at 2, and seek dismissal of the prior state court judgment as relief. As the basis for 9 relief, Plaintiffs assert, “federal law does not allow a debt to be collected based on 10 deception and fraud, nor does federal law allow a judge to make a decision that violates 11 the constitutional rights of a person[.]” Compl. at 3. Although the Complaint is unclear, 12 Plaintiffs’ seem to assert that perjury, fraud, and violations of various judicial canons in 13 the unlawful detainer action amount to due process violations. However, the claims are 14 inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because for these claims to succeed, 15 this Court must find that the state court improperly relied on evidence procured by perjury 16 and fraud in violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC, 307 17 F.3d at 992 ("A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal 18 claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it, 19 or if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court 20 decision or void its ruling.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).2 Based on the 21

22 23 2 The extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not save Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Extrinsic fraud is not legal error by the court but conduct by an 24 adverse party that “prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.” Kougasian v. 25 TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Examples of extrinsic fraud include deliberately serving process at the wrong address and 26 deliberately giving the defendant incorrect time and place of a hearing. De Fontbrune v. 27 Wofsy, 39 F.4th 1214, 1234-5 (9th Cir. 2022). Although the Complaint asserts that the state court judgment was obtained through fraud, Plaintiffs fail to allege an adverse party 28 1 deficiencies noted above, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 2 ||28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 3 Affidavit in Support of Request for Counsel 4 Plaintiffs submit an affidavit in support of a request for appointment counsel in lieu 5 a properly supported motion for appointment of counsel. Compl. at 10. As such, 6 || Plaintiffs’ request is DENIED without prejudice. 7 CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 9 1. Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 10 is GRANTED. 11 2. The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to 12 amend, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)G). See Freeman v. Oakland 13 Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Dismissals for lack of 14 jurisdiction ‘should be . . . without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his 15 claims in a competent court.’ ” (citation omitted)); Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 16 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is proper 17 if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.’’), and; 18 3. Plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel DENIED. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || DATED: July 2, 2024 21 9 JQHN A. HOUSTON YNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 ||claims in the unlawful detainer action. At most, Plaintiffs allege intrinsic fraud because the allegations go to the “merits of the prior proceeding which the . . . party should have 6 guarded against at the time.” Bailey v. IRS, 188 F.R.D. 346 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation 27 ||marks and citations omitted); see also De Fontbrune, 39 F. 4th at 1235 (noting that false 28 testimony of a witness or admission of a forged document into evidence are intrinsic fraud, distinct from extrinsic fraud).